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Innovation ecosystem strategy is often adopted by platform technology owners to seek 
complementary innovation from resources located outside the firm to exploit indirect 
network effect. In this dissertation I aim to address the issues that are related to the 
formation and business value of platform innovation ecosystems in the enterprise 
software industry. The first study explores the role of three factors – increased payoff 
from access to platform owner’s installed base, risk of misappropriation due to 
knowledge transfer, and the extent of competition – in shaping the decisions of third-
party complementors to join a platform ecosystem. The second study evaluates the effect 
of participation in a platform ecosystem on small independent software vendors’ business 
performances, and how their appropriability strategies, such as ownership of intellectual 
property rights or downstream complementary capabilities, affect the returns from such 
partnerships. Built upon resource based view and theory of dynamic capabilities, the third 
study reveals that users’ co-innovation in enterprise information systems, measured by 
their participation in online professional community networks, constitute a source of 







Whether a platform technology can generate significant economic returns often depends 
on complementary innovations in its related fields, as we have witnessed in the transition 
from mainframe computing paradigm to the client/server computing model (Bresnahan 
and Greenstein 1996). In recent years, platform-based competition is becoming 
increasingly a ubiquitous phenomenon in the information economy. The personal 
computer, personal digital assistant, and video game console are stylized examples of 
systems that consist of a core technology platform and interchangeable complementary 
applications built upon it (Bresnahan and Greenstein 1999). To meet the heterogeneous 
needs of users and to exploit indirect network effects, owners of platform often seek to 
encourage complementary third-party innovation from resources located outside the firm, 
ranging from customers, research companies and business partners to universities. This 
approach of complementary innovation has given rise to the model of an innovation 
ecosystem, where the collective power of platform users, developers, partners, and 
consultants is harnessed by the platform owner to achieve the shared success of the 
community (Adner 2006). 
Although we see a growing interest among practitioners and researchers in platform 
ecosystems (Iansiti and Lakhani 2009), there has been little empirical work in 
understanding the formation of innovation ecosystems and mechanisms through which 
they create business value for the various parties. In addition, the few extant studies on 
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platform ecosystems (Eisenmann et al. 2008; Gawer and Henderson 2007; Parker and 
Van Alstyne 2008; West 2003) almost exclusively focus on the platform owners’ 
decisions to open or close their technology platform or platform governance strategies. In 
contrast, there is a lack of understanding of the incentives and concerns on the part of 
third-party complementors who consider joining the platform, and under what conditions 
platform ecosystems create values for them. Further, in the process of adopting a 
technology platform, users often create co-innovations by making idiosyncratic adaption, 
modification and customization of the technology. However, their co-innovation 
activities in platform ecosystems have largely been left unexamined in prior research. 
I aim to bridge the gap in prior literature by modeling and empirically investigating the 
platform innovation ecosystems in the enterprise software industry. Wide adoption of 
enterprise software has contributed to the accelerated competition within the US 
economy and a period of intense innovation in corporate IT (McAfee and Brynjolfsson 
2008). Specifically, I choose SAP, the largest enterprise software company as the focal 
platform owner. This setting represents a good place to begin studying this phenomenon 
for several reasons. First, the SAP ecosystem is large; it includes over 41,000 customers 
and more than 7,000 partners, and has been characterized by some as having its own 
economy (Pang 2007). Second, SAP has taken a series of initiatives to seed 
complementary innovation and foster its ecosystem, such as promoting technology and 
solution partnership programs, building a thriving user community of innovation, and 
opening co-innovation lab facilities to enable co-creation of solutions with its partners, 
etc (Iansiti and Lakhani 2009). For example, SAP publicly certifies independent software 
vendors (ISVs) in its ecosystem, which means that SAP engineers test and endorse that 
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the ISV’s software integrates with the SAP platform. In addition, SAP actively promote 
the knowledge exchange and co-innovation between its customers, partners, developers 
and its own employees by sponsoring its online community network, which has drawn 
participation from more than 1.8 million registered members. Using this particular 
setting, I try to address two broad categories of research questions. The first category 
relates to the formation of innovation ecosystems, which includes questions like what 
attracts third party, complementary solution providers to participate in a platform 
ecosystem; what are the tradeoffs they face when they make such decisions; and under 
what conditions they can better appropriate the economic returns of their innovation in 
such relationships so that a successful ecosystem is more likely to emerge? The second 
category of questions relates to the business values that are enabled by innovation 
ecosystems for various innovation ecosystem participants, such as independent software 
vendors that become part of the ecosystem, or the technology platform adopters that 
invest their efforts to make platform specific co-innovations. 
In the first essay of my dissertation, I extend prior research by Gans et al. (2002) to build 
a payoff model that examines the factors influencing the likelihood an ISV will become 
certified by SAP as a platform-compatible application provider. I stress three distinct 
features of this type of partnership. First, the major benefit for ISVs to join the ecosystem 
is to gain market exposure to the platform owner’s installed base instead of accessing the 
platform owner’s technological or marketing resources, and therefore the analysis is 
different from the context of technology commercialization or markets for technology1 
                                                 
1 Research in the markets for technology literature examines transactions for the use, diffusion, and creation 
of technology. These include transactions involving knowledge that may or may not be protected by 
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(Arora and Ceccagnoli 2006). Second, potential risk of entry by the platform owner, 
together with uncontrollable knowledge transfer during the partnership, brings the 
relevance of appropriability mechanisms such as intellectual property rights (Graham and 
Mowery 2003) and downstream complementary capabilities (Teece 1986). Third, the 
relationship often involves collaboration between competitors, characterized as co-
opetition2 (Nalebuff and Brandenburger 1997). In many cases both the platform owner 
and the ISV provide similar functional modules and compete in multiple product markets, 
and the formation of partnerships may depend critically on the intensity of competition. 
These three factors – increased payoffs from access to the platform owner’s installed 
base, risk of misappropriation due to knowledge transfer, and extent of competition – 
form the main trade-offs to the partnering decision that I study in this essay. The model 
predicts that appropriability strategies based on intellectual property rights and the 
possession of downstream complementary capabilities by ISVs are positively related to 
partnership formation, and ISVs use these two mechanisms as substitutes to prevent 
expropriation by the platform owner. In addition, the model shows that greater 
competition in downstream product markets between the ISV and the platform owner is 
associated with a lower likelihood of partnership formation, while the platform’s 
penetration into the ISV’s target industries is positively associated with the propensity to 
partner. I then assemble a unique data set on the partnership decisions of 1201 ISVs over 
                                                                                                                                                 
intellectual property and may or may not be embodied in a product. For a recent overview of the markets 
for technology literature see Arora and Gambardella (2010). 
2 Co-opetition is a term used to describe collaboration between competitors. It was coined by Raymond 
Noorda, the founder of the networking software company Novell, to characterize Novell's business 
strategy. For details, see Nalebuff and Brandenburger (1997). 
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1996 to 2004 to test these model-based predictions, and find support for the theoretical 
predictions. 
In the second essay of my dissertation, I extend the previous payoff model to investigate 
the business value associated with joining a platform ecosystem and how start-up ISVs’ 
appropriation strategies lead to differences in the returns to the partnership. I argue that 
such partnerships emerge as a new type of inter-organizational relationship (IOR) that is 
different from a number of other types of IORs that have been examined in prior research 
such as joint ventures, alliances, networks, trade associations, and supply chain 
relationship. More importantly, the value creation processes associated with such a 
relationship are likely to be different from those of other types of IORs. For example, the 
primary reason for start-up ISVs to join a platform ecosystem is to signal compatibility of 
software applications and to thereby gain access to the platform owner’s installed base, in 
contrast to other inter-organizational relationships where organizational learning, risk 
sharing, resource pooling or strategic factors are important. I predict that the formation of 
such a partnership is associated with greater market access (Chellappa and Saraf 
forthcoming), positive product quality signal (Rao and Ruekert 1994), and social 
legitimate endorsement (Stuart et al. 1999), which leads to improved ISV performance 
after joining the platform ecosystem. In addition, I propose that due to the risk of 
expropriation by platform owner, the extent to which ISVs benefit from this relationship 
is moderated by their appropriability mechanisms. I test empirically how the business 
value of the ecosystem is reflected in sales, the likelihood of issuing an initial public 
offering (IPO) and the chances of being acquired of the ecosystem participants, and show 
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that the positive performance impacts are greater when an ISV’s innovation is protected 
by IP rights and downstream complementary capabilities. 
In the third essay of my dissertation, I conduct a study to evaluate the value of a platform 
owner sponsored online co-innovation community to platform adopting firms. Drawing 
upon theories of resource based view of IT and firm dynamic capabilities, I argue that IT 
using firms’ co-innovation in enterprise information systems complements their adoption 
of IT infrastructure and it improves the firms’ IT productivity. Organizations’ 
accumulation of co-innovation over time is likely to be heterogeneously distributed 
among firms due to their different strategic pursuits, and it is not easily transferred across 
firm boundaries due to time diseconomies, causal ambiguity and social complexities, and 
therefore it constitutes an important source of intangible assets that complements firms’ 
IT investment (Barney 1991; Mata et al. 1995). Enterprise software, being the backbone 
of enterprise information systems, presents an exemplary context where user firms 
engage in extensive co-innovation. Enterprise software products are highly process-
oriented and usually need to be tailored to fit business practices, where idiosyncratic local 
needs usually drive innovations in work practices (Hitt et al. 2002). To empirically 
identify the complementarities between user co-innovation in corporate information 
systems and IT investment, I construct a sample from fortune 1000 firms and collect data 
on their implementation of SAP enterprise software, their IT infrastructure, their stock of 
co-innovation in SAP’s software platform, and their business performance. To resolve the 
challenge of measuring enterprise software adopters’ co-innovation in the underlying 
software platform, I collect data on SAP user firms’ participation and contribution to an 
SAP-sponsored online community network. Incorporating IT co-innovation into 
 
7 
production function framework, my results suggest that firms with mean level stock of IT 
co-innovation extract as much as 54.5% greater productivity from their IT investment 





PARTICIPATION IN A PLATFORM ECOSYSTEM: 




“We started from the point that one company cannot be the best in all areas. So the 
more partners that we have to innovate around our technology, the more it will be a 
win/win situation.” 
“We have to be extremely clear with our partners about what they can expect. One 
rule is that we cannot protect the partner forever -- [we cannot guarantee] that there 
may not be a time when SAP is forced to enter his space.” 
Hening Kagermann, former CEO and Chairman of the Executive 
Board of SAP (Knowledge@Wharton 2006) 
 
Platform-based competition is becoming increasingly a ubiquitous phenomenon in the 
information economy. The personal computer (Bresnahan and Greenstein 1999), personal 
digital assistant (Boudreau 2007), and video game console (Zhu and Iansiti 2007) are 
stylized examples of systems that consist of a core technology platform (Boudreau 2007) 
and the interchangeable complementary applications built upon it. 3  In the software 
industry we observe that communities of innovation networks, known as ecosystems, 
have been increasingly employed by platform owners to meet heterogeneous user needs 
(Adomavicius et al. 2007; Evans et al. 2006). Industry leaders nurture their ecosystems 
                                                 
3 In this study I follow Bresnahan and Greenstein (1999) in defining a platform as a set of interchangeable 
IT components so that buyers and sellers can benefit from the same technological advance. 
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by coordinating and harnessing the collective power of developers, partners, and others 
integral to the shared success of the community (Adner 2006).  
While platform owners encourage the provision of complementary products in order to 
take advantage of indirect network effects (Rochet and Tirole 2003), there is often a 
tension between the developers of complementary products and the platform owners due 
to the risk that the latter may eventually compete in their partner’s product market space 
(Gawer and Henderson 2007). This risk is illustrated by the quote from SAP ex-CEO 
Hening Kagermann above. To the extent that the platform owner may ex post “squeeze” 
complementors, the latter may have less ex ante incentive to join the ecosystem in the 
first place (Choi and Stefanadis 2001; Heeb 2003). Prior research has used analytical 
models or case studies to investigate this issue from the perspective of the platform owner 
(Farrell and Katz 2000; Gawer and Henderson 2007). However, as yet there has been no 
systematic empirical evidence on how the potential for platform owner entry conditions 
independent software vendors’ (ISVs) incentives to participate in innovation ecosystems. 
Acquiring such evidence has important managerial implications, as it will inform when 
ecosystems are most likely to grow and succeed. 
In this study I try to bridge this gap in evidence by examining how the risks of platform 
owner entry influence ISVs’ decisions to join a platform in a specific setting: the 
enterprise software industry. Specifically, I examine the factors influencing the likelihood 
an ISV will become certified by SAP as a platform-compatible application provider. This 
setting represents a good place to begin studying this phenomenon for two reasons: (1) 
the SAP ecosystem is large; it includes over 41,000 customers and has been characterized 
by some as its own economy (Pang 2007), and (2) SAP publicly certifies vendors in its 
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ecosystem, providing an empirically verifiable metric that I use as my dependent 
variable. SAP certification means that SAP engineers have tested and endorsed that the 
ISV’s software integrates with SAP (SAP 2009a). SAP-certified partners are the only 
ones who are displayed on the SAP ecosystem web site and partners prominently trumpet 
their certification through press releases and on their web sites as a means of signaling 
their compatibility with SAP (BasWare 2005).  
I stress three distinct features of this setting. First, while ISVs have the option to produce 
software that is not certified, certification provides a signal that the software will 
interoperate with SAP, the largest enterprise software vendor. The major benefit of 
joining the ecosystem is the potential for greater sales arising from access to the platform 
owner’s installed base (Chellappa and Saraf forthcoming). Second, the relationship often 
involves collaboration between competitors, characterized as co-opetition (Hamel et al. 
1989; Nalebuff and Brandenburger 1997). The platform owner and the ISV may provide 
similar functional modules and compete in multiple product markets. Third, the potential 
for entry into the ISV’s market by the platform owner, together with uncontrollable 
knowledge leakage during the process of partnering, brings with it the risk of 
expropriation of the ISV’s intellectual property (IP) over the course of the partnership. 
These risks will be mitigated by the effectiveness of different appropriation strategies 
such as intellectual property protection and ownership of downstream complementary 
capabilities (Teece 1986). These three factors – increased payoffs from access to the 
platform owner’s installed base, competition between platform owner and 
complementors, and risk of entry through knowledge misappropriation – are the main 
trade-offs to the partnering decision that I examine in this study. 
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I test my theoretical predictions by assembling a unique data set on the partnership 
decisions of 1201 ISVs over 1996 to 2004. Collecting data from a variety of sources, I 
measure the extent to which ISVs are formally protected by intellectual property rights 
and possess downstream marketing capabilities, the extent of SAP’s market penetration 
into the ISVs’ target industries, and the intensity of potential product market competition 
between SAP and the ISVs. Using both discrete time hazard and fixed effects regression 
models, I find that small ISVs utilize both intellectual property rights protection and 
downstream capabilities to prevent expropriation. In particular, I find that ISVs with 
greater stocks of copyrights or those with strong downstream marketing capabilities are 
more inclined to join the ecosystem. Interestingly, the two appropriation mechanisms 
serve as substitutes to each other and the presence of one weakens the marginal effect of 
the other on the likelihood of partnering. In addition, I find that the incentive of ISVs to 
join an ecosystem is positively influenced by the penetration of SAP platform 
(specifically, ERP) in the ISV’s target industries, reinforcing the view that ISVs partner 
with the platform owner to gain access to its large installed base. Finally, I find evidence 
that ISVs’ decisions to join a platform are strongly influenced by the extent of 
competition between the product offerings of the platform owner and the ISV. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section I present an overview 
of related research and discuss my contributions to the literature. In section 2.3, I 
introduce the research setting and briefly describe SAP’s partnership program with ISVs. 
I present a simple payoff model to motivate the hypotheses in section 2.4. Section 2.5 
presents my hypotheses. Section 2.6 describes the data and empirical models. I present 
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the results, as well as a set of robustness checks, in section 2.7. In section 2.8, I discuss 
the implications of my study and conclude. 
2.2. Literature Review 
This study is related to three areas of the literature: recent work on technology platforms 
and ecosystems, research on appropriating the returns from innovation, and studies on the 
enterprise software industry. I discuss each of these in turn. 
2.2.1. Technology Platforms and Innovation Ecosystems 
A growing body of research has examined how platform owners can encourage third-
party complementors to contribute to a platform to stimulate indirect network effects. For 
example, theory research in this literature has examined platform owner decisions to open 
a platform (Boudreau 2007; Eisenmann et al. 2008; Gawer and Cusumano 2002; Gawer 
and Henderson 2007; Parker and Van Alstyne 2008; West 2003) and vendors’ strategic 
responses to open and closed platforms (Lee and Mendelson 2008; Mantena et al. 2007). 
Empirical work has sought to measure the value of network effects to end users 
(Brynjolfsson and Kemerer 1996; Gallaugher and Wang 2002; Gandal 1995; Liu et al. 
2008; Zhu and Iansiti 2009) as well as the effects of increasing openness on competition 
(Boudreau 2007). 
Most directly related to my own work is research on the strategies used by a platform 
owner to manage platform stakeholders such as end users and complementors (Gawer 
and Cusumano 2002; Gawer and Henderson 2007; Iansiti and Levien 2004). Of particular 
concern is the fine line that platform sponsors must walk between maximizing profits and 
leaving sufficient residual profit opportunities to encourage complementary innovation. 
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For example, platform sponsors like Microsoft will frequently absorb complements (e.g., 
a web browser or a media player) for efficiency gains (Eisenmann et al. 2007) or to avoid 
double marginalization (Casadesus-Masanell and Yoffie 2007). While such actions can 
increase ex post returns for the platform owner, they may discourage ex ante platform-
specific investments by potential complementors. At present, there is little empirical 
work that shows how threat of potential entry conditions complementor decisions to join 
a platform. This chapter takes a first step towards filling this gap by examining how 
appropriability and competition influence the decision to partner.  
2.2.2. Appropriating the Returns from Innovations 
Profiting from technology innovations within a platform-based industry such as 
enterprise software emerges as only a special example of the more general set of 
innovations investigated by Teece (1986). He suggests that when an innovation is easily 
imitated or invented around, profits from an innovation may be appropriated by the 
owners of certain manufacturing, marketing, and a variety of other capabilities that are 
required to commercialize an innovation. These complementary capabilities are usually 
specialized to the innovation (i.e., they would lose value in alternative uses). They have 
two associated characteristics: (1) they are not easily accessible through the market, since 
their specificity give rises to significant transaction costs (Teece 1986), and (2) they are 
valuable, rare and difficult to imitate and their ownership provides a sustainable 
competitive advantage (Barney 1991; Rothaermel and Hill 2005; Teece 1992). Indeed, 
from an empirical point of view, ownership and strength of downstream capabilities 
required to commercialize an innovation are some of the most important appropriability 
mechanisms across a wide range of industries (Cohen et al. 2000). 
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While a stronger position in specialized complementary capabilities is beneficial to the 
appropriation strategy through product markets, some argue that the possession and 
strength of intellectual property rights is conducive to technology licensing and markets 
for ideas (Arora et al. 2001; Dechenaux et al. 2008; Gans and Stern 2003). Recent 
research has extended this literature to examine how the existence of markets for 
technology influences the licensing strategies and survival of entrepreneurial firms in the 
security software industry (Arora and Nandkumar 2008; Gambardella and Giarratana 
2008). Gambardella and Giarratana (2008), in particular, find that technology markets in 
the security software industry thrive when product markets are fragmented and 
technologies have more general application, whereas ownership of patents or co-
specialized complementary capabilities do not have sizable or significant impacts on the 
hazard rate of licensing. Arora and Ceccagnoli (2006) show however that when firms of 
all size are considered, whether the effectiveness of patent protection increases licensing 
propensity depends critically on the ownership and strength of downstream 
complementary capabilities. 
To the best of my knowledge there is relatively little work studying how the ownership of 
intellectual property and downstream capabilities shape the innovation strategies of small 
firms in markets characterized by software platforms such as enterprise software. My 
setting allows me to significantly extend the extant appropriability and markets for 
technology literature, in order to take into account of the fundamentally different nature 
of the cooperative strategies characterizing platform-based industries. Since software 
certification requires the disclosure of sensitive and proprietary knowledge, I show that 
appropriability strategies—including IP protection, ownership of downstream 
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complementary capabilities and their interaction—are crucial drivers of the formation of 
such partnerships. 
2.2.3. Enterprise Software 
Extant IS research on enterprise software predominantly focuses on the user side of the 
market. For example, recent empirical research on firm-level performance suggests that 
adoption of enterprise systems is associated with improvements of productivity (Aral et 
al. 2008; Hitt et al. 2002), market value (Hendricks et al. 2007; Hitt et al. 2002), 
profitability (Hendricks et al. 2007) and operational performance (Cotteleer and Bendoly 
2006; Hitt et al. 2002; McAfee 2002). 
Despite this wealth of work, there has been a paucity of IS research that studies the 
supply side of enterprise systems, and there is less understanding of the economics and 
dynamics of the provision of enterprise software. An exception is Chellapa and Saraf 
(forthcoming), which investigates the strategic considerations behind alliance 
relationships among enterprise software vendors and how firms’ performance is 
conditioned on their structural position in the alliance network. My study, in contrast, 
differentiates the roles played by platform owner and complementary application 
providers, and unifies theories on technology platform, innovation appropriation and 
collaborative competition to provide a holistic view of the formation of enterprise 
software ecosystem.  
2.3. SAP and Its Ecosystem 
Enterprise software is claimed to be the organizational operating system (Chellappa and 
Saraf forthcoming), which consolidates the diverse information needs of an enterprise’s 
 
16 
departments together into a single, integrated software program that operates on a shared 
database (Hitt et al. 2002). I follow Bresnahan and Greenstein (1999) as defining a 
platform as a set of interchangeable IT components so that buyers and sellers can benefit 
from the same technological advance. Third-party software vendor applications extend 
the functionality of the platform and add value to adopters.  
ISVs that produce software that communicates with SAP have the option to become 
certified by SAP and become a member of the SAP platform ecosystem. This 
certification endorses the interoperability between the ISV’s software and the SAP 
platform. The certification process begins with the ISV completing an application with 
the assistance of the local SAP Integration and Certification Center (ICC) or SAP partner 
liaison/manager. The ISV will then go through development, documentation, and testing 
phases to make sure the product is compliant with SAP’s platform specifications. During 
this time, the SAP ICC will assign a consultant to work with the ISV to prepare for 
certification and conduct/document a certification test. Once the product successfully 
completes the certification test, a certification logo will be issued and the solution will be 
listed on SAP’s web portal which is accessible by its customers. For ISVs, the primary 
benefit to partnering is to signal software compatibility and to give ISVs access and 
exposure to SAP’s customer base (Chellappa and Saraf forthcoming). Further, 
partnership gives ISVs access to partner-only portals for product, marketing and sales 
information, sales/marketing assistance, and technical support. 
However, such partnerships are not costless for ISVs. Besides the fixed cost of 
developing a platform-compliant version of the software solution, certification 
application fees and yearly membership fees, there are considerable appropriability issues 
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for ISVs due to extensive knowledge sharing involved in the relationship. Knowledge 
transferred from the ISV to SAP may, perhaps inadvertently, lower the costs of SAP 
entering into the market with a competing product.  
2.4. Partnering to Achieve Platform Compatibility: A Simple Model 
I present a simple multi-stage decision model to formalize the payoff structure related to 
an ISV’s decision to join a platform ecosystem and to motivate my hypotheses. The 
model is adapted from Gans et al. (2002) and involves a start-up ISV and a platform 
owner. The ISV is endowed with an invention and embeds the invention into a software 
product. It faces a choice of going to the market alone or forming a partnership with the 
platform owner, and therefore gaining access to a larger market. In order to sell to the 
platform owner’s installed base the ISV must go through the certification process. Let θ 
be the strength of IPR protection for the ISV. That is, in case the invention is imitated or 
invented around by a competitor, the ISV has probability θ of enforcing its IPR 
successfully (that is, deterring entry). Let T denote the ISV’s downstream complementary 
capabilities, C denote the intensity of competition between the platform owner and the 
ISV in the application product market, and P denote the platform owner’s penetration 








Figure 2.1 illustrates the sequence of the game. If the ISV goes to market alone (i.e., does 
not join the platform), it enjoys a profit 𝜋� in a relatively small market. However there is 
a probability 𝑝� that the platform owner imitates its innovation (e.g., by reverse 
engineering) and enters the ISV’s application market. If the ISV is unsuccessful in 
defending its IPR, the ISV incurs a profit loss ∆�(𝐶,𝑇) with probability (1− θ) from its 
current market. Otherwise the ISV maintains its current position with probability θ. 
Therefore the expected profit of the ISV if it chooses not to join the platform is 
 𝜋� = 𝜋� − ∆�𝑝�(1 − 𝜃) (2.1)  
The ISV can also partner with the platform owner to tap into the customer base of the 
latter. Denote the additional profit the ISV enjoys from accessing the platform owner’s 
installed base by 𝜋�(𝐶,𝑃,𝑇). I assume 𝜋� is decreasing in the intensity of product market 
competition between the platform owner and the ISV ( ���
��
 < 0 ), increasing in the 
platform’s penetration into the ISV’s target industries ( ���
��
 > 0), and an ISV with strong 
downstream capabilities is more successful in extracting additional profits from the 
platform owner’s installed base (���
��
> 0). By going through the product certification 
process, an ISV may have to disclose product design information to the platform owner. 
Therefore the platform owner has a higher probability, 𝑝� >  𝑝� , of successfully 
imitating the innovation. Similarly the ISV has a probability θ of successfully enforcing 
its IPR in this case. In addition, if the platform owner imitates the innovation and the ISV 
is unsuccessful in defending its IPR, the ISV suffers a profit loss from both the platform 
owner’s installed base ∆�(𝐶,𝑇) and its own market ∆�(𝐶,𝑇). I assume the ISV’s losses 
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from both its own market and the platform owner’s installed base are decreasing in the 
strength of the ISV’s downstream complementary capabilities, while they are increasing 









> 0. The expected profit of the ISV by joining 
the platform is  
 𝜋� = 𝜋� + 𝜋� − (∆� + ∆�)𝑝�(1− 𝜃) (2.2)  
The ISV chooses to partner as long as 𝜋� − 𝜋� > 0. Let the relative benefit of joining the 
platform ecosystem be 
 𝑆 = 𝜋� − 𝜋� = 𝜋� − ∆�(𝑝� − 𝑝�)(1 − 𝜃) − ∆�𝑝�(1 − 𝜃) (2.3)  
Taking partial derivatives of S with respect to the ISV’s IPR strength, downstream 
complementary capabilities, their interactions, the platform’s penetration into the ISV’s 
target industries, and intensity of product market competition between the ISV and the 
platform owner, it is straightforward to see that 
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𝑝�(1 − 𝜃) < 0 (2.8)  
(2.4) – (2.8) correspond to the five hypotheses H1 – H5, respectively, that I propose in 
the next section.  
Further, it is straightforward to show that these results continue to hold or are 
strengthened if downstream complementary capabilities or intensity of product market 
competition between the ISV and the platform owner also affect the probability that the 













0. Essentially, these assumptions state that: (1) the additional risk of imitation (𝑝� −
𝑝�) due to partnering is (1) non-increasing in 𝑇, and (2) non-decreasing in 𝐶, both are 
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2.5. Theory and Hypotheses 
In this section I detail my theory and hypotheses. The simple model of the last section 
describes how the payoffs to partnering with a software platform owner are conditioned 
by factors such as IP protection, downstream capabilities, the platform’s market 
penetration, and the extent of product competition between the platform owner and an 
ISV. Below I describe a set of hypotheses that map to the comparative statics in the 
model.  
2.5.1. Intellectual Property Protection 
Inter-firm collaborative relationships that involve a technology component are often 
characterized by extensive knowledge sharing and exchange (Khanna et al. 1998; 
Mowery et al. 1996). To the extent that one party in the alliance relationship is unaware 
of the other’s knowledge acquisition intentions, or unable to define or control the extent 
of knowledge leakage, inter-firm collaboration may result in the loss of core 
competencies and expropriation of its innovation by collaborators if the transferred 
knowledge is not protected by any appropriation mechanism (Bresser 1988; Heiman and 
Nickerson 2004).  
Such knowledge transfer is likely to occur in partnerships between an ISV and a software 
platform owner. For example, during the course of certification in the enterprise software 
industry the ISV may reveal sensitive information on its proprietary technology, its 
codification of business processes or best practices that embody industry-specific 
knowledge, or a particular design interface. A platform owner who acquires such 
knowledge may replicate or invent around the innovations of the ISV, absorb the distinct 
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features of the ISV’s application programs into its own software product suite, and 
compete directly with the ISV by invading its product markets.  
ISVs can employ several mechanisms to protect their inventions, including legal 
mechanisms (patents, copyrights, and trade secrets), first mover advantages, and the 
ownership of complementary marketing and manufacturing capabilities (Cohen et al. 
2000). While surveys suggest that the exploitation of first mover advantages is the most 
effective appropriation mechanism in the software industry (Graham et al. 2009), this 
mechanism may be less effective among firms who partner. Historically, copyrights have 
been commonly regarded as an effective legal form of protection for computer software 
(Graham and Mowery 2003; Graham et al. 2009; Menell 1989); however a series of legal 
decisions throughout the 1980s and 1990s has recently strengthened the intellectual 
property protection afforded by patents, especially for “business methods” (Cockburn and 
MacGarvie 2006; Graham and Mowery 2003; Lerner and Zhu 2007). As a result, both 
patents and copyrights can be used by the ISV to defend its intellectual property (Graham 
et al. 2009). While knowledge leakage may increase the risk of imitation associated with 
partnering, I expect stronger IP protection to decrease the potential loss of revenues 
arising from a platform owner’s market invasion. Therefore, other things equal, increases 
in IP protection will be associated with greater expected payoffs to partnering. I 
hypothesize 
HYPOTHESIS 1 (H1). The better an ISV’s innovations are protected by intellectual 
property rights, the more likely that it will partner with the software platform owner. 
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2.5.2. Downstream Complementary Capabilities 
Since Teece’s (1986) seminal work, strategy research on innovation appropriation has 
emphasized the importance of the ownership of specialized downstream capabilities 
(Arora and Ceccagnoli 2006; Ceccagnoli and Rothaermel 2008; Gambardella and 
Giarratana 2006). ISVs with downstream capabilities will be more successful in 
appropriating returns from their innovations, even when potential competitors such as the 
platform owner successfully enter their product space (Graham et al. 2009). For one, in 
the case of the partnership between ISVs and SAP, strong downstream marketing 
capability will enhance the returns to access to SAP’s large installed base. In particular, 
the success of converting the platform owner’s extant users into an ISV’s customers will 
depend on downstream capabilities such as brand image, downstream marketing, 
distribution and service capability.  
For similar reasons, the losses from imitation of the ISV’s innovation will be lower in the 
presence of downstream capabilities. An ISV with brand image and marketing capability 
will be better able to defend their market than firms without such capabilities. Further, 
these capabilities may be difficult to replicate by the platform owner. While knowledge 
embedded in products can be codified by physical, formal or formulaic means, 
knowledge embedded in business practices or downstream service and consulting 
activities is often stored in human’s head and is less susceptible to unintended leakage 
(Heiman and Nickerson 2004). For example, implementation of enterprise software often 
requires idiosyncratic adaptations to user needs that will be embedded in the 
implementation and configuration of the software products, and related consulting and 
service activities (Hitt et al. 2002). Such downstream knowledge and capabilities are 
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more costly to transfer across firm boundaries (Brown and Duguid 2001; Von Hippel 
1994b) and may also act as a barrier to entry. Therefore, I propose 
HYPOTHESIS 2 (H2). The stronger an ISV’s downstream capabilities, the more likely 
that it will partner with the software platform owner. 
2.5.3. IP Protection and Downstream Capabilities 
Researchers have examined and recognized the substitution effect among different types 
of IP strategies (Graham and Somaya 2006). For example, filing a patent necessitates 
information disclosure which makes maintaining the secrecy of an innovation difficult; 
thus, the use of patents and trade secrecy tend to be substitutes in IPR protection 
(Friedman and Landes 1991; Horstmann et al. 1985; Teece 1986). In this study I argue 
that formal IP protection is less crucial to the expected payoff from partnering in the 
presence of strong complementary downstream capabilities. While the exact payoffs and 
marginal effects are described in my model in the previous section, here I sketch an 
intuitive argument. As noted in Hypothesis 1, patents and copyrights reduce the 
likelihood of knowledge expropriation. However, Hypothesis 2 suggests that the negative 
effect of potential knowledge expropriation will be weaker in the presence of 
complementary downstream capabilities. It follows immediately that the benefits of 
patents and copyrights as a means to protect knowledge when partnering (and, 
consequently the expected payoff to partnership) will be weaker in the presence of strong 
complementary downstream capabilities. Therefore, I propose 
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HYPOTHESIS 3 (H3). The impact of an ISV’s IP protection on the likelihood that it will 
partner with the software platform owner is lower when the ISV has strong downstream 
capabilities. 
2.5.4. Platform Penetration into the ISVs’ Target Industries 
Despite the risks of IPR expropriation, ISVs will partner with the platform owner to gain 
access to its installed base. Depending upon the software market, ISVs may still be able 
to market stand-alone application programs and make sales even in the absence of 
association with a platform. However, partnership with the platform owner signals 
compatibility of the ISV’s product with the platform, increasing the expected utility of 
purchasing the ISV’s product for platform customers and thereby increasing the ISV’s 
sales to the platform’s installed base. Thus, the payoff to partnership will be increasing in 
the size of the platform’s installed base. 
Increases in the platform’s installed base will increase the payoff to partnership with the 
platform owner for other reasons if there are significant (direct or indirect) network 
effects associated with the platform owner’s product. For one, buyers may be willing to 
pay more for products that are compatible with a larger network (Besen and Farrell 1994; 
Brynjolfsson and Kemerer 1996; Liu et al. 2008). Further, in industries that are 
characterized by network effects or complementary products, an industry standard often 
emerges (Besen and Farrell 1994; David and Greenstein 1990; Gandal 1995; Metcalfe 
and Miles 1994). In those industries, being associated with the industry standard is 
critical for the survival and success of producers of complementary products that are 
based on the chosen standard or platform (Suárez and Utterback 1995). The ISV’s 
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prediction of which platform will become dominant critically depends on the platform’s 
installed base. Therefore, I propose 
HYPOTHESIS 4 (H4). Greater market penetration by the software platform owner into 
an ISV’s target industries is associated with higher likelihood that the ISV will partner 
with the software platform owner. 
2.5.5. Competition between the Platform Owner and the ISV 
The effect of competition on partnership success is well documented in the strategy 
literature (Gimeno 2004). Although competitive collaboration, or co-opetition, could 
generate mutual benefits and result in a win-win situation through sharing 
complementary resources or acquiring new skills and capabilities by organizational 
learning (Hamel et al. 1989), empirical evidence often suggests the fragility of such inter-
firm relationship between rivals. For example, Kogut (1989) argues that competitive 
conflicts impair the stability of cooperative agreements due to imitation of partners’ 
technology and competition in the downstream market, and cooperative incentives could 
be offset by industry structural conditions that may promote rivalry among the partners.  
In this study, I examine one facet of competition between the ISV and the platform 
owner: closeness in product market space. Competition between the ISV and the platform 
owner will be greater when the products of the two vendors are more similar. Further, the 
losses from imitation of the ISV’s product will be higher when the two vendors offer 
more similar products. Since partnering increases the probability of imitation by the 
platform owner, these losses will in expectation be higher with partnering. That is, the 
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expected costs from increased competition with the platform owner will be higher under 
partnering.  
Anticipating these effects, an ISV with a more similar product portfolio to the platform 
owner will have an attenuated incentive to join the ecosystem. Therefore, I propose 
HYPOTHESIS 5 (H5). The greater the similarity of products with the platform owner, 
the less likely that the ISV will partner with the software platform owner. 
2.6. Methods and Measures 
2.6.1. Sample 
I test my theoretical predictions using a longitudinal data set of 1201 ISVs over the 
period of 1996-2004. My sample begins in 1996 since I observe no such partnerships in 
my sample prior to 1996 (more details will be provided later in the section of variable 
definition). 
A study of partnerships within the enterprise software industry based solely on publicly 
traded firms in the COMPUSTAT universe is likely to suffer from a serious selection 
bias: well-established public software firms may have starkly different incentives to form 
inter-firm linkages from those of privately held new ventures or start-ups (Cockburn and 
MacGarvie 2006; Shan 1990); moreover, the majority of ISVs are privately owned. 
However, collecting comprehensive, reliable information on small, private firms over an 
extended time period is extremely difficult. In this study I use the CorpTech directory of 
technology companies. The dataset has detailed information on 100,000 public and 
private firms, including information on geography, sales and employees, product 
offerings, industry classification, ownership, funding sources and executives.  
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To construct a representative sample of ISVs in enterprise software industry that are 
likely to form partnerships with SAP, I compare the product characteristics between 
existing SAP partners and those in the CorpTech data set. The first step involves 
retrieving a complete list of SAP’s current software partners. SAP publishes the directory 
of all its certified partners as well as their solution offerings on its Internet portal,4 and a 
searching using the terms “Country: United States” and “Partner Category: Independent 
Software Vendor” yields a list of 411 software firms that are existing SAP partners. 
Comparing this list with the CorpTech directory generates 206 matching records. One of 
the key advantages of the CorpTech database is that it records the product portfolio of 
each company and assigns each product into 3-digit product classes.5 I retrieve distinct 2-
digit level product classification codes of the 206 existing SAP software partners, and try 
to find the most frequent software product codes in the product portfolio of the partnering 
firms. Two product codes, SOF-MA (manufacturing software, 61 firms) and SOF-WD 
(warehousing/distribution software, 44 firms), emerge as the leading products that 
partnering firms produce. I subsequently define my sample as firms that operate in the 
United States, with primary industry of computer software (identified by CorpTech 
company primary industry code “SOF”), and that have ever produced SOF-MA or SOF-
WD products during the sampling period. The query generates 2175 ISVs from the 
CorpTech database. As I am primarily interested in the drivers of alliance formation for 
small, entrepreneurial software companies, I further remove established incumbents from 
my sample firms. Consistent with prior literature (Petersen and Rajan 1994; Puranam et 
                                                 
4 http://www.sap.com/ecosystem/customers/directories/searchpartner.epx 
5 CorpTech uses a proprietary, 3-digit level product classification system. For example, a product coded as 
“AUT-AT-DA” means “Factory automation”-“Automatic test equipment”-“Analog/digital component”. 
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al. 2006), I refine the ISV firms to those established after 1980, with sales less than $500 
million and number of employees less than 1000 throughout the sampling period. As an 
additional check, I manually go through the business description field in the CorpTech 
data set for each company, and visit the website of each firm (if the company no longer 
exists, I visit the archival web site from www.archive.org instead) to confirm that the 
ISVs indeed produce enterprise software applications, and delete those that do not fit the 
profile. My final sample consists of 1201 ISV firms. 
2.6.2. Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is whether an ISV firm enters into partnership with SAP and 
develops platform compliant application software for the first time in a particular year. 
As my study is longitudinal in nature, using the list of partnering ISV firms retrieved 
from SAP’s web portal as the dependent variable is problematic for several reasons. First, 
the list of partnering ISVs reflects only the current snapshot but fails to capture historical 
partnering events. SAP’s policy requires that partnering ISVs to recertify their products 
for compatibility and renew their partnerships every 3 years. Failure to recertify would 
result in removal of the company from the SAP’s web portal. Second, the enterprise 
software industry experiences considerable entry and exit during the sampling period, 
with some of the once partnering firms being acquired by or merged with other 
companies. Third, information about the exact date on which the partnership is formed is 
missing from SAP’s web portal, which makes the determination of the year of partnership 
formation impossible. 
As an alternative to overcome the aforementioned difficulties, I identify the alliance 
formation events with SAP through press releases. To test the viability of this approach, I 
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experiment with the existing partner list retrieved from SAP web portal to see whether a 
matching press release could be found for each firm. I use the search term 
“COMPANY(SAP) and COMPANY(XYZ) and BODY(certification or certify or certified 
or partner or partnership or alliance)” to search against the Lexis/Nexis news wire 
services database, where “XYZ” is replaced by the ISV’s name. For a random sample (60 
firms) of the 411 existing SAP partners, I am able to find a matching news release for 
over 98% of the firms, which confirms the validity of using press releases to determine 
the formation of alliances. I subsequently apply the same algorithm to my sample 
universe and retrieve 148 alliance events between sample ISVs and SAP. It is notable that 
there has been no such alliance activity prior to 1996. I further exclude pure joint 
development, marketing or distribution alliances and alliances after 2005 from the list. In 
addition, for ISVs that have multiple SAP alliance press releases (due to certification for 
multiple products, new versions of same product, or different interface certifications), I 
use the first such event as the time the ISV joins SAP’s platform ecosystem. I identify a 
total of 39 first-time alliance events for the sample ISVs. 
The observation unit for the dependent variable is firm-year, with the variable set to 1 if a 
first-time alliance is formed in that year; 0 otherwise. I treat partnering with SAP as an 
absorbing state, as there are no obvious reasons for a partnering ISV to make its certified 
product incompatible with SAP’s platform thus quitting from the platform ecosystem. 
Post-alliance observations are deleted as the firms are no longer exposed to the hazard of 
forming partnership with SAP. The 1201 sample ISV firms generate 6381 firm-year 
observations. The data is structured as an unbalanced panel. 
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2.6.3. Independent Variables 
Patents. I generate the ISV patent stock variable by using the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office (USPTO) CASSIS Patents BIB database. While the decision to partner will be 
influenced by a vendor’s stock of software patents, some vendors may have inventions in 
related areas such as manufacturing control or data acquisition equipment. Accordingly, I 
restrict my patent measure to software patents only (however my results are similar if I 
include both software and non-software patents). To identify software patents, prior 
research has used USPTO class-subclass combinations (Graham and Mowery 2006; Hall 
and MacGarvie 2006) while others have used a Boolean query that searches for keywords 
in patent text (Bessen and Hunt 2004). I follow Hall and MacGarvie (2006) in using the 
intersection of these two methods to identify software patents.6 As a robustness check, I 
also use the union of the software patent sets identified by the two methods and derive 
alternative measures; my empirical results are robust to the different measures of patents 
stock. To account for the heterogeneity in the impact and importance of innovation, I use 
Hall-Jaffe-Trajtenberg weighted stock of patent grants by incorporating forward patent 
citations (Hall et al. 2001). 
Patent effectiveness. An ISV’s stock of patents is partly determined by its patent 
propensity, which may in turn be influenced by variations in the effectiveness of patent 
protection in the different sub-segments in the software industry in which the ISV 
participates (Arora and Ceccagnoli 2006). To examine whether variance in patents does 
indeed capture sub-segment variation in the strength of patent protection, I construct the 
                                                 




variable patent effectiveness obtained from the patent inventor survey jointly conducted 
by Georgia Tech and the Japanese Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry 
(RIETI). 7  The survey asks patent inventors to assess the importance of patents in 
protecting their firm’s competitive advantage for the commercial product/process/service 
based on the patented invention in a 5-point Likert scale. I computed averages of the 
Likert responses at the 5-digit international patent class (IPC) level and linked to my data 
by the corresponding IPC class of the patents owned by ISVs in my sample. The resulting 
firm-level patent effectiveness score represents the average of patent effectiveness scores 
of all patents owned by the focal firm. A similar measure has been frequently used in the 
literature on innovation and appropriability as a summary indicator of the net benefits 
from patenting (Arora and Ceccagnoli 2006; Cohen et al. 2000; Gans et al. 2002). 
Copyrights. The cumulative number of software copyrights for each firm-year is obtained 
from the United States Copyright Office. I retrieve the complete set of copyrights that are 
described as “computer files” within that office’s classification scheme.  
Downstream capability. One important measure of a firm’s marketing capability is 
trademarks (Gao and Hitt 2004), which is a word, phrase, symbol or design, or 
combination of words, phrases, symbols or designs that identifies and distinguishes the 
source of the goods or services of one party from those of others. In this study I use the 
total number of software trademarks as a proxy for downstream marketing capabilities 
(Fosfuri et al. 2008), and obtain the data from the USPTO CASSIS Trademarks BIB 
                                                 
7 The survey was conducted in 2008 and was directed to the inventors of a random sample of the granted 
U.S. patents filed between 2000 and 2003 and included in the OECD’s Triadic Patent Families, e.g., filed 
with both the Japanese Patent Office (JPO) and the European Patent Office (EPO) and granted in the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). More information on the survey can be found in Jung 
(2009) and Walsh and Nagaoka (2009). 
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database. For each trademark listed on USPTO, a Live/Dead indicator is assigned, which 
could be Registered, Pending or Dead. Dead marks may have been abandoned, cancelled, 
or expired. Application abandonment usually happens as a result of failure to respond to 
an Office Action or a Notice of Allowance. Canceled trademarks are due to the 
registrant's failure to file the required continued use affidavit under Section 8 of the 
Trademark Act. An expired trademark results from the registrant’s failure to renew the 
trademark registration at the end of the registration period. To construct the trademark 
variable, I first retrieve all the trademark records for the sample ISVs, including pending 
and dead records. The next step involves devising a search term to be applied to the 
“goods and services” description of trademark records to retain only those software 
trademarks.8 Afterwards, I determine the life span of each trademark to derive the active 
trademarks for each firm-year. Pending and abandoned trademarks are removed as a 
formal trademark registration is never granted. For canceled trademarks, registration date 
and cancelation date are used to determine the life span. For expired trademarks, I 
calculate the expiration date as 10 years after the registration date, or 10 years after the 
latest renew date if there has been any renewal record for the trademark.  
Target industry penetration. In order to construct a valid measure of SAP’s market 
penetration in the ISV’s target industries, I obtain SAP installation data in the United 
States from Harte-Hanks CI Technology Database, and calculate SAP’s penetration rate 
in the companies of the CI database by each industry-year. Harte Hanks surveys over 
300,000 establishments in the United States per year on their use of information 
                                                 
8 After conducting thorough content analysis of 100 software trademarks, I construct the key words as: 
“computer application” or “computer software” or “computer program” or “operating software” or 
“business application” or “software application” or “application software” or “enterprise system” or 
“accounting system” or “application program”. 
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technology; my sample of data from the CI database includes all establishments with over 
100 employees.9 For each company in the CI database, I treat it as penetrated by SAP 
after its first installation of any module of SAP’s enterprise software suite. To define the 
industries of SAP’s user firms, I find that SAP uses a “master code” system to classify its 
customers, which is composed of indicators for 33 vertical industries, such as aerospace 
& defense, banking, and chemical, to mention a few. I match the SAP master codes with 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes (the match table is available upon request), 
and determine the master code for each company in the CI database by referencing the 
table. I then calculate employee-weighted penetration rate in the CI universe of firms for 
each master code-year as a measure of the size of SAP’s network. 10 Next, I read the 
target industries description of the 1201 sample ISV firms and create master code 
dummies for each of them (CorpTech data has a field that describes the industries that a 
firm sells its product and service to). Variable Target industry penetration is defined as 
the average of SAP penetration rate across all the industries that a particular ISV serves. 
However, for a small portion of the ISV firms, the CorpTech database does not give an 
explicit target industry description, but rather describe the firm as “selling products and 
services to multiple industries”. In that case, I use the average SAP penetration rate 
across all 33 industries as the value of the penetration variable. I also create an indicator 
variable multiple industry to control for potential bias introduced by this coding. The 
                                                 
9 The CI database has been extensively used in the information systems and economics fields to measure IT 
investment (Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2003; Dewan et al. 2007), including investment in enterprise software 
(Hitt et al. 2002). Prior work has shown that this database is quite representative of the distribution of large 
establishments (the ones most likely to use SAP) in the U.S. economy (Forman et al. 2005). 
10 As software license subscription is usually based on the number of concurrent users (Hitt et al. 2002), I 
use employee-weighted penetration rate instead of sales-weighted. 
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variable is set to 1 if a firm’s precise target industry is not given in the CorpTech 
database. 
Competition. The variety of its product portfolio is indicative of a software firm’s scope 
of economic activity (Cottrell and Nault 2004), and the similarity in product market space 
between the ISV and SAP (and similarly, the intensity of competition) can be measured 
by how much their application product offerings overlap. Product portfolio information is 
obtained from the CorpTech database. The CorpTech database has an internal “2-digit” 
classification system that indicates the products produced by software firms (for example, 
Software-Accounting and Software-Warehousing/Distribution are examples of “2-digit” 
classes). I retrieve the distinct 2-digit product codes for each ISV in each year, and 
compare those with SAP’s 2-digit product portfolio in the same year. 2-digit product 
codes are used as a proxy for product lines because they correspond very well to the 
functional modules of enterprise software. The variable product overlap is defined as the 
ratio of the number of common product lines (produced by both an ISV and SAP) to the 
number of ISV’s product lines for each firm-year. As a robustness check, I also construct 
alternative measures of product overlap by dividing the number of common product lines 
by the number of SAP’s product lines for each firm-year and the results are similar. Note 
product overlap is a time-varying covariate as an ISV may have entered into a related 
software market segment, introduced new software product lines, or exited from certain 
product markets. 
2.6.4. Control Variables 
I control for various firm level drivers that could influence an ISV’s decision to join the 
SAP ecosystem. Firm size is measured by an ISV’s annual sales, obtained directly from 
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the CorpTech database. Firm age is derived by referencing the year that an ISV was 
established. To allow for nonlinear effect of age, I add both linear and quadratic terms of 
age. I also add an ownership indicator variable to allow for different propensities for 
alliance formation between public and privately held companies. The variable public is 
set to 1 if an ISV is a publicly traded company; 0 otherwise.  
I also include controls for firm funding sources. Software firms’ source of capital is likely 
to affect their decision to form partnership for several reasons. First, software firms 
backed by corporate investment or venture capital are more likely to accumulate social 
capital that is unavailable to other start-ups. In addition, bargaining intermediaries such as 
venture capitalists can reduce the cost of forging a contract between the parties and so 
increase the likelihood of partnership (Colombo et al. 2006; Gans et al. 2002). The 
CorpTech database classifies the funding sources into corporate investment, private 
investment or venture capital investment. I create 3 dummy variables, cinvest, pinvest and 
vinvest, respectively, to control for the effect of firms’ source of funding on alliance 
formation. 
As a control for ISVs’ innovative capability, I obtain the ISVs’ cumulative number of 
publications in academic journals or conferences in each year via the Web of Science 
database. To account for the importance of publications, I also retrieve forward citation 
data for all the publications and construct citation weighted publications.  
2.6.5. Model Specification 
I use hazard models to study the decisions of ISVs to partner with SAP. The hazard 
model (also referred to in various literatures as survival, duration or event history model) 
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is appropriate since it relaxes normality assumption in most linear regressions and allows 
corrections for right censoring, truncation, late entry, time-varying covariates and 
duration dependence (Cameron and Trivedi 2005). Hazard analysis models the 
underlying and unobserved hazard rate, which is the instantaneous rate at which hazard 
events occur at time t, given that the subject under study has survived until time t.  
I chose the Cox proportional hazard model as a starting point for empirical analysis. The 
Cox proportional hazard model is a semi-parametric specification that makes no 
assumption about the shape of the baseline hazard over time, and assumes that covariates 
multiplicatively shift the baseline hazard function. Applying the hazard model to my 
specification, I have ℎ��𝑡�𝒙�,���� = ℎ�(𝑡) 𝑒𝑥𝑝�𝑥�,���𝜷�, and 
 
𝑥�,���𝜷 = 𝛽�𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡�,��� + 𝛽�𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡�,��� + 𝛽�𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘�,���
+ 𝛽�𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 × 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘�,��� + 𝛽�𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑦𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡�,���
× 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘�,��� + 𝛽�𝑆𝐴𝑃_𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛�,���
+ 𝛽�𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡_𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑝�,��� + 𝛽�𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠�,��� + 𝛽�𝑎𝑔𝑒�,���
+ 𝛽�𝑎𝑔𝑒�,���� + 𝛽��𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐�,��� + 𝛽��𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡�,���
+ 𝛽��𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡�,��� + 𝛽��𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑡�,��� + 𝛽��𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛�,��� 
(2.9)  
Where ℎ��𝑡�𝒙�,���� is the conditional instantaneous hazard rate for ISV i in year t, and 
ℎ�(𝑡) is the unspecified baseline hazard in year t. I lag all independent variables by one 
year to allow for causal interpretation. Note there is no intercept in the Cox model as it is 
subsumed into the baseline hazard function and unidentified. 
As an alternative estimation method, I use a (firm) fixed effects linear probability model 
to study the event history (Wooldridge 2001), allowing for firm-level unobserved 
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heterogeneity. I follow prior literature in using the fixed effects linear probability model 
to study outcomes with limited dependent variables (Forman et al. 2009; Gowrisankaran 
and Stavins 2004; Miller and Tucker 2009) due to the known difficulties of controlling 
for panel-level unobservables using fixed effects in nonlinear models such as the probit 
or logit.11 In order to estimate the linear probability model, the data are arranged into 
cross-sectional time series format. The unit of observation is a firm-year, and the event is 
the binary decision that an ISV joins the platform ecosystem of SAP. If the event happens 
for an ISV in a particular year, all post-event observations are removed from the sample 
as I assume partnering is an absorbing state. Otherwise the observation for the ISV is 




Table 2.1 provides summary statistics of the variables and controls, as well as the 
correlation matrix. The descriptive statistics indicate that ISVs are characterized by 
significant heterogeneity along key dimensions, such as ownership of IPRs (copyrights 
range from 0 to 498), downstream capability (trademarks range from 0 to 23), SAP 
penetration (ranges from 0% to 93%), and product portfolio overlap (ranges from 0% to 
100%). It is worth noting that patents are far less frequently used by start-up ISVs in the 
enterprise software industry (with mean of .14 patent per firm) than copyrights (mean 
                                                 
11  For a full discussion of these issues, see Wooldridge (2001). Unconditional fixed effects provide 
inconsistent estimates using probit or logit models because of the well-known incidental parameters 
problem. Further, conditional fixed effects models drop panels where there is no variation in the dependent 
variable—in my setting, this would include any ISV that does not eventually become a partner. 
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2.03 per firm), consistent with prior literature suggesting that copyrights remain an 
important source of IP protection for enterprise software since most innovations are in 
business processes, routines and best practices that may not be amenable to patenting 
(Mann and Sager 2007; Menell 1989).  
Results from Cox proportional hazard survival models are presented in Table 2.2. In all 
regressions I use the log transformation of patents, patent effectiveness, copyrights, 
trademarks and sales (that is, log(1+x) to avoid taking log of zeros except for patent 
effectiveness, which is strictly positive) to control for over dispersion and skewness in 
these variables. Variables are entered into the regression sequentially with the log 
likelihood reported for each model. Column 1 presents the baseline model where only 
variables for IP protection, downstream capabilities and publications are included. In 
column 2 I add interactions between IP protection and downstream capability. Column 3 
includes the measurement of SAP’s penetration rate in the ISV’s target industries, as well 
as product portfolio overlap between SAP and ISVs. I add the full set of control variables 
in Column 4. Finally, in column 5 I add patent effectiveness to control for potential 




Table 2.1 Summary Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
  Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 Partneri,t 0.006 0.078 0 1 1.000              
2 Patentsi,t-1 0.138 0.682 0 13 0.028 1.000             
3 Patent effectivenessi,t-1 1.028 0.239 1 5 0.047 0.472 1.000            
4 Copyrightsi,t-1 2.031 13.187 0 498 0.010 0.009 0.003 1.000           
5 Trademarksi,t-1 0.806 2.009 0 23 0.061 0.334 0.126 0.279 1.000          
6 SAP penetrationi,t-1 0.226 0.153 0 0.932 0.023 0.092 0.027 0.007 0.089 1.000         
7 Product overlapi,t-1 0.418 0.327 0 1 -0.026 -0.046 -0.024 -0.014 -0.073 -0.115 1.000        
8 Agei,t-1  12.947 5.680 0 24 -0.049 -0.111 -0.096 0.069 0.005 0.045 0.022 1.000       
9 Salesi,t-1 (millions) 6.967 13.980 0 169 0.077 0.213 0.124 0.292 0.356 0.032 -0.032 -0.044 1.000      
10 Publici,t-1 0.058 0.233 0 1 0.032 0.227 0.122 0.062 0.213 0.022 -0.031 -0.047 0.403 1.000     
11 Cinvesti,t-1 0.041 0.198 0 1 0.014 0.042 0.003 -0.021 0.045 0.023 0.015 -0.115 0.113 0.054 1.000    
12 Pinvesti,t-1 0.520 0.500 0 1 -0.037 -0.042 -0.039 -0.011 -0.050 0.024 0.029 -0.146 -0.095 -0.027 -0.061 1.000   
13 Vinvesti,t-1  0.114 0.318 0 1 0.079 0.121 0.071 -0.008 0.104 0.109 0.017 -0.332 0.152 0.138 0.073 -0.070 1.000  
14 Publicationi,t-1 0.616 5.532 0 137 0.000 -0.003 -0.004 0.000 0.032 0.039 0.005 0.045 0.052 0.079 -0.015 -0.018 0.040 1.000 
Notes. 





Table 2.2 Survival Analysis, Cox Proportional Hazard Model 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Patent 0.158 0.279* 0.226 0.124 -0.0217 
 (0.104) (0.153) (0.157) (0.169) (0.204) 
Patent effectiveness     1.826* 
     (1.103) 
Copyrights 0.142 0.569*** 0.607*** 0.658*** 0.663*** 
 (0.156) (0.208) (0.212) (0.219) (0.219) 
Trademarks 0.803*** 1.276*** 1.205*** 0.922*** 0.929*** 
 (0.213) (0.256) (0.257) (0.294) (0.292) 
Patents × Trademarks  -0.121 -0.107 -0.0755 -0.0463 
  (0.0997) (0.0992) (0.109) (0.110) 
Copyrights × Trademarks  -0.465** -0.485** -0.567*** -0.571*** 
  (0.200) (0.200) (0.211) (0.208) 
SAP penetration   3.417*** 2.709** 2.790** 
   (1.212) (1.322) (1.342) 
Multiple industry   0.880** 0.825** 0.832** 
   (0.393) (0.384) (0.386) 
Product overlap   -0.601 -0.941* -0.970* 
   (0.531) (0.547) (0.550) 
Public    -0.595 -0.570 
    (0.540) (0.539) 
Age    -0.106 -0.110 
    (0.119) (0.120) 
Age2    0.00245 0.00259 
    (0.00539) (0.00539) 
Sales    0.650*** 0.648*** 
    (0.174) (0.172) 
Corporate invest    0.110 0.111 
    (0.627) (0.627) 
Private invest    -0.702* -0.731* 
    (0.373) (0.375) 
VC invest    0.945** 0.924** 
    (0.374) (0.376) 
Publication 0.259 0.157 0.111 0.140 0.173 
 (0.327) (0.341) (0.367) (0.384) (0.379) 
No. of firms 1201 1201 1201 1201 1201 
Observations 6381 6381 6381 6381 6381 
Log likelihood -250.99388 -247.01567 -240.66373 -221.04926 -219.83565 
Notes.  
Standard errors in parentheses. 




Examining the results of the final model, I find support for H1. Increases in the stock of 
copyrights are positively associated with an ISV’s hazard of partnering with SAP, 
indicating that copyrights are an important mechanism employed by ISVs to prevent 
knowledge expropriation. Although the stock of patents is not found to be significantly 
related to the decision of an ISV to join the partnership, I do find evidence that the 
effectiveness of patent protection increases an ISV’s propensity to partner. This is not 
surprising since the stock of patents granted to a particular firm is driven by multiple 
factors such as patent propensity (itself driven by patent strength), technological 
opportunities, and R&D productivity (Griliches 1990). Patent effectiveness is a more 
direct, albeit survey-based, measure of the strength of patent protection. ISVs with few or 
no patents should have a low propensity to patent because this legal mechanism may not 
be effective for appropriating innovation rents. However, my theory implies that firms 
with stronger patents are expected to enforce their patents with a greater probability of 
success. Consistent with expectations, I find that ISVs holding patents in technological 
sub-classes where patent protection is considered more effective have greater incentives 
to partner due to greater abilities to safeguard themselves against the potential imitation 
by the platform owner. The results clearly show that the effect of patents is significantly 
reduced when patent effectiveness is included, suggesting that this variable is indeed 
capturing, albeit imperfectly, variations in the underlying strength of patent protection 
within segments of the enterprise software industry. I also find a strong positive effect of 
trademark stock on the partnership formation across specification and models, confirming 
hypothesis H2. Consistent with my expectation, I also find evidence that IP protection 
and downstream capabilities act as substitutes for one other in their influence on 
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partnership formation, and the effect is more pronounced for copyrights than for patents, 
partially confirming H3.  
A numerical example would illustrate the main effects and interaction effects of IPR 
protection and trademarks. To examine the marginal effects, I consider a log transformed 
variables xi in the Cox proportional hazard model. Suppose I increase xi by 100%, while 







= exp(𝛽�𝑙𝑛2) = 2��  
For example, if the effectiveness of patent protection is doubled while everything else 
remains unchanged, the likelihood of partnering with SAP will be increased by 2�.��� −
1 = 255%.  
Now consider a firm that has the mean value of log transformed copyright (.378, 
correspond to copyright=.46) and the mean value of log transformed trademarks (.333, 
correspond to trademark=.40). If the firm doubles its stock of copyrights while holding 
other variables constant, the hazard ratio becomes 2[.����(�.���)×.���] = 2.��� = 1.388, 
which means a 39% increase in the hazard. Similarly, if the firm doubles its stock of 
trademarks while holding other conditions unchanged, the hazard ratio becomes 
2[.����(�.���)×.���] = 2.��� = 1.639, which translates into a 64% increase in the hazard 








exp[𝛽� ln(2𝑥�) + 𝛽� ln(2𝑥�) + 𝛽� ln(2𝑥�) × ln(2𝑥�)]
exp(𝛽�𝑙𝑛𝑥� + 𝛽�𝑙𝑛𝑥� + 𝛽�𝑙𝑛𝑥� × 𝑙𝑛𝑥�)
= exp{[𝑙𝑛2 + 𝛽�𝑙𝑛2 + 𝛽�[(𝑙𝑛2)� + 𝑙𝑛2 × 𝑙𝑛𝑥� + 𝑙𝑛2
× 𝑙𝑛𝑥�]}
= 2.��� × 2.���
× exp{(−.571) × [(. 693)� + .693 × .378 + .693 × .333]}
= 1.730 
 
which implies a 73% increase in the hazard rate. This is considerably lower than the 
combination of the direct effect of copyrights and the direct effect of trademarks, 
1.388×1.639-1=127% increase, due to the substitution effect (negative interaction) 
between copyrights and trademarks.  
Hypothesis H4 suggests that as SAP’s penetration into an ISV’s target industries 
increases, the ISV is more inclined to partner with SAP. This hypothesis is confirmed by 
my empirical results. A one percent increase in SAP’s penetration into ISV’s industries is 
associated with a exp(. 01 × 2.790) − 1 = 2.83%  increase in the likelihood of 
partnering. 
Hypothesis H5 states that the higher product portfolio overlap with SAP that an ISV has, 
the less likely that the ISV will join the SAP’s platform ecosystem. I find that hypothesis 
H5 is supported. As an ISV’s product overlap with SAP increases by 1%, its likelihood of 
partnering with SAP decreases by 1 − exp[. 01 × (−.97)] = .96%. 
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Among the controls, the results suggest the funding sources of ISVs do influence their 
inter-firm linkage activities. Consistent with prior literature, ISVs that are backed by 
venture capital are more inclined to partner with SAP, due to their greater access to social 
capital, stronger bargaining power and lower contract cost. In contrast, ISVs funded by 
private investment are less likely to access those resources, and therefore have lower 
chance of partnering with SAP. 
2.7.2. Tests for Robustness 
Although survival analysis is suitable for modeling event history and my specification of 
Cox proportional hazard model does not impose restrictions on the baseline hazard 
function, there are two possible concerns associated with my prior analyses. First, there 
might be firm-specific unobserved heterogeneity that is correlated with the dependent 
variable which could lead to inconsistent estimates. For example, better managed or more 
innovative firms could both have more copyrights and trademarks and also be more likely 
to partner. Second, my measurements of IP protection using patents and copyrights stocks 
may be correlated with unobserved drivers of a firm’s innovative capability and 
propensity for adopting formal IP protection strategies. Using a fixed effects model could 
effectively remove any bias caused by any source of time-invariant unobserved firm-
specific heterogeneity.  
Table 2.3 presents the results of estimating a standard fixed effects (‘within firm’) model. 
Comparing the results with those of Table 2.2, I actually find stronger support for 
Hypothesis 1, as a significant positive effect is identified for patent stocks after 
controlling for time-invariant innovation capabilities and patent propensities. I also 
observe that the positive effect of patents is mainly driven by the strength of patent 
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protection. Indeed, when patent effectiveness is added to the model, the patent stock itself 
becomes insignificant. Hypotheses 2 and 3 also hold as before.  
While the results for all of my variables measuring IP appropriation are robust to the use 
of fixed effects, estimates for the effects of penetration and product overlap are weaker. I 
speculate that this result is driven by the fact that variation in these measures are 
primarily cross-sectional, while fixed effects models only utilize the within-firm, 
longitudinal variation to perform the estimation. As it is well known, this can lead to 
significant loss of efficiency in estimation (Greene 2002). Indeed, a between-firm panel 
estimation using cross-sectional variations confirms my conjecture and demonstrates a 
much stronger and significant effect of penetration and product overlap (between 




Table 2.3 Linear Probability Model, Fixed Effects Estimation 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Patents 0.00859*** 0.00910*** 0.00872*** 0.00717** 0.00485 
 (0.00295) (0.00331) (0.00331) (0.00335) (0.00350) 
Patent effectiveness     0.0291** 
     (0.0129) 
Copyrights 0.0120*** 0.0199*** 0.0197*** 0.0184*** 0.0184*** 
 (0.00414) (0.00503) (0.00503) (0.00505) (0.00504) 
Trademarks 0.00620* 0.0118*** 0.0115*** 0.0102** 0.0104*** 
 (0.00322) (0.00392) (0.00393) (0.00399) (0.00399) 
Patents × Trademarks  -0.000771 -0.000748 -0.00165 -0.000822 
  (0.00177) (0.00177) (0.00178) (0.00181) 
Copyrights × Trademarks  -0.00675*** -0.00660*** -0.00608** -0.00645** 
  (0.00254) (0.00254) (0.00255) (0.00255) 
SAP penetration   0.0149 0.0145 0.0149 
   (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0144) 
Multiple industry    -- -- -- 
      
Product overlap    0.0118 0.0106 0.0103 
   (0.00738) (0.00749) (0.00748) 
Public    0.0506*** 0.0499*** 
    (0.0130) (0.0130) 
Age    0.00323* 0.00337** 
    (0.00167) (0.00167) 
Age2    -9.09e-05** -9.45e-05** 
    (4.27e-05) (4.27e-05) 
Sales    -0.000844 -0.000648 
    (0.00266) (0.00266) 
Corporate invest    -0.0167 -0.0149 
    (0.0131) (0.0131) 
Private invest    -0.00249 -0.00255 
    (0.00638) (0.00638) 
VC invest    0.00228 0.00335 
    (0.00994) (0.00994) 
Publication 0.0242*** 0.0235*** 0.0234** 0.0244*** 0.0242*** 
 (0.00910) (0.00910) (0.00910) (0.00918) (0.00918) 
Constant 0.00501 0.00158 -0.00835 -0.0317 -0.0531** 
 (0.00350) (0.00372) (0.00671) (0.0240) (0.0258) 
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes 
No. of firms 1201 1201 1201 1201 1201 
Observations 6381 6381 6381 6381 6381 
R2 (with fixed effects) 0.5018 0.5026 0.5029 0.5052 0.5057 
Notes.  
Standard errors in parentheses. 




I further explore the robustness of my findings through several alternative models and 
measurements of the independent variables. In column 1 of Table 2.4 I present results of 
my baseline Cox hazard model using raw counts of stocks of patents and scientific 
publications that are unweighted by forward citations. While the measurement of product 
overlap is normalized by ISVs’ product portfolios in Table 2.2 and 2.3, the variable may 
not capture the extent to which SAP perceives the ISV as a competitor. I replace the 
variable by normalizing it using SAP’s product portfolio and present the results in 
Column 2 of Table 2.4. In both cases I find the set of results is similar to those in Table 
2.2.  
Although Cox hazard model has been commonly used in the literature because of its 
flexibility, the estimates are not always efficient when compared with full parametric 
models, if the underlining baseline hazard function is known (Cameron and Trivedi 
2005). In column 3 of Table 2.4 I present the results from the most commonly used 
parametric model, the exponential hazard model. Similar results are found as in the Cox 
proportional hazard model. I also extend the exponential model to account for 
unobserved heterogeneity, as there could be potential omitted variables that influence 
alliance formation and which are correlated with the independent variables. Empirically 
this amounts to the inclusion of a multiplicative idiosyncratic factor, known as a frailty, 
to the hazard function specification (Bruce et al. 2004; Cameron and Trivedi 2005). The 
unobserved heterogeneity is usually assumed to be gamma or inverse-Gaussian 
distributed. I present the results of an exponential hazard model with inverse-Gaussian 
frailty in column 4 of Table 2.4. The likelihood ratio test for heterogeneity does not reject 
the null of no heterogeneity (p=.304), indicating that my set of explanatory variables is 
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sufficiently inclusive. The different models listed in Table 2.4 provide further evidence of 
the robustness of my results. 
2.8. Discussion and Conclusion 
2.8.1. Summary of Results and Managerial Implications 
Innovation ecosystems have long existed in the computer software industry. Surprisingly, 
there has been a paucity of empirical studies that examine the incentives of participation 
and antecedents of the formation of such ecosystems from the perspective of its 
participants. My study uses a simple model to illustrate the facilitators of and barriers to 
an ISV’s partnering with a platform owner in the enterprise software industry. I present 
robust empirical evidence that ISVs with better legal protections through intellectual 
property rights and those with stronger downstream marketing capabilities are more 
likely to partner. Interestingly, protection of upstream capabilities using formal IPRs and 
downstream appropriation protection through marketing capabilities substitute for each 
other in shaping the payoff to partnering. Increases in the size of the platform owner’s 
installed base also increase the payoff to partnering. Further, when the ISV and the 
platform owner compete in similar markets, the risks of platform owner’s entry 




Table 2.4 Alternative Measures and Models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Alternative measure 













Patents 0.0549 0.119 0.103 0.113 
 (0.666) (0.171) (0.169) (0.183) 
Copyrights 0.660*** 0.683*** 0.693*** 0.764*** 
 (0.221) (0.222) (0.216) (0.283) 
Trademarks 0.925*** 0.909*** 0.903*** 0.987*** 
 (0.289) (0.296) (0.297) (0.352) 
Patents × Trademarks -0.156 -0.0812 -0.0892 -0.101 
 (0.403) (0.109) (0.109) (0.124) 
Copyrights × Trademarks -0.570*** -0.567*** -0.619*** -0.654*** 
 (0.210) (0.211) (0.215) (0.245) 
SAP penetration 2.778** 2.638** 1.983* 2.191* 
 (1.319) (1.329) (1.135) (1.297) 
Multiple industry  0.841** 0.807** 0.748** 0.800** 
 (0.383) (0.384) (0.368) (0.406) 
Product overlap  -0.900* -2.323** -1.002* -1.088* 
 (0.546) (0.975) (0.534) (0.602) 
Public -0.541 -0.530 -0.538 -0.540 
 (0.527) (0.543) (0.537) (0.616) 
Age -0.118 -0.0989 -0.163 -0.167 
 (0.119) (0.120) (0.114) (0.125) 
Age2 0.00270 0.00216 0.00358 0.00331 
 (0.00539) (0.00545) (0.00502) (0.00559) 
Sales 0.632*** 0.683*** 0.634*** 0.673*** 
 (0.173) (0.177) (0.173) (0.198) 
Corporate invest 0.140 0.0565 -0.0134 0.0136 
 (0.626) (0.628) (0.631) (0.707) 
Private invest -0.749** -0.717* -0.773** -0.830** 
 (0.375) (0.374) (0.375) (0.411) 
VC invest 0.903** 0.926** 0.876** 0.902** 
 (0.371) (0.373) (0.381) (0.417) 
Publication 0.225 0.138 0.140 0.142 
 (0.255) (0.379) (0.371) (0.421) 
Constant   -6.360*** -6.455*** 
   (0.874) (0.955) 
No. of firms 1201 1201 1201 1201 
Observations 6381 6381 6381 6381 
Log likelihood -220.90356 -219.36468 -157.44985 -157.31881 
Notes.  
Standard errors in parentheses. 




I envision several broad implications of my empirical findings for platform sponsors as 
well as participants in the platform ecosystem. First, while certification from a major 
platform owner may provide the ISV with a larger market access, endorsement effect and 
enhance its social and technical legitimacy (Chellappa and Saraf forthcoming), the ISV 
may bear considerable knowledge expropriation risks during the process if both IP 
protection is weak and if the ISV does not possess strong downstream capabilities. In 
addition, ISVs that compete with the platform owner in multiple product markets should 
be cautious about proceeding with such a partnership. Finally, for a platform owner that 
focuses on fostering the rapid growth of its ecosystem to capture the indirect network 
effect and promoting the platform as de facto industry standard, understanding the 
incentives and reservations of its complementary product providers is of paramount 
importance, and building proper governance mechanisms that alleviates its partners’ 
expropriation concerns could be conducive to the shared success of the community 
(Gawer and Henderson 2007). Surprisingly, my findings suggest that a strong, well-
functioning IPR regime not only protects complementors from expropriation risks, but 
also work to the benefit of platform owner in that it encourages the provision of 
complementary innovation that is based on the platform. 
My results also have implications for where ecosystems are most likely to arise. 
Ecosystems will be less likely to arise among firms with little formal means of IPR 
protection and, in particular, will be less likely where the protection afforded by patents is 
weak. They will be relatively more common when complementors are more effectively 
able to secure their innovations through copyrights, patents, and downstream capabilities, 
and when the products of platform owner and complementor do not directly compete. 
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Although my research is set in the enterprise software industry, I note that the 
implications could be applied to more general contexts which involve the relationship 
between a technology platform and complementary application provision. For example, 
in the media player software market, WINAMP was among the first to release Windows-
based mp3 players, and RealPlayer was the first Windows-based media player capable of 
streaming media over the Internet. However, with their innovation unprotected, Microsoft 
eventually invaded their product space with its introduction of built-in Windows Media 
Player, and squeezed both into oblivion. In contrast, Windows-based iTunes, released by 
Apple at a later stage, enjoyed great success, largely due to Apple’s ownership of 
downstream complementary capabilities: a dominant position in content provision and a 
large, loyal customer base of its mobile media device, iPod.  
2.8.2. Limitations and Future Research 
Although patents and copyrights appear as effective measures of IP protection, I 
acknowledge my limited ability to disentangle the effects of innovation from IPR 
protection on partnership formation, as firms in different industry segments may face 
different levels of strength of legal IPR mechanisms and have different propensities for 
employing patents, copyrights, trade secrecy, lead time advantage and other informal 
innovation protection alternatives (Cohen et al. 2000). For example, prior studies have 
documented that the patent propensity rate varies dramatically across industries, with 
firms in textiles on average patenting less than 10% of their innovations while 
pharmaceutical firms have a patent rate of more than 80% (Arundel and Kabla 1998). 
Although firms in the industry of interest in this study, enterprise software, are relatively 
homogeneous, it is possible that patent and copyright propensity varies according to firm 
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size (Brouwer and Kleinknecht 1999), relative effectiveness of patents and copyrights 
within software submarkets (Arora et al. 2008a; Mann and Sager 2007), or characteristics 
of the technology (Hall and Ziedonis 2001). I address this issue by including scientific 
publications of ISVs as a measure of (unprotected) innovation, by using fixed effects 
models to remove time-invariant factors that may contribute to patent filing, and by 
explicitly controlling for the strength of patent protection using a survey-based measure.  
Another limitation of this study is that I focus on the dyadic relationship between an ISV 
and the platform owner, while theory and research have advanced to analyze conduct and 
performance of firms by examining the network relationships in which they are 
embedded (Bae and Gargiulo 2004; Goerzen and Beamish 2005). In cases that multiple 
platforms and standards coexist in certain industries, firms face substitutable alliance 
partners from which they can draw complementary resources from (Bae and Gargiulo 
2004). Particularly in enterprise software, studies of what determines small ISVs to 
choose or join different platforms sponsored by dominant incumbents such as SAP or 
Oracle, and how firm performances are conditioned on their structural positions inside 
the partnership network would provide a much richer understanding of the ecosystem 
evolution than treating the partnership decision as binary choices. 
There is plenty of room for further research on the topic of ecosystem of enterprise 
software. Particularly, it is unclear through what mechanisms the partnering ISVs extract 
relational rent from such inter-firm exchange and how their post-partnership financial 
performance and exit strategies differ from non-participants. In addition, the roles of 
other ecosystem constituents such as customers, implementation partners and consulting 




CO-CREATION OF VALUE IN A PLATFORM ECOSYSTEM: 
THE CASE OF ENTERPRISE SOFTWARE 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Platform-based technologies such as personal computers, PDAs, and video game 
consoles are becoming increasingly important in the information economy (Evans et al. 
2006). As noted by Boudreau (2007), such platforms are defined as the set of components 
used in common across a product family whose functionality can be extended by 
applications. To meet the needs of heterogeneous users and to exploit indirect network 
effects, owners of a platform often seek to encourage complementary third-party 
innovation from resources located outside the firm, ranging from customers, research 
companies and business partners to universities (Linder et al. 2003). This approach of 
complementary innovation has given rise to the model of an innovation ecosystem. A 
burgeoning body of research has started to theorize about how such ecosystems are 
formed and their implications for platform owners, complementary providers, and users 
(Adomavicius et al. 2007; Adomavicius et al. 2008; Eisenmann et al. 2008; Gawer and 
Henderson 2007; Lee and Mendelson 2008; Mantena et al. 2007; Parker and Van Alstyne 
2008; West 2003). 
To encourage complementary innovation, owners of IT hardware and software platforms 
such as Microsoft, IBM, and SAP often have partnership programs for members of their 
innovation ecosystems. Members of these partnership programs co-create value with the 
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platform owner by developing applications and solutions to be used on the platform. Such 
partnerships have also drawn interest as examples of co-opetition (Hamel et al. 1989) that 
inevitably involve competition and conflict of interest. However, despite increasing 
interest among practitioners and researchers on ecosystems there has been little work in 
understanding the value of these partnership programs, and under what conditions they 
are most beneficial to their participants. This is a surprising gap in understanding. For 
researchers, this means that there is little systematic measurement of the extent to which 
partnership programs facilitate the co-creation of value. For example, recent theoretical 
work on how platform owners can encourage the development of ecosystems (Eisenmann 
et al. 2008; Parker and Van Alstyne 2008; West 2003) would benefit from empirical 
evidence on the value of these programs. For practitioners, platform owners and their 
complementors currently have no systematic means to determine how much to invest in 
them. In addition, efforts of start-up software vendors to use ecosystem participation as a 
growth strategy will have meaning only if vendors know who is most likely to benefit 
from such relationship. In short, measurement of the (co-created) value from ecosystem 
partnership programs has important implications for both researchers and practitioners.  
A related question is the issue of value appropriation in IT innovation networks. Recent 
studies on inter-firm alliances have emphasized the role of partners’ resources and 
capabilities in value creation (Ahuja 2000; Lane and Lubatkin 1998; Mowery et al. 
1996). However, they have generally tended to overlook the effect of appropriation 
hazards on the co-creation of value by alliance partners. The misappropriation issue is 
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particularly important in the case of platform ecosystem partnerships, 12  as such 
relationships are often characterized by a conflict between the developers of 
complementary products and the platform owner due to the risks that the latter may 
eventually compete in the former’s product market space (Gawer and Henderson 2007). 
The question of how these risks of misappropriation affect the returns to partnership has 
yet to be answered. Acquiring empirical evidence on these issues has important 
managerial implications, as it will inform when ecosystems are most likely to grow and 
succeed. 
In this chapter I take one step toward addressing these gaps in prior research. To do this, I 
develop a set of hypotheses building upon a rich literature on the commercialization of 
new technologies and markets for technology (e.g., Arora et al. 2001; Gans et al. 2002; 
Gans and Stern 2003). Following one stream of this literature (e.g., Gans et al. 2002; 
Gans and Stern 2003), I explore the decisions of small firms to pursue a cooperative or 
competitive strategy with incumbents. Focusing in this way allows me to isolate a key 
tradeoff to potential partners in my setting—the benefits of partnership from accessing a 
larger installed base versus the potential risks of intellectual property expropriation from 
the platform owner.  
Building on this central tradeoff, I develop a set of hypotheses that predict the 
relationship between platform ecosystem participation, appropriation strategies and firm 
performance. I then test these hypotheses in the context of the enterprise software 
industry. Specifically, using a unique data set on the partnering activities of 1210 
                                                 
12 For example, over the last decade SAP has resolved a number of disputes with its ecosystem partner 
ISVs, whose claims include infringement of patents and copyrights as well as misappropriation of 
confidential information and trade secrets (SAP annual report 1998 – 2008). 
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independent software vendors (ISVs) over the period of 1996-2004, I evaluate the effects 
of joining the SAP ecosystem on two critical performance measures for entrepreneurial 
ISVs: sales and the likelihood of obtaining an initial public offering (IPO). I analyze the 
former because it is strongly correlated with the profitability and overall financial 
performance of the firm, due to the high fixed cost/low variable cost structure of software 
firms. I analyze the latter because it is both a measure of the future sales prospects for the 
firm and a common measure of small firm performance (Cockburn and MacGarvie 2009; 
Shane and Stuart 2002). I present robust empirical evidence showing that the decision to 
partner is associated with both an increase in sales and a greater likelihood of an IPO.  
I next investigate how appropriability strategies, such as ownership of intellectual 
property rights (IPR) and downstream complementary capabilities by the ISV, moderate 
the effects of partnership on ISV performance. A rich literature on appropriating the 
returns to innovation show that both are conducive to appropriating returns through 
product markets (Teece 1986) or the markets for technology (Arora and Ceccagnoli 2006; 
Arora et al. 2001; Gans and Stern 2003) and have a significant effect on firm 
performance (Ceccagnoli 2009), though as yet there is less understanding of how these 
may condition the value of partnerships in a platform ecosystem. In particular, I find that 
the impact of partnership on sales and the likelihood of an IPO is greatest for those ISVs 
who are protected by IPR and who have strong downstream capabilities. 
My study contributes to the extant literature on several fronts. First, although prior 
research on alliance relationships has examined their impact on firm performance (Bae 
and Gargiulo 2004; Baum and Oliver 1991; Goerzen and Beamish 2005; Mitchell and 
Singh 1996; Zaheer and Bell 2005), the focus in much of that literature has been on the 
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value of alliances as a mechanism to facilitate learning and access to specialized 
resources (Porter and Fuller 1986). My analysis and theory differs from this extant 
literature in significant ways: in my setting, partnerships are valuable primarily as a way 
of signaling compatibility with the platform rather than a mechanism of sharing critical 
information that will improve the innovative productivity of the partnering organizations 
(Colombo et al. 2006; Khanna et al. 1998; Mowery et al. 1996). In that way, my study 
shares similarities with Chellappa and Saraf (forthcoming), who also argue that 
compatibility signaling is a primary benefit of partnership in enterprise software. 
However, while Chellappa and Saraf are primarily interested in how a firm’s position in 
the social network of large enterprise software firms influences firm performance, I 
examine the impact of ecosystem partnership on ISV performance.  
My research differs from prior alliance literature (including Chellappa and Saraf) in 
another significant way. With the exception of Lavie (2007), few authors have 
simultaneously studied value creation and value appropriation mechanisms in alliance 
relationships. I bridge this gap by applying theory on innovation commercialization to 
inter-firm alliance studies. While Lavie (2007) emphasizes the role of bilateral and 
multilateral competition on value appropriation in alliance relationships, I examine how 
the benefits of participation in a platform ecosystem vary according to different 
appropriation strategies. Specifically, my findings imply that appropriability, in particular 
intellectual property protection, is a critical determinant of the returns to ISVs from the 
co-creation of value in the software industry, and that successful and sustainable 
ecosystems will be found in environments where appropriability mechanisms are strong. 
In such environments, strong ISV participation in the ecosystem will engender a rich 
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supply of innovative solutions to meet heterogeneous customer needs, igniting a virtuous 
cycle of indirect network effects that will in turn lead to further value co-creation. 
More broadly, while a growing body of literature has examined how platform owners can 
encourage third-party complementors to stimulate indirect network effects, the current 
literature on platform technology focuses primarily on the management issues and 
strategies from the perspective of the platform owners (Eisenmann et al. 2008; Gawer and 
Cusumano 2002). There is at present little work examining the perspective of the 
platform participants. In this way, my research builds upon the previous chapter where I 
study the decisions of ISVs to participate in a partnership program.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section I present an overview 
of literature in related research areas and propose hypotheses regarding value creation 
and appropriation in a platform ecosystem. In section 3.3 I describe the research setting, 
the data, and methods used in the empirical investigation. I present the results, as well as 
a set of robustness checks, in section 3.4. In section 3.5 I discuss the implications of my 
findings and conclude. 
3.2. Relevant Literature and Hypotheses 
In this section I propose hypotheses regarding value creation and appropriation in 
platform ecosystems. My hypotheses are grounded in the literature on innovation 
commercialization, appropriability, and markets for technology (e.g., Arora et al. 2001; 
Gans et al. 2002; Gans and Stern 2003). This line of work suggests that the decision of 
start-ups to partner with established firms in order to commercialize their innovations is 
critically conditioned by ownership of IPR and downstream commercialization 
 
61 
capabilities. I apply and extend these ideas to analyze the impact of an ISV decision to 
join a platform ecosystem on its financial performance. Later, in section 3.5, I discuss the 
generalizability of my findings to other platform environments. 
3.2.1. Appropriating the Returns from Innovation 
Technology entrepreneurs such as small enterprise software vendors often face a critical 
challenge when attempting to translate their innovation into a steady stream of economic 
returns. When start-ups commercialize their innovations, they often face a choice 
between (1) embedding the innovation into a product and competing with established 
firms versus (2) earning returns through cooperation with incumbents (Gans and Stern 
2003). A key determinant of this choice is the ownership of costly-to-build downstream 
manufacturing, marketing, distribution and other complementary capabilities that are 
essential to a firm’s value chain and required for successfully launching a product or 
service (Teece 1986). These complementary capabilities are often a choke point for 
innovation commercialization, since they cannot be easily contracted for through the 
market on competitive terms and are therefore rare, path-dependent and difficult to 
imitate (Teece 1986). Their ownership may constitute a barrier to entry and provide a 
sustainable competitive advantage (Barney 1991; Rothaermel and Hill 2005; Teece 
1992). Indeed, large scale empirical studies suggest that ownership of downstream 
capabilities required to commercialize an innovation is one of the most effective means 
of securing returns from innovation across a wide range of industries (Cohen et al. 2000). 
While the ownership of downstream complementary assets is typically conducive to an 
appropriation strategy through vertical integration into the product market, securing 
returns from innovation by commercialization through the market for technology depends 
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critically on the possession and strength of IPR (Arora et al. 2001; Gans and Stern 2003; 
Oxley 1999). For example, Gambardella and Giarratana (2008) find a positive 
relationship between the effectiveness of patent protection and technology licensing in 
the security software industry, while the ownership of downstream complementary 
capabilities increases the likelihood that firms will launch new products. Recent research 
has also extended this literature to examine the role of markets for technology in affecting 
the survival of entrepreneurial firms in the security software industry (Arora and 
Nandkumar 2008). 
In what follows, I develop a set of hypotheses based on some of the key ideas outlined 
above.  
3.2.2. Participation in the Ecosystem and Sales 
In technology industries where network effects are important and a dominant standard 
has yet to be established, small technology firms may initiate an alliance or join a 
platform ecosystem to achieve technology compatibility with a platform. The literature 
on standards competition suggests that technology compatibility is often a prerequisite to 
gaining access to the user base of the platform owner (Brynjolfsson and Kemerer 1996; 
Katz and Shapiro 1994; Kauffman et al. 2000; Matutes and Regibeau 1988; Tassey 
2000).  
Since the key objective of partnerships in this industry is to achieve compatibility 
between innovative software solutions of the complementors and the platform, 
cooperation is a way to access a key complementary asset, certification of software 
compatibility, that increases a startup’s ability to appropriate the returns from its 
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innovation (Arora et al. 2001; Gans et al. 2002; Gans and Stern 2003; Teece 1986). This 
kind of alliance therefore co-creates value by avoiding investments in hard-to-duplicate 
complementary assets (e.g., investments needed to integrate complementary products 
with the platform and gain a reputation for quality and reliability). They also increase the 
value captured by the complementors, by allowing the ISV to achieve a more reliable 
integration with the platform, as well as reach the installed base faster and more 
effectively.  
Indeed, since platform owners are usually established incumbents with a large installed 
base, partnership exposes an ISV to a greater potential market that is not served or is 
underserved by the platform owner. Successful exploitation of the platform owner’s user 
base is therefore expected to boost the sales of a partnering ISV. In addition, in order to 
become a certified complementary solution provider to a platform, an ISV may have to 
conform to a series of quality specifications in product design and pass a rigorous 
certification process conducted by the platform owner. As a result, obtaining certification 
from an industry leader may be perceived by users as a quality signal (Rao and Ruekert 
1994), which may enhance the willingness-to-pay of the ISV’s potential customers, and 
in turn have a positive impact on sales revenue. Indeed, prior research has shown that 
obtaining quality certification such as ISO (International Organization for 
Standardization) 9001 enhances software companies’ revenue and is associated with 
higher price per unit of output (Arora and Asundi 1999).  
Therefore, I propose 
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Hypothesis 1 (H1). An ISV’s participation in an enterprise software platform’s 
innovation ecosystem is associated with an increase in sales. 
A few words are in order about the statement of my hypothesis. As I will discuss in 
section 3.2.4, while platform participation may be associated with an increase in sales on 
average, the relationship between participation and sales may vary significantly with ISV 
characteristics (in particular the appropriation strategies of the ISV) and the market 
conditions under which the ISV operates. In other words, there may exist considerable 
heterogeneity in value co-creation—and for the ISV, value appropriation—across 
partnerships. Further, ISVs may choose to partner with incomplete knowledge about the 
future values of these variables that will moderate the effects of partnership. I discuss 
these variables in detail in section 3.2.4.  
3.2.3. Participation in the Ecosystem and IPO 
For young entrepreneurial software companies, a crucial dimension of long term 
performance is the speed at which the company issues an initial sale of securities in the 
financial market (Hsu 2006; Stuart et al. 1999). An IPO is a critical milestone which 
marks the transition of a privately held venture into a publicly owned company. From the 
perspective of a new venture, selling securities to the public is a less expensive way to 
raise working capital that is required for future growth and expansion, and it presents an 
opportunity to the equity holders to exchange their stake in the company for cash.  
However, the IPO market is a context in which investors need to assess the quality of 
relatively new companies with a short track-record and about which investors will have 
limited information (Pollock and Rindova 2003). I argue that given the significant 
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uncertainty surrounding a new venture’s viability and future profit generating 
capabilities, an ISV’s decision to join a platform ecosystem will be an effective way of 
mitigating uncertainties in the eyes of third party investors. First, the market’s evaluation 
of the firm is based on its expected future cash flow (Kaplan and Ruback 1995), which 
will be correlated with its current market penetration and sales. Since joining the platform 
ecosystem facilitates a faster and more effective penetration of the installed base by the 
ISV, as argued above, such partnerships should be interpreted favorably by the financial 
markets and boost investors’ confidence in the future profitability of the new venture, 
resulting in a greater likelihood of IPO. 
Second, institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) suggests that organizations are 
under the pressure of institutional environments to conform to prevailing social norms 
and demonstrate legitimacy. Third parties such as investors will be more willing to 
engage in exchange relationships with firms that have proven social legitimacy (Sine et 
al. 2007). To the extent that small ventures have limited history of demonstrating their 
conformance to prevailing rules, practices and social norms, partnering with large, well-
established companies can significantly increase their visibility, reputation, image and 
prestige. Indeed, studies have examined how endorsements from venture capitalists 
(Gulati and Higgins 2003; Shane and Stuart 2002), investment banks (Gulati and Higgins 
2003; Stuart et al. 1999), alliance partners (Stuart et al. 1999) and media coverage 
(Pollock and Rindova 2003) can affect impression formation and impart legitimacy to 
entrepreneurial ventures, and increase the likelihood of raising capital through an IPO. 
Therefore, I propose 
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Hypothesis 2 (H2). An ISV’s participation in an enterprise software platform’s 
innovation ecosystem is associated with an increase in the likelihood of issuing an IPO. 
3.2.4. Participation in the Innovation Ecosystem and Appropriation Strategies 
As is widely noted in the markets for technology literature, cooperative strategies like 
ecosystem partnerships often occur in the shadow of competition (Arora and Ceccagnoli 
2006; Arora et al. 2001; Gans et al. 2002; Gans and Stern 2003). The above literature has 
highlighted the paradox of disclosure that occurs when start-ups explore potential 
licensing strategies with established firms: when trading in ideas, the willingness to pay 
for potential buyers depends upon their knowledge of the idea, however disclosure of the 
idea implies that the potential buyer need not pay for it (Gans and Stern 2003).  
Similar appropriability risks arise for small ISVs who consider joining a platform 
ecosystem. Although joining a platform ecosystem may improve an ISV’s sales and 
likelihood of IPO on average, there may be considerable risks associated with such 
relationships that may lead to variance in the returns to partnership. One particular risk is 
that the platform owner may replicate the technology of the ISV and begin to offer a 
competing product, a risk that is likely to increase with partnership. Inter-firm 
collaborative relationships often lead to unintended knowledge transfer (Khanna et al. 
1998; Mowery et al. 1996). Knowledge that is not protected by any appropriation 
mechanism can therefore be profitably used by collaborators (Bresser 1988; Heiman and 
Nickerson 2004). As noted above, the potential risk that platform owners may enter a 
complementor’s product space has been acknowledged by theoretical and case study 
work on software platforms (Gawer and Cusumano 2002; Gawer and Henderson 2007; 
Iansiti and Levien 2004), but has not been empirically tested. 
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The partnership between an ISV and a software platform owner is likely to facilitate such 
knowledge spillovers. Software certification may require the ISV to disclose proprietary 
knowledge, the codification of business processes or its best practices that the platform 
owner could imitate. In this way, the costs of entry for the platform owner into the ISV’s 
product market are reduced. In other words, by joining a platform ecosystem an ISV is 
exposed to a greater expropriation risk. 
Prior research has noted that the disclosure problem can be ameliorated if IPR are 
available (Arora and Ceccagnoli 2006; Gans and Stern 2003; Oxley 1999). Both patents 
and copyrights have been shown as common methods of IPR protection in the software 
industry (Bessen and Hunt 2007; Graham et al. 2009). In particular, in the presence of 
patents and copyrights, a start-up may be able to deter imitation or exercise its IPR and 
prevent entry once imitation has occurred (Gans et al. 2002). I expect that stronger IP 
protection from patents and copyrights will increase the payoff to partnering by 
decreasing the risks of imitation. As a result, the effect of partnership on sales and the 
likelihood of issuing an IPO will be higher in the presence of IP-based appropriability 
strategies. 
Appropriability risks will also be affected by the ownership and strength of specialized 
downstream capabilities (Arora and Ceccagnoli 2006; Ceccagnoli and Rothaermel 2008; 
Gans and Stern 2003; Rothaermel and Hill 2005; Teece 1986). These are specialized 
downstream assets necessary to manufacture, market, and distribute products, e.g., assets 
that lose value when redeployed to other classes of products. For example, sales forces 
that specialize in a particular product may have accumulated specialized skills that are 
not easily transferred and would require time and costly retraining to be exploited in 
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selling different classes of products. Specialized complementary assets are difficult to 
imitate since they are built over long periods of time, are not easily codified, and often 
result from the interaction of people from different parts of a firm’s organization (Teece 
1992). 
The effect of partnering on the ISVs’ returns will be higher in the presence of specialized 
downstream capabilities for two reasons. First, the returns to accessing the platform 
owner’s installed base will be greater if the ISV has an established brand image or strong 
marketing, distribution and service capabilities, as it is able to convert platform adopters 
into its own customers more effectively. Second, an ISV with strong downstream 
capabilities will be better able to defend its “territory” in the presence of platform owner 
entry than firms without such capabilities. Knowledge embedded in business practices or 
downstream service and consulting activities is difficult to codify and therefore will be 
more difficult for the platform owner to imitate (Barney 1991; Dierickx and Cool 1989). 
For example, implementation of enterprise software often requires extensive effort to 
configure it to meet the user’s idiosyncratic needs (Hitt et al. 2002; Ko et al. 2005). 
Knowledge of how to conduct such configurations will typically reside in the consulting 
and service activities of the ISV. Such downstream knowledge and capabilities are 
difficult to transfer across firm boundaries (Brown and Duguid 2001; Von Hippel 1994b) 
and may also act as a barrier to entry.  
In summary, I argue that the extent to which an ISV may benefit from joining a platform 
ecosystem is likely to vary according to the ISV’s ownership of IPR and downstream 
capabilities. Particularly, I propose 
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Hypothesis 3 (H3). The positive effect of an ISV’s participation in an ecosystem on sales 
is greater when a) the ISV is better protected by intellectual property rights such as 
patents and copyrights, and b) the ISV has stronger downstream capabilities.  
Hypothesis 4 (H4). The positive effect of an ISV’s participation in an ecosystem on the 
likelihood of issuing an IPO is greater when a) the ISV is better protected by intellectual 
property rights such as patents and copyrights, and b) the ISV has stronger downstream 
capabilities. 









3.3. Methods and Measures 
3.3.1. Research Context 
Enterprise software is often considered to be the organizational operating system 
(Chellappa and Saraf forthcoming; Cotteleer and Bendoly 2006), which consolidates the 
diverse information needs of an enterprise’s departments together into a single, integrated 
software that operates on a shared database. In this study I am interested in the 
partnership between an enterprise software platform owner and the ISVs that develop 
complementary applications that are integrated with the owner’s platform. As noted 
above, I adopt the definition of Boudreau (2007) and define a platform as the components 
used in common across a product family whose functionality can be extended by 
applications and is subject to network effects. ISV applications extend the functionality 
of the platform and co-create value for customers who adopt the platform. SAP AG, the 
business software company, is chosen as the focal enterprise software platform owner for 
several reasons. First, SAP’s enterprise computing platform is economically significant. 
Partnerships are core to SAP’s platform strategy and its network of software solution 
providers, value-added resellers, distributors, technology and services partners 
(numbering over 7,000 as of 2009) is among the industry's largest (SAP 2009b). Second, 
many core features of SAP’s platform are common to other settings where platform 
owners co-create value with their partners. For example,  partnership with SAP signals 
compatibility with SAP’s platform (Chellappa and Saraf forthcoming), enabling ISVs to 
more easily sell to SAP’s installed base. Similar motivations are behind the decisions of 
firms to join platforms such as Cisco’s Internetwork Operating System (IOS) platform for 
computer networking (Gawer and Cusumano 2002). Further, platform participants in 
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other industries face similar expropriation risks, as platform owners have entered 
complementary markets for efficiency gains or strategic advantage (Casadesus-Masanell 
and Yoffie 2007; Eisenmann et al. 2007; Gawer and Cusumano 2002; Gawer and 
Henderson 2007).  
To join SAP’s partner program, ISVs develop a product and then obtain a certification 
from SAP which endorses the interoperability between the product and the SAP platform. 
In particular, ISVs that plan to achieve software integration with the SAP solutions work 
with one of the local SAP integration and certification centers (ICCs) to have their 
product certified. The process typically involves a feasibility study, service offer 
processing, and extensive testing by SAP. If successful, SAP issues a formal SAP ICC 
contract for the ISV to sign and applicable fees are paid by the ISV and the now-certified 
integration is publicly listed online in the SAP partner information center. 
By making its product SAP-certified, the ISV effectively signals its compatibility with 
the SAP platform. This will strengthen the ISV’s ability to sell to SAP’s large customer 
base. In addition, by teaming up with a prestigious industry leader, ISVs gain 
endorsements, enhance their social legitimacy, and signal their technological excellence 
(Stuart et al. 1999). The reputation consequences of strategic partnership are particularly 
important in high-technology industries, which are noted for pervasive uncertainty 
(Tushman and Rosenkopf 1992).  
A couple of examples will help to place my research context in perspective. LogicTools 
Inc. is a software company that provides an integrated suite of strategic supply chain 
planning solutions that optimize the supply chain by simultaneously optimizing account 
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production, warehousing, transportation and inventory costs, as well as service level 
requirements. It became an SAP software partner in January 2004 (Simchi-Levi et al. 
2006). Since then, LogicTools’ customer base has been growing rapidly, adding 30 new 
clients in 2005 alone, with its sales growing by over 50% in 2005 (Business Wire Inc. 
2006). According to the press release, “LogicTools' software partnership with SAP and 
certified integrations make LogicTools' solutions an easy choice for many companies”. 
As yet another example, TIBCO Software Inc. (www.tibco.com), an ISV that provides 
enterprise application integration solutions, certified its interface for SAP R/3 solutions 
and became a member of the SAP Complementary Software Partner program in 1998 
(Business Wire Inc. 1998). Since then it became the de facto standard for event-driven 
computing and enterprise application integration in finance, manufacturing, construction, 
electronic commerce and other industries, and obtained an initial public offering at 
NASDAQ one year later (Business Wire Inc. 1999). This IPO was highly successful with 
a strong first day of trading, when its stock price increased from $15 to $32.375. 
On the other hand, joining SAP’s platform ecosystem is not costless for ISVs. Besides the 
fixed cost of developing a platform-compliant version of the software solution, 
certification application fees and yearly membership fees, there are considerable 
misappropriation risks for ISVs due to the extensive knowledge sharing involved in the 
relationship. For example, AMC Technology, a leading provider of multi-channel 
integration solutions that allows contact centers to more efficiently manage all types of 
customer interactions, has been a certified SAP software partner since 1998. With its 
introduction of the product suite mySAP CRM 5.0 in 2005, SAP folded the multi-channel 
integration functionality into its platform and entered into AMC’s product territory with a 
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“CRM Interaction Center” module, which allegedly contained copyrighted AMC code 
from AMC’s “Multi-Channel Management Suite” product. AMC soon filed a lawsuit that 
claimed vicarious copyright infringement, breach of contract, and misappropriation of 
trade secrets by SAP (Shapiro 2005).  
3.3.2. Data 
I test my theoretical predictions using a longitudinal data set of 1210 small independent 
software vendors over the period of 1996 - 2004. I collect information on both the ISVs’ 
decisions to join SAP’s innovation ecosystem and information on their business 
performance. The sampling period starts from 1996 as I find no such partnership 
activities between SAP and small ISVs in the sample before then (more details will be 
provided later in the section on variable definitions). 
My primary data source is the CorpTech database, which has detailed information on 
over 100,000 public and private firms, including information on sales, employees, 
product offerings, source of funding and company executives.13 It is well known that 
studies related to firm performance solely based on public firms may suffer from severe 
sample selection bias (Cockburn and MacGarvie 2006; Shan 1990), and will be 
particularly problematic for my study given my focus on small firms.  
To construct a representative sample of entrepreneurial ISVs that could potentially form 
partnerships with SAP, I first identify within CorpTech the set of firms operating in the 
United States and who list computer software as their primary industry. To further 
                                                 
13 These data have been used frequently to study firm behavior in technology industries. For examples of 
recent studies using the CorpTech database to study the software industry, see Lerner and Zhu (2007) and 
Cockburn and MacGarvie (2009).  
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identify firms in the enterprise software industry I examine the product portfolios of 
current SAP software partners, and then find all software firms in CorpTech that produce 
similar products. The first step involves retrieving a complete list of SAP’s current 
software partners. SAP publishes the directory of all its certified partners as well as their 
solution offerings on its Internet portal,14 and a search using the terms “Country: United 
States” and “Partner Category: Independent Software Vendor” yields a list of 411 
software firms that are current SAP partners. Comparing this list with software firms 
within CorpTech generates 206 matching records.  
I use these matching records to identify the set of potential partners. One of the key 
advantages of the CorpTech database is that it records the product portfolio of each 
company and assigns each product to a 3-digit product class.15 I retrieve the distinct 2-
digit product classification codes of the 206 current SAP software partners, and find that 
SOF-MA (manufacturing software, 61 firms) and SOF-WD (warehousing/distribution 
software, 44 firms), are the most frequent software product codes in the product 
portfolios of the matched partnering firms. To verify that the unmatched partners are not 
systematically different from those matched to CorpTech, I collect information on the 
unmatched ISVs from Company Insight Center (CIC), a database launched by 
BusinessWeek and Capital IQ. A short business profile is obtained from CIC for each of 
the remaining ISVs, which is complemented by a description of their business and 
products I collect from the ISVs’ websites. Then I manually examine the product 
portfolio of these ISVs by reading their business profiles and product descriptions. I find 
                                                 
14 http://www.sap.com/ecosystem/customers/directories/searchpartner.epx. 
15 CorpTech uses a proprietary, 3-digit product classification system. For example, a product coded as 
“AUT-AT-DA” means “factory automation”-“automatic test equipment”-“analog/digital component”. 
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that manufacturing software and warehouse/distribution software are also the two most 
frequently produced by the unmatched ISVs, similar to the ISVs that are matched in the 
CorpTech database. I subsequently define my sample as firms that have produced SOF-
MA or SOF-WD products during the sample period.16 The final query retrieves 2175 
ISVs from the CorpTech database.  
I further exclude established incumbents and restrict my sample to startup ISVs. 
Consistent with prior literature (Petersen and Rajan 1994; Puranam et al. 2006) that has 
focused on small, entrepreneurial businesses, I restrict my sample to firms with less than 
$500 million in sales and 1000 employees, and those established after 1980. I exclude 
established incumbents because of my research focus on small ISV behaviors and 
because the partnering incentives and payoffs of large firms are likely to be quite 
different from those of small firms. For example, to the extent that large firms sponsor 
platforms of their own, partnership may increase the value of a large firm’s own platform. 
Also the misappropriation risks that large firms face after partnering may be quite 
different than those of small firms due to the latter’s strong IPRs and/or downstream 
capabilities. My final sample consists of 1210 ISVs with 6578 observations over the 1996 
- 2004 time period. The typical ISV in the final sample is about 12 years old, with 56 
employees and average sales of $7 million.  
It should be noted that in my setting ISVs produce software products that can be sold 
both as a stand-alone product and as platform compliant software. Once the product is 
                                                 
16 As an additional check, I manually go through the business description field in the CorpTech data set for 
each company, and visit the website of each firm (if the company no longer exists, I visit the archival web 
site from www.archive.org instead) to confirm that the ISVs produce enterprise software applications, and 
delete those that do not fit the profile. 
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developed, the cost of making it compatible with a platform (technical cost, to be 
specific) is considerably lower than product development cost. As a result, ISVs rarely 
make products that are dedicated to one specific platform from the beginning; in most 
cases a stand-alone product is first developed, then is made compatible with the platforms 
of incumbents. In addition, many ISVs certify their product for multiple platforms to gain 
access to as many customers as possible.17  
3.3.3. Dependent Variables 
Sales. Sales data for each company-year are retrieved directly from the CorpTech 
database, and are measured in millions of US dollars. I take the log form of the sales 
variable (that is, log (1+x) to avoid taking log of zeroes) as the dependent variable in the 
regressions because this variable is highly skewed to the right. When the distribution of 
dependent variable is skewed, models using logged dependent variable often satisfy the 
classical linear model assumptions more closely than models using the level of the 
dependent variable (Verbeek 2008; Wooldridge 2008). 
IPO. I search the Securities Data Company (SDC) platinum database to retrieve the list of 
ISVs in my sample that issued an initial public offering in the US market during the 
                                                 
17 As an additional check, I examined the history of SAP partners in my sample to check whether their 
certified products were new, exclusive add-ons for only one platform. If this is true, it may suggest 
alternative explanations for the proposed hypotheses, especially H1. I found that all the partners fell into 
one of three cases: (1) they had already produced multiple versions of the software prior to partnering with 
SAP; (2) they had already used trademarks related to the product in commerce at least two years prior to 
partnering (and so were not new); or (3) the product has been certified by multiple other enterprise software 
platforms such as Oracle, Siebel, J.D. Edwards, Infor, PeopleSoft, etc. I further note that ISVs in my 
sample had been around for several years prior to partnering; the average age of the ISVs in the year prior 
to patenting is 9.4 (with the youngest being 1 in the year prior to partnering (that is, 2 in the year when a 
partnership was formed) and oldest being 23), and the average sales of these firms at one year prior to 
partnering is $20.7 million (with the lowest being $.33 million). 
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sample period. I also obtain the date of IPO. The variable is set to 1 if an IPO is issued for 
a firm during a year, 0 otherwise.  
3.3.4. Independent Variables 
Partnership. The independent variable of interest is whether an ISV is an SAP-certified 
software solution provider in a particular year. As my study is longitudinal in nature, 
using the list of partnering ISVs retrieved from SAP’s web portal as the dependent 
variable is problematic for several reasons. First, the list of partnering ISVs reflects only 
the current snapshot but fails to capture historical partnering events. Second, the 
enterprise software industry experiences considerable entry and exit during the sampling 
period; many partnering firms are eventually acquired by or merged with other 
companies. Third, information about the exact partnering date is missing from SAP’s web 
portal, which makes determination of the year of partnership formation difficult. 
As an alternative to overcome the aforementioned difficulties, I identify the partnership 
formation events through press releases. To test the viability of this approach, I examined 
the existing partner list retrieved from the SAP web portal to see whether a matching 
press release could be found in the Lexis/Nexis database for each firm. For a random 
sample (60 firms) of the 411 existing SAP partners, I am able to find a matching news 
release for over 98% of the firms, which confirms the validity of using press releases to 
determine the formation of partnerships. I subsequently apply the same algorithm to my 
sample universe and retrieve 148 alliance events between sample ISVs and SAP. It is 
notable that there has been no such alliance activity prior to 1996. I further exclude pure 
joint development, marketing or distribution alliances and alliances after 2004 from the 
list. In addition, for ISVs that have multiple SAP alliance press releases (due to 
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certification for multiple products, new versions of same product, or different interface 
certifications), I use the first instance of such events to indicate the time that the ISV 
joins SAP’s platform ecosystem.  
The partnership variable is set equal to 1 in the first year that a partnership is formed and 
remains 1 for the rest of the years, and is 0 otherwise. I treat partnering with SAP as an 
absorbing state, as there are no obvious reasons for a partnering ISV to make its certified 
product incompatible with SAP’s platform. In order to verify that partnering with SAP is 
indeed an absorbing state, I collect information on the ISVs’ status after the partnering 
events. I find that partnering ISVs fall into the following three categories. (1) 31% of the 
ISVs are partners with SAP as of April 2010 (they are listed on SAP’s current ecosystem 
website) and their products remain certified. (2) 46% of the ISVs were acquired or 
merged with other companies since they partnered with SAP. By reading the press 
releases of these merger and acquisition events, I find that the certified product existed at 
the acquisition/merger event in all cases, and note that such firms are dropped from my 
sample subsequently. (3) 23% of the ISVs are no longer listed on SAP’s website as 
certified partners, but their most recent SAP certification occurs after 2004, the end of my 
sample period. To summarize, these efforts reassure me that partnering is an absorbing 
state for all the ISVs during my sample period (1996 - 2004). 
Patents. I measure the patent stock of ISVs by using the USPTO CASSIS patent BIB 
database. Although diversified software vendors may have patented innovations in 
related areas (e.g., manufacturing control or data acquisition equipment), I am primarily 
interested in their software patents. I follow Hall and MacGarvie (2006) by defining the 
universe of software patents as the intersection of the two sets of criteria: the patents in 
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the software-related U.S. Patent Office technology classes defined by Graham and 
Mowery (2005), and those that are found in the results of a Boolean queries that searches 
for key words in the text of issued patents (as defined by Bessen and Hunt (2007))18. For 
a survey of different ways to identify software-related inventive activities see Arora et al. 
(2008b). I also weight the resulting stock of software patents using each patent’s forward 
citations, to account for the heterogeneity in the value of an innovation protected by the 
patent (Hall et al. 2001).19  
Copyrights. The cumulative number of registered software copyrights for each firm-year 
is obtained from the United States Copyright Office.20 To indicate copyright type, the US 
Copyright Office assigns a prefix to each copyright it issues. As I am interested in 
software copyrights, I retrieve only those copyrights that are described as “computer file” 
within the TX (monograph including books, maps and software) class.  
Downstream Capabilities. Following prior literature, I use the stock of software 
trademarks registered in the U.S. as a proxy of  the ISV’s effort to build brand, 
reputation, and distribution channels (Gao and Hitt 2004). According to the USPTO 
definition, a trademark is “a word, phrase, symbol or design, or combination of words, 
phrases, symbols or designs, that identifies and distinguishes the source of the goods or 
services of one party from those of others.” While trademarks may not directly protect a 
                                                 
18 As a robustness check, I also use the union of the two software patent sets and derive alternative 
measures, and find that all the empirical results are robust to this alternative measure. 
19 Use of patent data is becoming increasingly common in IS research. For one example, see Kleis et al. 
(2009). 
20 A copyright protects the original expression of an idea fixed in a medium and does not need to be 
registered to be obtained. However, registration of a copyright in the US Copyright Office provides 
evidence of validity of the claim and enables the right holder to file an infringement suit in court and to file 




firm against the imitation of its products by its rivals per se, they enhance a firm’s 
appropriability by legally protecting its investments in marketing and other intangibles 
such as brand and reputation (Fosfuri et al. 2008). It is important to note that trademarks 
not only protect the brand and logo of a firm’s products, but also the broader marketing 
and promotional investments. For example, “The Best-Run Businesses Run SAP” is a 
registered trademark of SAP AG, as well as Microsoft’s slogan “Global Access to Local 
Knowledge”. I follow prior research where trademarks have been used as a proxy for the 
stock of marketing-specific downstream assets and a firm’s brand capital (Fosfuri et al. 
2008; Gambardella and Giarratana 2006). Brand capital represents a hard to imitate 
capability since it is not easily contracted for through the market on competitive terms 
and is hard to be redeployed to alternative uses and alternative users (Williamson 1991). 
The data have been obtained from the USPTO CASSIS Trademarks BIB database. I use 
only software trademarks that are active for the firm-year.  
3.3.5. Control Variables 
I control for a number of firm characteristics that could potentially influence operational 
performance. In particular, I control for an ISV’s basic R&D capabilities by including its 
yearly stock of publications in academic journals or conferences in both the sales and 
IPO regressions. I obtain this variable from the ISI Web of Knowledge database, by 
searching for the ISV’s name as organization and (“article” or “proceedings paper”) as 
document type. I weight the number of publications by the number of forward citations 
obtained by each article, to account for heterogeneity in their importance. 
Software firms’ funding sources are likely to impact their operations. I therefore control 
for the effect of firms’ source of funding. I create three dummy variables, cinvest, pinvest 
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and vinvest following the CorpTech database classification of funding sources into 
corporate investment, private investment or venture capital investment.  
I also control for firm age in both performance equations based on the year in which an 
ISV was established, as well as its quadratic term, to account for nonlinear effects. As 
typically done for IPO equations, I control for firm size by incorporating the number of 
employees, which is obtained directly from the CorpTech database. Due to the high 
correlation (> 0.9) between sales and employees I exclude sales in IPO equation to avoid 
multicollinearity (Hsu 2006). The variable employees is not included in the sales equation 
due to endogeneity concerns. To control for performance differences between public and 
privately held companies I instead add an ownership indicator variable in the sales 
equation.  
Investments in product and process innovations are driven in part by expectations about 
the potential size of the market and its growth potential (Acemoglu and Linn 2004; 
Cohen 1995; Schmookler 1966). In other words, ecosystem partnership may be 
associated with unobserved industry-level features such as expected industry growth that 
may influence a firm’s success. To control for these industry-level features, I obtain the 
target industries that each ISV serves from the CorpTech database and classify them into 
40 categories (such as banking, chemical, oil and gas). Next, I calculate the industry 
growth rate by averaging the sales growth rates of all the ISVs that serve the industry. I 
then map the industry growth to individual ISVs and derive the variable industryGrowth 
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as a control. Table 3.1 presents the summary statistics of all of my variables, as well as 
the correlation among them21. 
3.3.6. Methods 
Main Effect of Partnering. Cross-sectional analysis of the effect of partnering on an 
ISV’s performance is likely to suffer from unobserved firm heterogeneity which may be 
correlated with partnering decisions, resulting in inconsistent estimates. I choose panel 
data methods with fixed effects as a starting point for the empirical analysis. Specifically, 
for firm sales I estimate the following equation: 
 
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠��) = 𝛼 + 𝛽�𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟�� + 𝛽�𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡�� + 𝛽�𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑦𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡��
+ 𝛽�𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘�� + 𝛽�𝑎𝑔𝑒�� +  𝛽�𝑎𝑔𝑒��
�
+  𝛽�𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐�� + 𝛽�𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡�� + 𝛽�𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡��
+ 𝛽��𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑡�� + 𝛽��𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛��
+ 𝛽��𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ�� + 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟� +  𝑐� + 𝑢��  
(3.1) 
where 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟� is a set of year dummies, and 𝑐� denotes firm fixed effects. The variables 
patent, copyright, trademark and publication are entered in log form (that is, log (1+x) to 
avoid taking log of zeroes) because their distributions are highly skewed. 
 
                                                 
21 Notice that the correlations need to be interpreted with caution due to the panel structure of the data. For 
example, the correlation coefficient between partner and IPO is 0.06. If the data are collapsed at the firm 
level the correlation increases to 0.24, which reflect variation between firms. Similarly, the correlation 
between trademarks and IPO is 0.005 overall, but jumps to 0.11 in the between sample. It is difficult to 
describe the correlation between variables within firms. 
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Table 3.1 Summary Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
  Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 Salesi,t 7.539 16.219 0.000 206.400 1.000 
             2 IPOi,t+1 0.004 0.064 0.000 1.000 0.035 1.000 
            3 Partneri,t 0.017 0.129 0.000 1.000 0.295 0.063 1.000 
           4 Copyrighti,t 1.988 12.841 0.000 498.000 0.253 0.029 0.044 1.000 
          5 Patenti,t 0.145 0.722 0.000 13.000 0.303 0.038 0.129 0.016 1.000 
         6 Trademarki,t 0.835 2.011 0.000 23.000 0.377 0.005 0.154 0.282 0.338 1.000 
        7 Agei,t 12.566 5.830 0.000 24.000 -0.052 -0.059 -0.058 0.069 -0.114 0.004 1.000 
       8 Publicationi,t 0.600 5.259 0.000 137.000 0.044 -0.005 0.003 0.001 -0.005 0.030 0.045 1.000 
      9 Corporate investi,t 0.046 0.210 0.000 1.000 0.102 0.010 0.101 -0.019 0.031 0.062 -0.118 -0.016 1.000 
     10 Private investi,t 0.501 0.500 0.000 1.000 -0.087 -0.029 -0.039 -0.007 -0.048 -0.053 -0.144 -0.017 -0.068 1.000 
    11 VC investi,t 0.122 0.327 0.000 1.000 0.176 0.108 0.171 -0.008 0.155 0.106 -0.339 0.039 0.071 -0.073 1.000 
   12 Employeei,t 56.248 104.904 1.000 997.000 0.901 0.071 0.283 0.240 0.286 0.385 -0.075 0.049 0.108 -0.100 0.199 1.000 
  13 Industry growthi,t 1.261 0.342 0.873 6.322 0.007 0.006 0.012 -0.001 -0.012 -0.023 -0.051 0.013 -0.019 -0.015 -0.019 0.011 1.000 
 14 Publici,t 0.061 0.239 0.000 1.000 0.447 -0.017 0.230 0.059 0.248 0.243 -0.058 0.072 0.075 -0.040 0.157 0.477 0.013 1.000 
Notes.  





Following prior studies (Forman et al. 2009; Gowrisankaran and Stavins 2004; Tucker 
2008) with binary dependent variables, I estimate the IPO regression using a linear 
probability model with firm fixed effects, due to the known difficulty of controlling for 
time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity using panel data probit or logit models. In 
particular, I estimate:  
 
1(𝐼𝑃𝑂���� = 1)
= 𝛼 + 𝛽�𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟�� + 𝛽�𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡�� + 𝛽�𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑦𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡��
+ 𝛽�𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘�� + 𝛽�𝑎𝑔𝑒�� + 𝛽�𝑎𝑔𝑒��
�
+ 𝛽�𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡�� + 𝛽�𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡�� + 𝛽�𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑡��
+ 𝛽��𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛�� + 𝛽��𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ��
+ 𝛽�� 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒�� + 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟��� +  𝑐� + 𝑢����  
(3.2) 
where 1(𝐼𝑃𝑂���� = 1) represents a binary variable indicating whether an IPO has been 
issued in year t+1. Note that only private firms are included in the IPO regression. The 
observations after a firm goes public are dropped from the sample as the firm is no longer 
exposed to the hazard of issuing an IPO. I lag all the independent variables by one year to 
further mitigate for potential endogeneity of the right-hand-side variables. Number of 
employees is entered into the regression equation in log form. 
Moderating Effects of Appropriation Mechanisms. In order to evaluate Hypotheses 3 and 
4, I add interactions between an ISV’s partnering status and its IPR and downstream 
capabilities. To enable a more intuitive interpretation of my regression results, I create 
discrete measures of IPR and downstream capabilities. Particularly, the variables 
highCopyright and highTrademark are set to 1 if an ISV’s cumulative number of 
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copyrights and trademarks are in the top quartile of the distribution22. Because less than 
15% of the observations have patents, the variable highPatent is set to 1 if an ISV has at 
least one patent during the year, 0 otherwise. 
To summarize, I estimate the following two equations to test if the effects of partnering 
on an ISV’s sales and likelihood of issuing an IPO are moderated by appropriation 
mechanisms. 
 
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠��) = 𝛼 + 𝛽�𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟�� + 𝛽�ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡��
+ 𝛽�ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑦𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡�� + 𝛽�ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘��
+ 𝛽�𝑎𝑔𝑒�� +  𝛽�𝑎𝑔𝑒��
� +  𝛽�𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐�� + 𝛽�𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡��
+ 𝛽�𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡�� + 𝛽��𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑡�� + 𝛽��𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛��
+ 𝛽��𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ�� + 𝛽��𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟��
× ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡�� + 𝛽��𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟�� × ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑦𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡��
+ 𝛽��𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟�� × ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘�� + 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟� +  𝑐�




= 𝛼 + 𝛽�𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟�� + 𝛽�ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡��
+ 𝛽�ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑦𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡�� + 𝛽�𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘��
+ 𝛽�𝑎𝑔𝑒�� +  𝛽�𝑎𝑔𝑒��
� + 𝛽�𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡�� + 𝛽�𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡��
+ 𝛽�𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑡�� + 𝛽��𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛��
+ 𝛽��𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ�� + 𝛽�� 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒��
+ 𝛽��𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟�� × ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡�� + 𝛽��𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟��
× ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑦𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡�� + 𝛽��𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟��
× ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘�� + 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟��� +  𝑐� + 𝑢����  
(3.4) 
 
                                                 
22 As a robustness check, I test the models using an alternative threshold, the 50th percentile, to define the 
variables highpatent, highcopyright and hightrademark. I conduct further robustness checks using 
continuous values for patents, copyrights and trademarks. All my findings reported in the main text are 




3.4.1. Effect of Joining Platform Ecosystem on Sales 
The results of fixed effects models that use log(sales) as the dependent variable are 
presented in Table 3.2. Variables are entered into the regressions sequentially. In column 
1 I present the baseline model in which only the variables partnering status, IPR and 
downstream capabilities are included. In column 2 I add the other control variables. In 
column 3 I include year dummies. 
Examining the results from the final model, I find support for Hypothesis 1, suggesting 
that joining a platform ecosystem is associated with greater sales. The variable partner is 
significant at the 5% level in all of the models. On average, ISVs enjoy a 26% (=e.23-1) 
increase in sales after they become SAP certified. Interestingly, I also find that ISVs’ 
annual sales are strongly correlated with their appropriability mechanisms, as the 
coefficients of patent, copyright and trademark are positive and highly significant.23  
  
                                                 
23 Note that I present two sets of R-squared values in all of my tables. First, I present “within” R-squares 
that do not include the explanatory power of the fixed effects on the explained sum of squares, and are 
computed based on the fraction of variance explained within firms. These within R-square values are lower 
than my R-squared with fixed effects, which are based on the total (within and between) sum of squares 
and incorporate the explanatory power of the fixed effects. Note that in my IPO regressions, my dependent 
variable is binary, not continuous, and regressions with binary dependent variables typically have lower R-
squared values than continuous variables. For further examples, see Forman et al. (2009).  
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Table 3.2 Effect of Partnering on Sales 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Baseline  
model 
With firm level 
 controls 
With year  
dummies 
Partner 0.484*** 0.254** 0.231** 
 (0.115) (0.105) (0.105) 
Patent 0.179*** 0.121*** 0.111*** 
 (0.032) (0.026) (0.027) 
Copyright 0.233*** 0.167*** 0.156*** 
 (0.034) (0.031) (0.031) 
Trademark 0.204*** 0.102*** 0.085*** 
 (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) 
Age  0.079*** 0.037*** 
  (0.009) (0.011) 
Age2  -0.002*** -0.002*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Publication  0.062 0.048 
  (0.065) (0.065) 
Cinvest  0.339*** 0.327*** 
  (0.119) (0.117) 
Pinvest  0.040 0.027 
  (0.045) (0.045) 
Vinvest  0.172** 0.171** 
  (0.085) (0.085) 
IndustryGrowth  0.048*** 0.055*** 
  (0.015) (0.016) 
Public  0.715*** 0.704*** 
  (0.136) (0.136) 
Year dummies No No Yes 
Constant 1.232*** 0.476*** 0.848*** 
 (0.019) (0.071) (0.090) 
Observations 6578 6578 6578 
Number of firms 1210 1210 1210 
R-squared (within) 0.103 0.183 0.192 
R-squared (with fixed effects) 0.906 0.914 0.915 
Notes. 
Fixed effects panel data models with robust standard errors in parentheses. 




3.4.2. Effect of Joining Platform Ecosystem on IPO 
Hypothesis 2 suggests that joining a platform innovation ecosystem is associated with a 
greater likelihood of issuing an IPO. The hypothesis is supported by the results in Table 
3.3. As I did for the sales models, I present the baseline model in column 1, the one with 
the full set of control variables in column 2, and include year dummies in column 3. The 
variable partner is significant at the 5% or 10% level in all of the models. Using the 
results of the full model in column 3, I find that joining SAP’s platform ecosystem is 
associated with a 5.9 percentage point increase in the likelihood of obtaining an IPO, 




Table 3.3 Effect of Partnering on IPO 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Baseline  
model 
With firm level  
controls 
With year  
dummies 
Partner 0.066** 0.060* 0.059* 
 (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) 
Patent 0.004 0.005 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Copyright 0.019** 0.016** 0.016* 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Trademark 0.002 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Age  0.000 -0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
Age2  -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Publication  -0.006* -0.006* 
  (0.003) (0.003) 
Employee  0.004*** 0.004** 
  (0.002) (0.002) 
Cinvest  0.043 0.044 
  (0.028) (0.028) 
Pinvest  0.004 0.004 
  (0.005) (0.005) 
Vinvest  0.027 0.028 
  (0.021) (0.021) 
IndustryGrowth  0.002 -0.001 
  (0.002) (0.002) 
Year dummies No No Yes 
Constant -0.005 -0.025*** -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.009) (0.022) 
Observations 62661 62661 62661 
Number of firms 11751 11751 11751 
R-squared (within) 0.020 0.032 0.037 
R-squared (with fixed effects) 0.654 0.662 0.664 
Notes. 
Fixed effects panel data models with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.  





3.4.3. Robustness Checks  
I test a number of alternative models and use different variable definitions to demonstrate 
the robustness of my findings. The results are presented in Table 3.4 (sales results) and 
Table 3.5 (IPO results).  
First, in the benchmark models I use forward-citation-weighted patents and publications 
as independent variables. In column 1 of Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 I present a similar 
specification using a fixed effects model and raw counts of patent stocks and scientific 
publications that are unweighted by forward citations. Second, although fixed effects 
models are robust to unobserved heterogeneity and require weaker model assumptions, 
they are more susceptible to attenuation bias arising from measurement error (Griliches 
and Hausman 1986). In column 2 of Tables 3.4 and 3.5 I present the results from a 
random effects model. I observe that the estimates of the marginal effects of partnering 




Table 3.4 Robustness Check, Sales 










Partner 0.230** 0.232** 0.298*** 1.995** 
 (0.102) (0.096) (0.115) (0.822) 
Patent 0.443*** 0.097*** 0.110*** 0.100*** 
 (0.091) (0.022) (0.027) (0.029) 
Copyright 0.128*** 0.173*** 0.156*** 0.136*** 
 (0.031) (0.022) (0.031) (0.032) 
Trademark 0.080*** 0.136*** 0.084*** 0.057** 
 (0.023) (0.021) (0.023) (0.028) 
Age 0.035*** 0.032*** 0.036*** 0.037*** 
 (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) 
Age2 -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Publication 0.062 0.014 0.049 0.089 
 (0.060) (0.044) (0.065) (0.068) 
Cinvest 0.321*** 0.301*** 0.328*** 0.347*** 
 (0.118) (0.082) (0.117) (0.125) 
Pinvest 0.024 -0.058* 0.028 0.036 
 (0.044) (0.033) (0.045) (0.048) 
Vinvest 0.166* 0.290*** 0.168** 0.033 
 (0.086) (0.059) (0.086) (0.108) 
IndustryGrowth 0.054*** 0.059*** 0.055*** 0.057*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) 
Public 0.626*** 0.791*** 0.705*** 0.426** 
 (0.137) (0.105) (0.136) (0.217) 
One year before partnering   0.070  
   (0.102)  
Two years before partnering   0.122  
   (0.123)  
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.868*** 0.941*** 0.850***  
 (0.090) (0.067) (0.090)  
Observations 6578 6578 6578 6578 
Number of firms 1210 1210 1210 1210 
R-squared (within) 0.197 . 0.193 0.069 
R-squared (with fixed effects) 0.915  0.915  
Notes. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 




Table 3.5 Robustness Check, IPO 









Partner 0.059* 0.058* 0.063* 0.242* 
 (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.132) 
Patent 0.018 0.006 0.004 0.002 
 (0.016) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Copyright 0.015* 0.014** 0.016** 0.014* 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) 
Trademark -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Age -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age2 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Publication -0.010** -0.005 -0.005* -0.002 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Employee 0.004** 0.006*** 0.004** 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Cinvest 0.044 0.028 0.044 0.041 
 (0.028) (0.021) (0.028) (0.028) 
Pinvest 0.004 -0.002 0.004 0.006 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Vinvest 0.029 0.035** 0.028 0.014 
 (0.021) (0.015) (0.021) (0.018) 
IndustryGrowth -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
One year before partnering   -0.009  
   (0.030)  
Two years before partnering   0.032  
   (0.050)  
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.002 -0.021* -0.003  
 (0.022) (0.011) (0.022)  
Observations 62661 62661 62661 62661 
Number of firms 11751 11751 11751 11751 
R-squared (within) 0.038 . 0.040 0.041 
R-squared (with fixed effects) 0.664  0.665  
Notes. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.  




It is possible that there exist time-varying omitted variables that affect both the ISV’s 
decision to join SAP’s platform ecosystem and its performance, which are not fully 
accounted for in the fixed effects models in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. For example, it is possible 
that ISVs with superior performance choose to join the SAP’s platform ecosystem. I 
address these endogeneity concerns in several ways. First, as a falsification test I verify 
that the measured positive impacts of partnering on ISV performances do not occur 
before the partnering year (Agrawal and Goldfarb 2008). If we expect firms with better 
financial status will join SAP’s ecosystem, it is likely that I will observe an increase in 
sales or the likelihood of an IPO in the years preceding their partnership with SAP. To 
investigate this possibility, I add as additional controls two dummy variables that are 
equal to one in the two years prior to the first partnering event. I present the results in 
column 3 of Tables 4 and 5. The results show no significant preexisting trend on sales or 
the likelihood of an IPO for partnering ISVs. The effect only takes place after partnering 
with SAP.  
Second, I use instrumental variables (IV) methods to address potential endogeneity 
concerns. In particular, I use two candidate variables that should be correlated with the 
partnering decision but not with financial performance. The first variable describes how 
many executives of an ISV have personal connections with SAP. From the CorpTech 
database I retrieve the complete list of executives for every firm-year. I then look up the 
working experience of each executive on the business-oriented social network website, 
LinkedIn, to find if he/she has ever worked for SAP as an employee. I then aggregate the 
number of executive links to SAP at the firm-year level. The rationale for using this 
variable as an instrument is that an executive’s past working experience at SAP is likely 
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to establish personal connections that would increase the propensity to partner with SAP. 
However, it is unlikely to be correlated with unobserved firm-level factors that would 
increase the performance of the firm where he/she serves as an executive. The second 
variable describes the propensity to partner with SAP among ISVs that serve markets 
similar to those of the focal ISV. The CorpTech database has data on the target industries 
within which each company sells its products and services, which I broadly classify into 
40 categories. I calculate the fraction of ISVs that partner with SAP in each industry-year, 
and use this to approximate the partnering propensity at the industry level. I then 
calculate the partnering propensity for each ISV, by weighting these data by the set of 
industries served by the ISV. If an ISV serves multiple industries, the industry level 
propensities are averaged to derive the ISV’s propensity. The logic for this variable is 
that it will capture cross-industry differences in the value of partnership. However, 
conditional on my controls for industry growth, it should be uncorrelated with factors 
influencing ISV performance. Following prior literature on instrumental variables under 
binary endogenous variables, I use these instruments to run a probit model of the 
propensity of a firm-year to be an SAP partner.24 I then use the predicted probability of 
partnership from this probit model, and the square of this predicted probability, as my 
instruments. Using nonlinear fitted values of instruments in this way has been shown 
under some cases to have superior efficiency properties than a traditional linear first stage 
but still provides consistent estimates (Angrist 2001; Newey 1990).  
                                                 
24 That is, I run the probit model of partnership on my two instruments: social connections and industry 
propensity to partner.  
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I present the results from the instrumental variable model in column 4 of Tables 4 and 5. 
My results are robust to the use of these models.25 
Since acquisition by another firm is often considered a successful exit strategy for small 
start-up firms, an alternative measure of forward-looking performance in the literature is 
whether the firm issues an IPO or has been acquired (Cockburn and MacGarvie 2009). I 
also examine how partnership influenced the likelihood of obtaining an IPO or 
acquisition,26 and the results were qualitatively similar to my IPO models.27 
3.4.4. Moderating Effect of Appropriability Mechanisms for Sales 
Hypothesis 3 suggests that the positive effect of joining a platform ecosystem on an 
ISV’s sales is greater when the ISV enjoys greater IPR protection or stronger downstream 
capabilities. In other words, the effect of partnering on ISV sales is moderated by their 
appropriability mechanisms. I present the results for the moderating effects in Table 3.6. 
As usual, fixed effects panel data models are used. Column 1 presents the baseline model 
where only partnering status, appropriability mechanisms and their interactions are 
included. In column 2 I add the control variables, while in column 3 I include year 
dummies. The results in column 3 suggest that ISVs who partner with SAP on average 
experience a 43.6% sales increase provided that they have high patent stocks, a 32% 
increase provided that they have high copyright stocks, or a 26.9% increase provided that 
                                                 
25 All the instrumental variable results presented in the study are supported by tests of instruments validity 
(available from the author upon request). Indeed, the p-value related to the tests of the joint null hypothesis 
of no effect of the instruments on partnership is always lower than 0.001. In addition, the tests of the 
overidentifying restrictions (Hansen J tests) always suggest that the instruments used are exogenous in all 
the IV specifications presented in the study. 
26 I define acquisitions as majority share acquisitions, and I exclude bankrupt acquisitions and liquidation 
acquisitions. Data are collected from the SDC Platinum database. 
27 Due to space constraints, the results of these models are not reported, but are available upon request.  
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they have high trademark stocks. The upper panel of Figure 3.2, which is based on 
column 3 of Table 3.6, visually illustrates the moderating effect of IPR and downstream 
capabilities on the relationship between partnership and ISV sales. Surprisingly, my 
results indicate that ISVs whose innovations are not protected by any means of 
appropriation do not experience any significant improvement in sales. If anything, their 
sales performance is poorer (though not significantly so) than if they did not partner.  
While a firm’s stock of trademarks is a good measure of its marketing and distribution 
capabilities, I acknowledge that the downstream capabilities of an ISV may encompass 
other equally important dimensions that may not be entirely captured by the firm’s stock 
of trademarks, such as its consulting and other professional service capabilities. As a 
robustness check of my measure of downstream capabilities, I construct a variable that 
measures the extent of software services that are offered by an ISV. The CorpTech 
database provides information on my sample firms’ portfolio of software service 
offerings, which are classified into categories such as software consulting services, 
business intelligence services, custom software programming services and artificial 
intelligence R&D services.28 From this information I derive the variable anyService, 
which indicates that the ISV offers services to its clients (about 22% of the sample has 
anyService equal to 1). After sales service and support is an important part of the service 
offerings of many ISVs, and in many cases will be required by potential buyers to 
purchase the software. Thus, it is an alternative measure of downstream capabilities. 
                                                 
28 The complete list of service categories is as follows: artificial intelligence (AI) services, AI software 
programming, AI R&D services, other R&D services not elsewhere classified, software consulting 
services, custom software programming services, applications software services, systems software services, 
other custom programming services, and other software services. 
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I present the results with this new measure in columns 4 and 5 of Table 3.6. When 
anyService is substituted for highTrademark it behaves very similar to the latter variable; 
the interaction term of Partner and anyService is positive and significant in column 4. 
However, when both highTrademark and anyService are included in the same regression 
(in column 5) I find that the latter variable is statistically insignificant. I take this as 
evidence that while both highTrademark and anyService capture downstream capabilities, 
highTrademark is more important than anyService in appropriating the returns from 
partnership. There may be several reasons for this result: trademarks may be a stronger 
appropriability mechanism because they are more difficult to imitate; further, in the case 
of a sales increase the stock of trademarks can be scaled up at a much lower cost than 
services. Regardless of the measure used, I find that the interactions between partner and 
highPatent and highCopyright are all positive and significant at conventional levels. The 




Table 3.6 Moderating Effect of IPR and Downstream Capabilities, Sales 














Partner 0.057 -0.084 -0.149 -0.043 -0.185 -0.543  
 (0.136) (0.129) (0.129) (0.107) (0.132) (1.398) 
HighPatent 0.616*** 0.383*** 0.346*** 0.356*** 0.344***  
 (0.058) (0.057) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056)  
HighCopyright 0.456*** 0.339*** 0.310*** 0.315*** 0.310***  
 (0.045) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)  
HighTrademark 0.199*** 0.104*** 0.088***  0.089*** 0.070* 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)  (0.021) (0.031) 
AnyService    0.009 0.017  
    (0.043) (0.043)  
HighIPR      0.285*** 
      (0.063) 
Partner × HighPatent 0.392*** 0.323** 0.362** 0.466*** 0.426***  
 (0.149) (0.143) (0.142) (0.148) (0.149)  
Partner × HighCopyright 0.251** 0.262** 0.278** 0.265** 0.295**  
 (0.127) (0.121) (0.121) (0.121) (0.121)  
Partner × HighTrademark 0.385*** 0.214** 0.238**  0.199* 1.175 
 (0.112) (0.107) (0.106)  (0.110) (0.765) 
Partner × AnyService    0.230* 0.161  
    (0.121) (0.124)  
Partner X HighIPR      2.498* 
      (1.323) 
Age  0.081*** 0.035*** 0.038*** 0.035*** 0.029*** 
  (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) 
Age2  -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Publication  0.083* 0.066 0.064 0.062 0.120* 
  (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.068) 
Cinvest  0.357*** 0.339*** 0.354*** 0.342*** 0.329** 
  (0.069) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.136) 
Pinvest  0.049 0.035 0.042 0.036 0.059 
  (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.050) 
Vinvest  0.165*** 0.164*** 0.158*** 0.159*** -0.035 
  (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.125) 
Public  0.749*** 0.730*** 0.754*** 0.732*** 0.484* 
  (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.225) 
IndustryGrowth  0.048*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.056*** 0.058*** 
  (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) 
Year dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 1.220*** 0.430*** 0.839*** 0.838*** 0.835***  
 (0.014) (0.053) (0.076) (0.077) (0.077)  
Observations 6578 6578 6578 6578 6578 6477 
Number of firms 1210 1210 1210 1210 1210 1109 
R-squared (within) 0.091 0.182 0.192 0.189 0.193 0.012 
R-squared  
(with fixed effects) 
0.904 0.913 0.915 0.914 0.915  
Notes.  
Fixed effects panel data models with robust standard errors in parentheses. 




Figure 3.2a: Marginal Effect of Partnership on 
Growth in Sales by Patent Stock 
 
Figure 3.2b: Marginal Effect of Partnership on 
Growth in Sales by Copyright Stock 
 
Figure 3.2c: Marginal Effect of Partnership on 
Growth in Sales by Trademark Stock 
 
Figure 3.2d: Marginal Effect of Partnership on 
IPO Likelihood by Patent Stock 
 
Figure 3.2e: Marginal Effect of Partnership on 
IPO Likelihood by Copyright Stock 
Notes:  
1. Marginal effects on sales are measured 
by percent increase 
2. Marginal effects on IPO are measured 
by increase in percentage point 
 








































































3.4.5. Moderating Effect of Appropriability Mechanisms for IPO 
I find that the positive effect of joining a platform ecosystem on the ISVs’ likelihood of 
issuing an IPO is also moderated by their appropriability mechanisms. Table 3.7 presents 
the results of this model. Confirming Hypothesis 4a (column 3 of Table 3.7), I find that 
the increase in the likelihood of obtaining an IPO will be 19.0 percentage points higher  
provided the ISV also has high patent stocks and 15.8 percentage points higher  provided 
it also has high copyright stocks. These results are statistically significant at conventional 
levels. I do not find evidence that ISVs with high trademarks experience greater benefits 
from partnering. The moderating effects of IPR are illustrated in the lower panel of 
Figure 3.2. In addition, I find that if the innovations of an ISV are not protected by any 
appropriability mechanism, there is no evidence that partnering will increase the 
likelihood of obtaining an IPO. This can be seen from the insignificant (and negative) 
coefficient of the partner variable. 
I believe that the lack of result for the interaction of partner and highTrademark may be 
due to a feature of my data: the number of IPOs decline dramatically throughout my 
sample because of the deterioration of financial market conditions in the wake of the dot-
com bust. At the same time, the fraction of firms with highTrademark increases from 
22.0% (in 1996) to 38.0% (in 2004). Thus, it is difficult for me to separate the effects of 
increasing trademarks from deteriorating financial market conditions on the likelihood of 
an IPO. In a separate set of regressions, I interacted my partner variable with a post-2001 
dummy and found that the marginal effect of partner on IPO declines substantially post-
2001 because of this change in external environment. Thus, I believe my coefficients for 
the partner × highTrademark variable are biased downward because of this change in 
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economic and financial conditions. As a robustness check, I also used the alternative 
measure anyService (column 4 and column 5) but again found no evidence that this 
measure of downstream capabilities was complementary with partnership. 29 
While I do use firm fixed effects in all of my models in Tables 6 and 7, one potential 
concern is that there may exist time-varying omitted variables that may be correlated with 
partner and its interaction with highPatent, highCopyright and highTrademark. If that is 
the case, then my estimates of these parameters may be biased. However, use of 
instrumental variables for the complete set of endogenous variables is difficult in my 
setting: This would require a set of four separate instruments, which would compound the 
usual problems that fixed effects remove all of the useful cross-sectional variation in the 
data and in the presence of measurement error give rise to attenuation bias (Angrist and 
Pischke 2009; Greene 2002). To reduce the number of endogenous variables that I must 
instrument for, I create a new variable called highIPR which equals to one if either 
highPatent or highCopyright is one. Since patents and copyrights are used as substitute 
forms of IPR protection in the software industry (Lerner and Zhu 2007), this variable is a 
combined measure of IPR protection for the ISV.  
  
                                                 
29 Note that because I measure no significant moderating effects of trademarks on IPO likelihood, I do not 
include a graph of these results in Figure 3.2. 
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Table 3.7 Moderating Effect of IPR and Downstream Capabilities, IPO 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables Baseline 
model 








Partner -0.077 -0.081 -0.083 -0.068 -0.080 
 (0.071) (0.072) (0.071) (0.042) (0.071) 
HighPatent 0.002 0.002 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
HighCopyright 0.016* 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.015 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
HighTrademark 0.004 0.000 -0.000  -0.000 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.004) 
AnyService    0.006 0.006* 
    (0.004) (0.004) 
Partner × HighPatent 0.194** 0.189* 0.190* 0.180* 0.179* 
 (0.098) (0.102) (0.101) (0.103) (0.100) 
Partner × HighCopyright 0.162** 0.160** 0.158** 0.160** 0.163** 
 (0.068) (0.068) (0.067) (0.068) (0.069) 
Partner × HighTrademark 0.005 0.005 0.007  0.016 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.054)  (0.053) 
Partner × AnyService    -0.041 -0.045 
    (0.031) (0.028) 
Age  0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age2  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000* 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Publication  -0.004* -0.004* -0.005* -0.005* 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Employee  0.004*** 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Cinvest  0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 
  (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Pinvest  0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Vinvest  0.024 0.026 0.027 0.027 
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
IndustryGrowth  0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Year dummies No No Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.001 -0.026*** 0.003 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.003) (0.009) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) 
Observations 62661 62661 62661 62661 62661 
Number of firms 11751 11751 11751 11751 11751 
R-squared (within) 0.038 0.053 0.058 0.060 0.060 
R-squared (with fixed effects) 0.660 0.669 0.671 0.672 0.672 
Notes. Fixed effects panel data models with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.  
1: only private companies are included. Post IPO observations are dropped.  
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Thus, I have three endogenous variables: partner, partner × highIPR, and partner × 
highTrademark. Following prior literature on the use of instrumental variables in 
nonlinear (in variables) settings (Gallant 1987, p. 440), I instrument for these variables 
using the predicted values of partner using the method above, and the interaction of this 
variable with highIPR, highTrademark, and other exogenous variables such as age, age-
squared, and sales growth. In total, I have eight instruments for three endogenous 
variables.  
Instrumental variables estimates for my sales regressions are included in column 6 of 
Table 3.6. My results are qualitatively robust to the use of instrumental variables and 
fixed effects. The coefficient estimates show that partnership will only be associated with 
an increase in sales in the presence of highIPR and highTrademark. The coefficient for 
the interaction of partner with highIPR remains significant at the 10% level. The 
interaction of partner with highTrademark, while not significantly different than zero at 
conventional levels, remains statistically significant at the 12.5% level.  
Instrumental variable results related to the IPO equation with interactions are not shown 
due to the poor fit of the model (negative R-squared) and the inability to identify the 
effects under study. I believe that this is due partly to the difficult data environment: In 
the IPO regressions my dependent variable is binary, a particularly challenging setting to 
estimate via nonlinear IV (instrumenting for partnership and its interactions) using only 
the within firm variation (because of my use of firm fixed effects). Further, as noted 
above, the effect of highTrademark is inherently more difficult to identify in this setting 




To summarize, I report participating in a platform ecosystem as a new and viable 
innovation commercialization strategy employed by small ISVs. My results demonstrate 
that, on average, ISVs can achieve significant benefits through participation in a platform 
ecosystem—benefits that can translate into significant increases in sales and an increased 
likelihood of eventually attaining an IPO, a widely recognized measure of success for 
start-up firms. However, there exists considerable heterogeneity in the extent to which 
ISVs can capture the value co-created by these partnerships. In particular, ISVs without 
downstream marketing or service capabilities or without IPR such as patents and 
copyrights will appropriate less of the co-created value generated from compatibility with 
the platform. These results are robust to a battery of robustness checks, including 
instrumental variables analysis and a falsification exercise.  
Limitations. I believe that my study represents a careful analysis of the impact of 
platform participation on small firm performance. However, like any empirical study, it 
does have several limitations. One potential issue arises from sample definition, in 
particular how to determine the “at- risk” set of potential participants in the ecosystem. 
As noted above, in this study I identify the set of at-risk firms as those software firms 
producing manufacturing and warehousing/distribution software. I chose not to extend 
my sample to firms producing other product types for two reasons. First, many of the 
software firms in my sample produce other types of products beyond manufacturing and 
warehousing/distribution. Thus, my sample includes a much broader cross-section of 
software products than might appear at first glance. For example, among my sample of 
1210 ISVs, 474 also produce accounting software, 323 provide utility systems software, 
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and 256 also provide sales/marketing software. Second, selecting on other software 
product types would introduce significant unobserved heterogeneity into my sample by 
adding many firms whose products are unrelated to SAP’s software and for whom the 
benefits of partnership are likely to be extremely low. For example, if I add producers of 
accounting software to my list (SOF-AC; the group with the next highest hazard rate of 
partnership), it would increase my sample size by over 2000 firms, but would add only 14 
partners.  
Implications for Other Industry Environments. My study follows prior work that has used 
case studies of individual industries to examine the implications of platforms for producer 
and user behavior (Adomavicius et al. 2008; Nair et al. 2004). I believe this approach is 
appropriate for the study of platform industries insofar as it reduces unobserved 
heterogeneity across observations and improves internal validity. However, my focus on 
platform ecosystems is valid across a wide variety of settings. Large ecosystems have 
been fundamental to the success (in terms of platform sales, and ultimate business 
survival) of IT platforms such as Ethernet (13 vendors supported Ethernet in 1982 
compared to the three vendors supporting Token Ring; Von Burg 2001); Microsoft 
Windows (38,338 vendors, including 3,817 ISVs; Iansiti and Levien 2004); Palm 
Handhelds (who claimed over 140,000 developers for its standard in 2001; Nair et al. 
2004); and iPhone (50,000 applications as of June 2009), 30  as well as Real estate 
platforms like Multiple Listing Service (12,322 listings in the Madison, WI area 
according to Hendel et al. 2009).  




Moreover, the key platform issues that I study—the benefits to joining a platform from 
signaling technological compatibility and the risks of entry from the platform owner—
also have widespread validity. For example, complementors benefit from compatibility 
with platforms such as Microsoft Windows, the Cisco Internetwork Operating System 
(IOS), and Intel microprocessors, however the threat of incursion from the platform 
owner into the complementor’s market has been a focus of theoretical work and case 
studies in all three industries (Eisenmann et al. 2007; Gawer and Cusumano 2002; Gawer 
and Henderson 2007).  
While my setting shares many features with other IT platforms, one key difference is that 
complementors in my setting have the option to choose between joining a platform and 
selling platform-independent, stand-alone applications. In particular, in my setting, the 
platform plays the role of reducing compatibility costs among heterogeneous 
components, rather than providing an infrastructure that includes components required 
for complementary applications to run. In that way, my setting shares similarity with 
environments like Cisco’s Internetwork Operating System (IOS) platform (which reduces 
the costs of communication among heterogeneous routers and switches) rather than the 
Microsoft Windows or Xbox platforms (which includes key infrastructure required for 
complementors’ applications to run). More empirical research is needed in this latter, 
important area. 
It is important to state how ecosystem partnerships are distinct from other forms of IT 
value co-creation (Kohli and Grover 2008). Like other settings of IT value co-creation, in 
my setting IT is “instrumental in creating a product to co-create business value” (Kohli 
and Grover 2008). However, in other settings IT is used to co-create value by facilitating 
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standardization of business processes or improving information flows between 
heterogeneous systems of individual firms (Markus et al. 2006). In this way, IT facilitates 
value co-creation by reducing transaction costs through inter-organizational systems that, 
among other things, strengthen supply chain relationships (Bharadwaj et al. 2007; 
Clemons et al. 1993; Gerbauer and Buxmann 2000; Melville et al. 2004). In my setting, 
partnership aids in the standardization of interfaces between software products that are 
used to co-create business value. In so doing, I add to the evolving work in IS that seeks 
to understand how firms co-create value through IT platforms (Dhar and Sundararajan 
2007). 
Theoretical Implications. Platform-based innovation ecosystems present an interesting 
setting for studies on the dynamics of inter-organizational collaboration and competition. 
An increasing body of theoretical work has examined firm strategies in platform markets, 
including decisions on the extent to which a platform should be opened (Eisenmann et al. 
2008; Parker and Van Alstyne 2008; West 2003) and vendor reactions to open and closed 
platforms (Lee and Mendelson 2008; Mantena et al. 2007). However, there has been little 
research that measures the value co-created through participation in such a platform. My 
study takes initial steps to investigate these issues from the perspective of small, 
complementary solution providers in the enterprise software industry.  
Perhaps most significantly, I establish a set of boundary conditions on the extent to which 
this value is captured by small ISVs. These findings extend and complement Chapter 2, 
where I show that highly innovative ISVs are more likely to join a platform ecosystem. 
Interestingly, while this focus on establishing the conditions for appropriating value from 
IT investment has long been a focus on other ecosystems studied in the information 
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systems literature such as supply chain relationships (Grover and Saeed 2007; Subramani 
2004), it has drawn relatively little attention in empirical work on software platforms. I 
feel this is a fruitful area for future research. 
Finally, my contributions to the markets for technology literature stems naturally from 
my focus on the enterprise software industry. In this setting technology 
commercialization by entrepreneurial companies may be facilitated by joining the 
platform ecosystem. Such partnerships represent a natural setting for the identification of 
the effect of IPR on technology commercialization and firm performance, a key objective 
of this study and the markets for technology literature (Arora and Ceccagnoli 2006; Arora 
et al. 2001; Cockburn and MacGarvie 2006; Cockburn and MacGarvie 2009; Gans et al. 
2002). Indeed, unintended knowledge spillovers are particularly salient during SAP 
software certification, which requires partnering firms to closely integrate their product 
interface designs. This highlights a clear tradeoff for technology commercialization by 
ISVs. My results imply that strong IPR directly influence this tradeoff by affecting the 
likelihood of expropriation of IP rights and platform owner entry. Further, strong IPR 
will indirectly benefit the platform owner by nurturing the platform ecosystem with 
innovative software solutions. In other words, IPR appear to favor both value 
appropriation and value co-creation in the enterprise software industry.  
Managerial Implications. My findings have important implications for both platform 
sponsors as well as those who participate in the platform ecosystem. First, my results 
suggest that under certain conditions ISVs who join a platform ecosystem will see gains 
in operational performance. However, ISVs whose innovations are not protected by IPR 
or downstream complementary capabilities should be cautious about initiating 
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partnerships. To prevent the threat of invasion from the platform owner, they should 
actively seek IPR protection, or secure complementary downstream capabilities first. 
Finally, I believe that it is critical for the platform owners to understand the incentives of 
complementary product providers. In particular, the appropriate management of the 
expropriation concerns of its smaller yet most innovative entrepreneurial partners 
represents a potential strategy to sustain their innovation ecosystems. 
More generally, my results suggest some conditions under which a “virtuous cycle” may 
be realized in a software platform ecosystem. As is well known, there is significant 
variation in the extent to which formal appropriability mechanisms like patents and 
copyrights are effective at protecting firms’ IP rights (Cohen et al. 2000). My results 
suggest that ISVs who participate in markets for which appropriability mechanisms like 
patents are strong will see greater returns from partnership. These greater returns will in 
turn encourage new partners to join the ecosystem, and will also draw in additional 
customers (and in turn, more partners). My results similarly suggest conditions under 
which this virtuous cycle is unlikely to occur, however. In environments where 
appropriability mechanisms are weak, my results suggest that the expected gains from 
partnership are relatively low, and under such conditions the platform ecosystems are 





CO-INNOVATION IN ENTERPRISE INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
AND IT PRODUCTIVITY: EVIDENCE FROM SAP ECOSYSTEM 
 
4.1. Introduction 
To the extent that pure technology advance alone is not sufficient to generate significant 
economic value, co-inventions around the base technology is often a determinant of its 
adoption and diffusion (Bresnahan and Greenstein 1996). For example, while digital TV 
broadcasting technology has been invented long ago, it wasn’t widely adopted until 
complementary innovations in high definition TV sets, digital recording devices and rich 
content provision were made available. Complementary innovation is especially 
important to platform-based technologies such as personal computer (Bresnahan and 
Greenstein 1999), video game console (Zhu and Iansiti 2007) or PDA/ handheld 
computers (Boudreau 2008), as they are characterized by indirect network effects which 
arise when the benefit of using the underlying platform increases with the availability of 
complementary, platform-compatible applications or programs (Katz and Shapiro 1994; 
Nair et al. 2004). Prior research has documented that technology users are an important 
source of innovation (Von Hippel 1994a), for they are often the first to develop and use 
prototypes of enhanced features and add-on functions (Morrison et al. 2000). Innovation 
ecosystem strategy, in which owners of platform technologies actively seek 
complementary, third-party innovation from resources located outside the firm, is widely 
used to encourage user participation in co-innovation (Adner 2006). For example, owners 
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of IT hardware and software platforms such as Apple, Microsoft, IBM, and SAP often 
sponsor web-based online communities of innovation, which may embrace a series of 
web 2.0 technologies such as forum, wiki, blogs and code sharing to promote learning, 
innovation, and knowledge exchange among platform users and developers of the 
complementary programs.  
While there is anecdotal evidence that platform owner-sponsored online communities are 
often used for promoting innovation and peer-support among platform adopters, and they 
bear similarity to open source communities in many ways (Gorman and Fischer 2009; 
Von Hippel 1994a), there has been a lack of formal studies that examine the extent to 
which user firms of technology platform benefit from participation in those online 
communities. Given that platform sponsors have invested heavily in building such online 
innovation communities and they were embraced by millions of members in some cases, 
answer to this question is critical in the understanding of platform ecosystems. In 
addition, although recent studies on IT value have established a positive relationship 
between IT investment and firm performance (Aral et al. 2006; Brynjolfsson and Hitt 
1996; Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2003; Dewan and Min 1997), there remains to be 
considerable variation in the distribution of IT productivity among individual firms 
(Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2000). Recent studies have attributed this variation to 
complementarities between IT investment and firm workforce practice (Bresnahan and 
Greenstein 1996), investment in human capital (Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2000), IT 
governance (Gu et al. 2008) or actual IT usage (Devaraj and Kohli 2003). However, this 
research has largely ignored the role of user co-innovation in information systems in 
explaining this variation. Indeed, “understanding co-invention is a key to understanding 
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the economic payoff to invention in new information technologies today” (Bresnahan and 
Greenstein 1996). 
In this research I try to bridge the gap in prior literature by linking IT productivity theory 
with research on platform innovation ecosystem. Built upon resource based view of firms 
and theory of dynamic capabilities, I argue firms’ co-innovation in information systems 
complements their adoption of IT infrastructure and it helps to enhance firm’s IT 
productivity. Following prior research (Bresnahan and Greenstein 1996), I define IT co-
innovation as the collection of idiosyncratic adaptations that an IT using organization 
invents around its computing platform to create a useful mapping between IT and 
business operations, adaptations that may include configuration, customization and 
modification of vendor supplied technology, technical solutions and workarounds 
developed internally to meet idiosyncratic user needs and integrate various IT 
components, or changes in business processes that can better harness the power of 
underlying technology. Note my definition of IT co-innovation excludes technology 
invented by vendors and market supply of complementary applications, which, from the 
perspective of resource based view, cannot constitute a source of sustained competitive 
advantage due to its perfect mobility across firm boundaries (Mata et al. 1995). 
Enterprise software, being the backbone of enterprise information systems, presents an 
exemplary context where user firms engage in extensive co-innovation. Enterprise 
software products are highly business process-oriented and usually need to be tailored to 
fit business practices, where idiosyncratic local needs usually drive innovations in work 
practices (Hitt et al. 2002; Von Hippel 2005). Starting from a core enterprise software 
platform, customers simultaneously adapt the software and their business processes to 
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create a socio-technical system that represents a useful mapping between the two. Over 
time, local innovations and workarounds make their way into the socio-technical system 
through adaptations to software and formal processes (Gorman and Fischer 2009). This 
way, firms’ accumulation of complementary innovation constitutes an important source 
of intangible asset that complements firms’ IT capital. To empirically test the 
complementarity between user co-innovation in corporate information systems and IT 
capital, I construct a sample from Fortune 1000 firms and collect data on their 
implementation of SAP enterprise software, their IT infrastructure, their stock of co-
innovation in SAP’s software platform, and their business performances. I adopt the 
production function framework (Brynjolfsson and Hitt 1996; Dewan and Min 1997; 
Mittal and Nault 2009) to identify the moderation effect of firms IT co-innovation on 
their IT productivity. The empirical evidences suggest that firms with mean level stock of 
IT co-innovation extract as much as 54.5% greater productivity from their IT investment 
than those without IT co-innovation, and the results are robust to a number of model 
specifications, alternative measurement of production output, and endogeneity issues. 
This research contributes to the extant literature in several ways. First, my view of 
ecosystem from the perspective of platform adopter reveals key implications on the 
business value of platform innovation ecosystem. Combined with insights from prior 
literature that primarily focuses on strategies of the platform sponsor (Boudreau 2007; 
Eisenmann et al. 2007; Eisenmann et al. 2008), this study provides a holistic 
understanding of platform ecosystem formation and its value. Second, by investigating 
the complementarity between user IT co-innovation and IT investment, I add to the 
current literature on IT business value (Brynjolfsson and Hitt 1996; Dewan and Min 
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1997) and synergy between IT investment and organizational assets (Brynjolfsson and 
Hitt 2000; Gu et al. 2008), and identify user co-innovation as one of the important source 
that contribute the variation of IT productivity across firms. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: in section 4.2 I review the relevant 
literature in IT business value and IT co-innovation, and lay the theoretical foundation of 
complementarities between IT investment and IT co-innovation. In section 4.3 I propose 
an innovative way to measure co-innovation in enterprise information systems through an 
online community of innovation ecosystem. Section 4.4 describes the empirical models 
and the data set. I present the empirical evidences in section 4.5. Section 4.6 provides 
conclusions and implications. 
4.2. IT Business Value and IT Co-innovation 
4.2.1. IT Business Value and Theory of Complementarity 
Since the early 1990s’ a series of studies on IT business value has presented firm-level 
evidences that link investment in IT assets to various firm performance measures, such as 
productivity, financial market valuation, and operational level performance (Aral et al. 
2006; Bresnahan et al. 2002; Brynjolfsson and Hitt 1995; Brynjolfsson and Hitt 1996; 
Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2003; Dewan and Min 1997; Hitt et al. 2002). While it is now 
generally accepted that investment in information technology is often associated with 
higher firm performance, studies also reveal that there exists considerable variation in the 
returns to such investments (Brynjolfsson and Hitt 1995; Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2000). To 
explain this observation, researchers have proposed that complementary organizational 
practices/assets are often required in order to extract productivity and other performance 
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premiums from IT investment (Aral et al. 2009; Aral and Weill 2007; Bresnahan et al. 
2002; Brynjolfsson et al. 2002). In other words, the value of IT investment is magnified 
when a firm also invests heavily in organizational practices and business process changes 
in a way that the strategic use of computing power can be harnessed to achieve business 
objectives. For example, from the theoretical perspective of resource based view of IT, 
Melville et al. (2004) argue that successful application of IT is often accompanied by 
significant organizational changes, such as polices and rules, organizational structure, 
workplace practices and organizational culture. However, caution must be exercised 
when management tries to introduce an extensive set of organizational changes that are 
intended to complement new information systems investments, for the co-introduction of 
IT and complementary organizational practices may not result in immediate success due 
to adjustment costs, learning and other factors (Brynjolfsson et al. 1997; Melville et al. 
2004). 
A number of empirical studies have investigated the complementarity between IT 
investment and other organizational practices/assets. For example, in the retail industry, it 
has been shown that IT alone does not create sustainable performance advantages, but 
firms that use IT to leverage intangible human resources and business resources achieve 
superior performances (Powell and Dent-Micallef 1997). Brynjolfsson et al. (2002) find 
that one dollar of IT investment is associated with ten dollars of financial market value, 
and nine dollars out of these can be attributed to investments in complementary 
organizational assets. Aral and Weill (2007) demonstrate that different strategic purposes 
of IT assets are associated with higher firm performance along different dimensions, and 
variations in the impact of IT assets on firm performance is partially driven by 
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organizational IT capability, which may encompass IT skills of employees, management 
commitment to IT initiatives, and a series of organizational practices, etc. Similarly, Gu 
et al. (2008) argue that IT governance mode is part of the complementary organizational 
capitals, and show that firms with low IT governance misalignment obtain two to three 
times the value from IT investment compared to firms with average IT governance 
misalignment. In addition, Devaraj and Kohli (2000) report, by examining longitudinal 
data collected from 8 hospitals, that IT investment contributes to higher revenue, but the 
effect is more pronounced for organizations that also implement corporate initiatives such 
as business process reengineering (BPR). A recent study by Aral et al. (2009) also reveals 
that there are three-way complementarities among IT adoption, performance pay and 
monitoring practices. 
Although prior studies have examined a broad range of organizational assets/practices 
that may complement a firm’s investment in IT capital, the role of co-innovation in 
enterprise information systems has been largely ignored. In the following I extend the 
theory of IT and complementarities to the construct of IT co-innovation. 
4.2.2. Enterprise Information Systems and Co-innovation 
Pure technical progress alone is rarely sufficient to bring about significant economic 
returns. Among other factors, technology users’ co-innovation, through their 
experimentation and discovery, often make the technology more valuable. For example, 
Bresnahan and Greenstein (1996) show that new technology platform, such as 
client/server, requires significant customization within each idiosyncratic organization, 
and the costs of co-invention are important to understand the transition from mainframe 
computing to client/server computing architecture. Similarly, Von Hippel (1994a) find 
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that user were the developers of over 70% innovations in the field of scientific 
instruments and semiconductors/printed circuit boards manufacturing. Augier and Teece 
(2006) argue, according to the theory of dynamic capabilities, that accumulation of 
complementary innovation is especially valuable to users in enterprise software industry. 
These types of complementary innovation are a source of co-specialized asset to a firm’s 
investment in computers and software than can be coordinated to build a (dynamic) 
capability to seize new opportunities and manage threats. The co-specialized innovations 
are hard to contract from markets and are often path-dependent, therefore the 
accumulation of them can lead to a firm’s competitive advantage. From a resource based 
view of IT, once the IT co-innovations are in place, the unique combination of them with 
IT investments can be economically valuable, scarce, and difficult to imitate due to path 
dependencies, embeddedness, causal ambiguity about the source of competitive 
advantage, and time diseconomies of imitation (Barney 1991). In addition, because of the 
differences in firms’ strategic priorities, the deployment of the IT resources and IT co-
innovation are heterogeneously distributed and unlikely to be perfectly mobile across 
firm boundaries. This suggests that co-innovation in enterprise information systems may 
in part explain the differences in the return of firms’ IT investments. 
I argue that a firm’s accumulation of co-innovation around its information technology 
infrastructure constitutes a source of intangible organizational asset that may enhance its 
IT productivity. First, the adoption and exploitation of information systems often require 
invention of idiosyncratic, complementary technical solutions (co-innovation) on the part 
of the IS users. For example, implementing of the off-the-shelf enterprise software 
modules usually requires users to customize the configuration of a series of system 
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parameters, choosing specific add-on functions and features, and sometimes even 
devising specific tools to meet heterogeneous user needs. In addition, to facilitate the 
interoperability of the enterprise system with legacy IT infrastructure, or the seamless 
integration with the information systems of its partners, suppliers and customers, the end 
users often have to create workarounds and solutions to interface various IS components. 
According to a study conducted by Panorama Consulting Group (Kimberling 2009), only 
23% of organizations implement vanilla, off-the-shelf ERP software with little to no 
customization. The remainder of organizations in the study customized their software, 
with 34% indicating that they heavily customized their software. When a firm takes 
tremendous effort to create co-innovation that better integrate computers into existing 
business systems, it is more likely to achieve efficient use of information technology and 
unlock its productivity. 
 Second, implementation of enterprise systems is likely to bring about change in the way 
of conducting business, which requires co-innovation in business process and workplace 
practices (Melville et al. 2004). These co-innovation activities may involve changing 
jobs, hierarchies, and other organizational structures by changing the information that 
flows through them (Bresnahan and Greenstein 1996). As Davenport (1993) points out, 
IT is often viewed as an enabler of process innovation which makes new process design 
possible. When new IT functionality is implemented, it has the potential to alter the basic 
principles and assumptions that the set of current business processes subscribe to, such as 
centralization versus decentralization, coordination and control mechanisms, new metrics 
for performance monitoring, time to market of new product design, and the degree to 
which the supply chain is integrated with partners (Venkatraman 1994). Changes in these 
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first principles, coupled with innovative way of process redesign, can lead to significant 
improve in firm productivity. For example, when new EPR system is introduced at IBM 
PC division, IBM reengineered its business processes to respond to Dell’s build-to-order 
business model by eliminating non-value-adding activities. Among other changes, the 
fulfillment process, in which the distributors often had to disassemble PCs they received 
and modify them to meet customer needs, were changed such that IBM delivered 
components instead of assembled PCs to its distributors. As a result, IBM and its 
distributors were able to cut the inventory lead time from 12 weeks to just 2 weeks (Chen 
2001). Indeed, co-innovation in business processes, just as technical co-innovation 
around computing platform, is instrumental in unleashing the computing power to drive 
productivity gains (Brynjolfsson et al. 2008). 
In addition, IT resource needs to be coupled with human expertise to create economic 
value for a firm (Melville et al. 2004). Based on Barney’s (1991) classification of firm 
resources, Bharadwaj (2000) propose that human IT resource is an important dimension 
of firm’s overall IT resources, along with IT infrastructure and IT enabled intangibles. 
Human IT resources include both technical IT skills, such as system analysis and design, 
application programming, knowledge in emerging technology, etc.; and managerial IT 
skills, such as effective management of various IS functions, ability to lead and motivate 
development teams to complete IT projects according to specification and within time 
and budget constraints, and effective communication and interaction with end users. 
These human IT resources usually are tacit, take long periods of time to evolve, and tend 
to be highly local or organization specific (Sambamurthy and Zmud 1994). For example, 
building a large scale software application requires locating and assembling specialized 
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domain expertise, building effective coordination mechanisms among team members, 
securing management commitment, and strong leadership to allocate resources and set 
priorities, which can only be cultivated and perfected over time through a series of 
learning-by-doing practices. Participation in the co-innovation activities in enterprise 
information systems helps internal IT professionals to learn and reinforce their domain 
knowledge about a firm’s information systems, build up mechanisms and routines that 
allow effective communication and coordination, strengthen their ability to continuous 
innovate and improve IS practices to meet end user requirements, and develop 
management skills to lead IS projects and motivate IS staff. 
The proposition that IT co-innovation is an integral component of intangible IT assets is 
also consistent with Aral and Weill (2007) who argue that IT resource is a combination of 
mutually reinforcing IT capital and IT capabilities. The two main conceptual building 
blocks of IT capabilities, competencies and practices (Nelson and Winter 1982), are both 
related to co-innovation activities. In summary, I propose that accumulation of IT co-
innovation around a firm’s enterprise information systems is likely to complement its IT 
investment to boost productivity. 
4.3. Measuring Co-innovation: SAP Community Network (SCN) 
One of the practical challenges of this study is the accurate measure of firms’ co-
innovation in their underlying computing platform. I resolve this challenge by focusing 
on the backbone of enterprise information systems: adoption of enterprise software (SAP 
particularly), and collect data on SAP user firms’ participation and contribution to SAP-
sponsored online community network.  
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As part of its platform strategy, SAP established its online community of innovation since 
2003, with SAP developer network (SDN) and business process expert (BPX) as its two 
major modules. It serves as a resource reservoir and collaboration channel for SAP users, 
developers, architects, consultants and integrators to create and exchange knowledge 
about adopting and implementing SAP solutions. SAP community network hosts forums, 
expert blogs, a technical library, article downloads, a code sharing gallery, e-learning 
catalogs, Wikis and other facilities through which its members contribute their 
knowledge. All these web 2.0 technologies support open communication between active 
members of the community, which amount to more than 1,820,000 as of 2010. This 
online community enables interesting co-innovation patterns among its members. For 
example, in 2006 two developers from Colgate-Palmolive invented SAPlink, a tool that 
provides the ability to easily distribute and package custom objects on SAP’s NetWeaver 
platform, and made it available freely to other SDN members (Iansiti and Lakhani 2009). 
Soon after its release it attracted other developers to contribute, and 19 additional plug-
ins are added to handle other object types. 
A unique feature of SAP community network is that its members’ contribution to the 
community can be quantified. To reward active members, SAP has developed the 
Contributor Recognition Program (CRP), which awards points to community members 
for each technical article, code sample, video, wiki contribution, forum post, and weblog 
authored. For example, in the case of forum discussion participation, 2, 6, or 10 points 
may be awarded for forum posts replying to existing threads marked as questions 
depending on the helpfulness of the answer. Points are awarded at the discretion of the 
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poster of the original thread. Similarly, awards with varying points go for contributing 
other resources such as code samples, wikis, videos, podcasts or e-learning materials. 
SAP publicly recognizes its most active members. For example, on the “Top 
Contributors” page, the top 50 contributors are listed in recognition of their contribution. 
On each forum page, the top three contributors to that forum are listed, with their total 
reward points displayed. In addition, SAP identifies and provides special status to 
exceptional and high-value members of SAP Developer Network and Business Process 
Expert communities by granting them the title of “SAP Mentor”. SAP Mentors are role 
models who differentiate themselves through the high quality and frequency of their 
community contributions, their perspectives, attitudes, and interaction styles. They are 
subject-matter experts who are passionate about SAP and share their opinions and 
insights with the community. SAP Mentors are offered unique opportunities for access to 
SAP senior management, early access to information on products and programs and 
greater visibility in the online communities as well as at SAP events such as SAP Tech 
Ed. 
The participation in the community network is completely voluntarily and anyone can 
register as a member by providing basic personal information. One piece of such profile 
information is the company affiliation of the member and his/her relationship to SAP, 
which he/she may choose whether to disclose or not. Other identifying information 
includes email address, phone number, expertise, and LinkedIn profile page, etc. By 
aggregating contribution (award points) from individual level to firm level, I can derive 
any SAP-adopting firm’s contribution to the community network. I use this variable as a 




4.4.1. Production Function Framework 
A typical production function relates firm output to factors of input of production. For 
example, a simple form of three-factor Cobb-Douglas production function has been 
widely used in prior studies on IT productivity (Brynjolfsson and Hitt 1996; Dewan and 
Min 1997; Mittal and Nault 2009): 
 𝑌 = 𝐴𝐾�𝐿�𝑍� (4.1) 
 
Where Y is the quantity of production output, K is the stock of non-IT capital, L is the 
stock of labor, Z is the stock of IT-capital, and A denotes the total factor productivity 
(TFP). TFP is defined as the output contribution that is not explained by the factor inputs 
and often interpreted as technological progress (Mittal and Nault 2009). In this case, the 
output elasticity of IT-capital, 𝛾 = 𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑌/𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑍 , represents the percentage increase in 
output due to a one percent increase in IT capital. The marginal product of IT capital, 
which is measured as the increase of output due to an additional dollar investment in IT 
capital, can be calculated as 𝑓� = 𝛾 ∙ (
�
�
). The output elasticity and marginal product of 
other factors can be similarly derived. 
The Cobb-Douglas production function can be employed to estimate the factor 
productivities by implementing the following model: 
 𝑙𝑛𝑌 = 𝑎 + 𝛼𝑙𝑛𝐾 + 𝛽𝑙𝑛𝐿 + 𝛾𝑙𝑛𝑍 + 𝜖 (4.2) 
 
In order to test my theory of complementarities and detect if firms’ co-innovation 
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activities in enterprise information system enhance their IT productivity, I interact co-
innovation with IT-capital and estimate the following model 
 𝑙𝑛𝑌 = 𝑎 + 𝛼𝑙𝑛𝐾 + 𝛽𝑙𝑛𝐿 + 𝛾𝑙𝑛𝑍 + 𝛿𝐶 ∙ 𝑙𝑛𝑍 + 𝜖 (4.3) 
 
where C denotes the firms’ co-innovation. In the empirical investigation, I use both 
discrete measure of C (high co-innovation vs. low co-innovation) and continuous 
measure of C (log form of co-innovation, due to over-dispersion of this variable) to test 
the model. Since co-innovation is not a direct production input but a source of firm 
heterogeneity, I cannot introduce it into the regression as a separate explanatory variable. 
The treatment of co-innovation in production function is similar to the role of IT risk in 
Dewan et al. (2007). The functional specifications are also similar to that of Mefford 
(1986), which tests a production function with the assumption that technology level of the 
plant enhance the stock of capital and skill level of workforce enhance the stock of labor. 
Therefore, a positive, significant coefficient δ would demonstrate the complementarity 
between co-innovation and IT capital, and the total output elasticity of IT capital, taking 
into account the interaction between co-innovation and IT capital, is 𝛾 + 𝛿𝐶. 
An alternative way to measure the value of co-innovation to firms’ IT investment is to 
estimate its contribution to increasing effective IT stock, using similar framework 
developed by Mittal and Nault (2009). Specifically, assuming that co-innovation 
multiplicatively augment firms’ IT-capital, I define the augmented, co-innovation 
adjusted effective quantity of IT-capital as 
𝑍� = 𝑍𝑓(𝐶) 
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With the augmentation increasing in co-innovation, 𝑓�(𝐶) > 0 , and there is no 
augmentation if there is no co-innovation, 𝑓(0) = 1 . The augmented Cobb-Douglas 
function becomes 
𝑌 = 𝐴𝐾�𝐿��𝑍�� 
Consistent with Mittal and Nault (2009), I further specify the form of the augmentation of 
IT-capital as  
𝑍� = 𝑍𝑒�� 
The exponential form of augmentation is chosen as the original Cobb-Douglas production 
function is nested in the augmented form in that if η=0, the latter is reduced to the former. 
This allows me to directly test if the augmentation effect is present, by empirically testing 
if η=0. Taking nature log on both sides, the estimation equation becomes 
 𝑙𝑛𝑌 = 𝑎 + 𝛼�𝑙𝑛𝐾 + ?̅?𝑙𝑛𝐿 + ?̅?𝑙𝑛𝑍 + 𝜅𝐶 + 𝜖 (4.4) 
 
where 𝜅 = ?̅?𝜂 . The augmentation factor, η, is captured by 𝜅/?̅? . The estimated 
augmentation factor for a firm with co-innovation level of C is identified as 𝑒(�/�)�. 
4.4.2. Data and Variables 
I test the relationship between co-innovation in enterprise systems, IT capital, other 
production factors and production output by constructing a dataset of firms that are SAP 
enterprise software users and are publicly traded. I use the Computer Intelligence (CI) 
database to determine the status of SAP adoption, as well as to obtain IT investment data. 
The CI database records detailed information about IT infrastructure for most Fortune 
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1000 firms, which include data of the quantity of mainframes, peripheral, minicomputers, 
servers and PC systems, as well as other IT hardware stocks. Recent CI data also includes 
information on firms’ adoption of enterprise software such as accounting, supply chain, 
CRM or human resource modules, etc. The data were collected via a variety of methods 
including surveys, physical audits, site visits and telephone interviews. CI database has 
been widely used by prior studies to investigate issues related to IT productivity (e.g., 
Chwelos et al. forthcoming). The CI data were then matched with Standard and Poor’s 
Compustat database to obtain financial information of the publicly traded companies. 
Using similar method of prior research (Brynjolfsson and Hitt 1996; Brynjolfsson and 
Hitt 2003; Chwelos et al. forthcoming; Dewan and Min 1997), I use the financial data to 
construct measures of production output, non-IT capital stock and labor expenses. As the 
Contributor Recognition Program on SAP community network starts from year 2004, I 
choose the sample as cross section data of firms in 2006, which allows 3 years for the 
sample firms to accumulate co-innovation in their enterprise systems.  
Sample. As my measure of co-innovation activities in enterprise systems is limited to 
SAP enterprise software platform, I am interested in sample firms that are SAP adaptors. 
2006 CI database provides detailed, establishment level information on the enterprise 
software that is adopted by each firm. By examining the data of enterprise software 
adoption I retrieve a list of firms that are based in the United States, and have adopted at 
least one enterprise software module that is produced by SAP as of 2006. I further 
remove consulting firms that are major SAP implementation partners, as their co-
innovation activities in SAP systems are usually driven by customer demand instead of 
their own use of enterprise systems, therefore are unlikely to affect their IT productivity. 
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The set of firms is then matched with Compustat, which result in a total of 295 publicly 
traded, SAP adopting companies. 
IT Capital. The measure of IT capital is derived from Computer Intelligence (CI) 
Technology database, maintained by Harte Hanks. The information in the database 
covers major IT areas, such as personal computing, systems and servers, networking, 
software, storage and managed services (Gu et al. 2008). However, one issue of the 
database is that it no longer includes direct measures of IT capital stock after year 1998 
(Tambe and Hitt 2008). To construct the IT capital variable, I adopt the method used by 
Chwelos et al. (forthcoming) who use hedonic regression to impute the value of 
equipments using historical data (1987-1994) and estimate the value of IT stock in later 
years using implicit prices. According to Chwelos et al. (forthcoming), the estimated IT 
stock is highly correlated with the original CI IT capital measure (Pearson correlation 
coefficient > .92). Specifically, I obtained the implicit prices for eight major IT 
components31 that are estimated by Chwelos et al., and retrieve the quantities of sample 
firms’ IT stock in these 8 categories from the CI database.32 The IT capital is calculated 
as the predicted total value using the implicit prices and IT equipment stocks. 
Co-innovation in Enterprise Software. The extent of firms’ co-innovation in their 
enterprise information systems is measured by their employees’ contribution to the SAP 
community network, that is, the sum of reward points earned by their employees. First, I 
retrieve a complete list of contributors at SAP community network in year 2004, 2005 
                                                 
31  The eight categories are: IBM mainframes, non-IBM mainframes, mini-computers, PCs, local-area 
networks, mainframe tape drives, mainframe disk drives, and dumb terminals.  
32 Statistics on dumb terminals are no longer provided by CI database for recent years, due to the shift of 
computing paradigm from mainframe to client/server architecture. As a result, dumb terminals are not 
incorporated in my calculation of IT capital. 
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and 2006 together with the number of reward points each member has earned during this 
period.33 The period starts from 2004 as it is the first year that the SAP Contributor 
Recognition Program is implemented and reward points are available. I then use a 
crawler program to acquire the information on the user profiles for all the registered users 
of SAP Community Network, such as their name, address, company, profession, email 
address, country, personal website, LinkedIn profile, etc. Next, I select all the members 
reside in the United States, and match them with companies in my sample by examining 
their company affiliations and the domain of their email addresses. I then aggregate the 
individual level award points to firm level according to the members’ affiliation 
information, and use the firm level reward points as a measure of the stock of co-
innovation in enterprise information systems of the firms. 
Production Output and Other Production Factor. Following prior literature (Brynjolfsson 
and Hitt 1996; Dewan and Min 1997), I use financial data from Standard and Poor’s 
Compustata database to construct variable of production output (Y), non-IT capital stock 
(K) and labor expense (L). Two most commonly used output measures for each firm in 
year 2006 are obtained: (1) annual sales and (2) added value, which is defined as sales 
minus materials. Sales are chosen as the production output in the baseline models. Added 
value is chosen as it is said to be less noisy and more comparable across industries 
(Dewan and Min 1997). Annual sales of a firm are obtained directly from Compustat. 
Material is calculated by subtracting labor and related expenses (Compustat data item 
XLR) from total operating expenses (Compustat data item XOPR). 
                                                 
33 The information is obtained from: http://www.sdn.sap.com/irj/sdn/topcontributors. 
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Non-IT capital stock is calculated by subtracting IT capital stock (explained above) from 
a firm’s total capital stock. Consistent with prior studies (Dewan and Min 1997; Hall 
1990), I define the total capital stock as the sum of: net value of property, plant and 
equipment (Compustat data item PPENT), value of the firm’s inventories (Compustat 
data item INVT), value of investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries (Compustat data 
item IVAEQ and IVAO), and intangibles (Compustat data item INTAN). 
For a subset of firms, Compustat provides data on Labor and Related Expenses (data item 
XLR). For these firms, labor expenses are directly obtained from Compustat. For firms 
with missing values for XLR, it is conventional to use one of the two ways that are 
adopted by prior literature to impute this variable. First, following Wilson (2009), I 
calculate the labor expenses by multiplying the firm’s reported number of employees 
(Compustat data item EMP) by the 3-digit industry (SIC) mean of per-employee labor 
expenses, which is computed over firms in the Compustat universe with non-missing 
values for XLR. If 3-digit industry average cannot be obtained, I use the 2-digit industry 
mean instead. Second, consistent with prior studies (Bloom and Van Reenen 2007; 
Bresnahan et al. 2002; Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2003), for firms that do not report labor 
expenses expenditures, I obtain average weekly wages and benefits at the four-digit 
industry (NACIS) level from Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), and derive industry level 
annual per-employee compensation (assuming a 52-week year) and multiply this number 
by the firm’s reported employment level. When 4-digit NACIS average cannot be 
obtained, I use 3-digit industry average instead. The two measures of labor expenses are 
highly correlated (ρ=0.81) and all the results are robust to the use of either measure. For 
brevity, the results reported below use the first measure. 
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Table 4.1 presents the summary statistics of the variables. The average firm in the sample 
has sales of $13.58 billion, with 33,690 employees, indicating the sample contains 
relatively large companies. This is consistent with my sample being publicly traded, 
Fortune 1,000 SAP adopters. In addition, the firms invest heavily in IT capital, which has 
a mean level of $9.68 million and maximum of $345.23 million. Table 4.2 provides the 
correlation matrix among the key variables. 
Table 4.3 presents a breakdown of the sample firms by vertical industries, which is based 
on 2-digit NACIS code. It is notable that firms in manufacturing industry account for the 
majority of the sample, which amount to over 70% of the total. This indicates that 




Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Description Obs Mean Std. dev Minimum Maximum 
S Annual sales (million $) 295 13582.57 25716.08 48.405 204892 
VA Added value (million $) 295 5051.506 8719.877 16.1359 71835.91 
K Non-IT capital (million $) 295 13254.07 45427.28 11.74955 661702.9 
L Labor expense (million $) 295 2538.453 4457.188 9.271005 38906.54 
Z IT capital (million $) 295 9.680195 24.0529 0 345.228 
C Co-innovation (reward points) 295 64.88814 336.0369 0 4234 
Emp Number of employees (thousands) 293 33.69048 51.3339 0.07 355.766 
 
Table 4.2 Pearson Correlation Matrix of Selected Variables 
Variable Description S VA K L Z C Emp 
S Annual sales (million $) 1.0000        
  (-)       
VA Added value (million $) 0.8111 1.0000       
  (0.0000) (-)      
K Non-IT capital (million $) 0.5892 0.7156 1.0000      
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (-)     
L Labor expense (million $) 0.5396 0.8423 0.4631 1.0000     
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (-)    
Z IT capital (million $) 0.4343 0.4218 0.2193 0.4287 1.0000    
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (-)   
C Co-innovation (reward points) 0.3017 0.1644 0.0423 0.1325 0.4003 1.0000   
  (0.0000) (0.0046) (0.4692) (0.0228) (0.0000) (-)  
Emp Number of employees (thousands) 0.6688 0.8126 0.4738 0.8184 0.4968 0.1431 1.0000  




Table 4.3 Industry Segments of the Sample 
2-digit NACIS Description Freq. Percent 
11 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting 1 0.34 
21 Mining 10 3.39 
22 Utilities 13 4.41 
23 Construction 2 0.68 
31-33 Manufacturing 213 72.2 
42 Wholesale Trade 7 2.37 
44-45 Retail Trade 3 1.02 
48-49 Transportation and Warehousing 6 2.03 
51 Information 12 4.07 
52 Finance and Insurance 4 1.36 
53 Real Estate and Rental and Leasing 2 0.68 
54 Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 10 3.39 
56 Administrative and Support and Waste Management and Remediation Services 2 0.68 
62 Health Care and Social Assistance 2 0.68 
72 Accommodation and Food Services 5 1.69 









To examine the effect of co-innovation on a firm’s IT productivity, I estimate equations 3 
and 4 which correspond to the complimentarity and augmentation arguments, 
respectively. In the baseline models annual sales are used as production output, and the 
results are reported in Table 4.4. First, in column 1 I present the results from a 3-factor 
Cobb-Douglas production function using non-IT capital (K), IT-capital (Z) and labor (L) 
as production inputs, without considering firms’ co-innovation in their enterprise 
systems. Consistent with prior studies (Brynjolfsson and Hitt 1996; Dewan and Min 
1997), I find that IT-capital is significantly correlated with production output. The 
estimated elasticity of output for IT-capital is 0.162 (p<0.01), indicating one percent 
increase in IT-capital is associated with 0.16 percent increase in the production output. 
To control for heterogeneity in IT productivity across different industries, I create 16 
industry dummies according to the two-digit NACIS codes, and run a test with these 
industry segments as controls. The results are presented in Column 2 of Table 4.4. It is 
noticed that after removing industry differences, the estimated elasticity of output with 
regard to IT capital is reduced to 0.128 (p<0.001). The estimated output elasticity of IT 
capital is quantitatively similar to that of prior research, such as 0.12 in Dewan and Min 
(1997), 0.109 in Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1995), or 0.11 in Lichtenberg (1995). 
Next I turn to the effect of IT co-innovation, the main variable of interest, on production 
output. In order to test if there is systematic differences in IT productivity between low 
co-innovation and high co-innovation firms, I create a dummy variable, highInno, which 
is set to one if a firm’s co-innovation, or sum of the reward points from SAP community 
network, is greater than 80 (the 90th percentile of the population of the sample), and zero 
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otherwise. I then generate the interaction of this dummy variable with IT capital and test 
a model with this interaction added to other production factors. The results are presented 
in column 3 of Table 4.4. By examining the coefficient of this interaction term, I find that 
IT productivity is significantly higher for firms that accumulate large stock of co-
innovation in their enterprise systems. The results indicate that the average elasticity of 
output with regard to IT capital is 0.110 (p<0.05) for a low co-innovation firm, but for a 
firm with high co-innovation, the elasticity is increased by 0.118 (p<0.01) to 0.228. As a 
robustness check, I create an alternative measure of high co-innovation dummy, 
highInno2, which is based on the 50th percentile of the total reward points in the sample. 
The results, presented in column 4 of Table 4.4, consistently show that a significant 
difference in IT productivity exists between high co-innovation and low co-innovation 
firms. Next, I introduce an interaction between IT capital and a continuous measure of IT 
co-innovation, log (C), and test the model of equation 3. The results in column 5 suggest 
that, while output elasticity of a firm without co-innovation is about 0.11, for a firm with 
mean level of IT co-innovation (64.89 reward points), one percent increase in IT-capital 
lead to 0.17 percent (=0.105+0.0155×ln (64.89)) increase in output, due to the 
complementary effect of co-innovation to IT investment. Comparing the two, IT 
productivity is 54.5% higher for a firm with mean level co-innovation than that with no 
co-innovation. 
Column 6 of Table 4.4 presents the estimate of the model of equation 4, where the IT 
asset is assumed to be augmented by IT co-innovation. Examining the coefficient of 𝜅, I 
find the empirical evidences also support the augmentation argument. The augmentation 
factor, η, which is defined as 𝜅/?̅?, is estimated to be 0.0026. As an illustration of the 
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augmentation effect, consider a comparison between a firm with zero IT co-innovation 
and another with mean level co-innovation. While a firm with zero IT co-innovation 
experience no augmentation of its IT asset, for a firm with mean level IT co-innovation 
(64.89 reward points), its IT asset is augmented by 𝑒(�/�)� =1.18. To put this 
augmentation effect into perspective, consider an average firm with $9.68 million IT 
investment: the augmentation effect translates to an additional $1.78 million investment 
in IT capital for this firm. Comparing the results from column 2 and column 6, it is 
interesting to note that when the augmentation factor is added, the estimate of the 
coefficient of non-IT capital (0.637, p<0.01 vs. 0.632, p<0.01) and labor (0.222, p<0.01 
vs. 0.222, p<0.01) is almost unchanged, indicating that only IT capital experiences the 




Table 4.4 Sales as Production Output 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 










       
Log(K) 0.569*** 0.637*** 0.636*** 0.633*** 0.634*** 0.632*** 
 (0.0291) (0.0350) (0.0332) (0.0341) (0.0331) (0.0325) 
Log(Z) 0.162*** 0.128*** 0.110** 0.115** 0.105** 0.110** 
 (0.0473) (0.0459) (0.0462) (0.0463) (0.0472) (0.0466) 
Log(L) 0.254*** 0.222*** 0.212*** 0.216*** 0.213*** 0.222*** 
 (0.0403) (0.0424) (0.0414) (0.0419) (0.0413) (0.0406) 
highInno×log(Z)   0.118***    
   (0.0388)    
highInno2×log(Z)    0.0583**   
    (0.0282)   
Log(C) ×log(Z)     0.0155***  
     (0.00571)  
C      0.000286*** 
      (5.70e-05) 
Constant 1.881*** 1.881*** 1.969*** 1.879*** 1.916*** 1.944*** 
 (0.177) (0.182) (0.177) (0.179) (0.176) (0.174) 
Industry Dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 295 295 295 295 295 295 
R-squared 0.888 0.915 0.918 0.916 0.917 0.919 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 




From a theoretical stand point, IT co-innovation does not enter into the production 
function as a separate production input as it is related to production output in an indirect 
manner through its complementarity with IT investment. As a result, co-innovation does 
not enter into regression model 3 as a separate term but only appears as an interaction 
with IT capital stock. Though theoretically correct, this may raise the concern that the 
detected effect of the interaction is just picking up the differences in productivity 
differences between high co-innovation and low co-innovation firms, which may not 
necessarily be related to IT investment. To address this econometric concern, I run split 
sample tests in which I divide the sample firms into high and low co-innovation groups 
based on the cumulative reward points they have earned. Consistent with the definition of 
high co-innovation in Table 4.4, variable highInno is defined based on 90th percentile of 
reward points and highInno2 is based on 50th percentile. The results of the split sample 
tests are presented in column 1-4 of Table 4.5. By comparison it is clear that IT 
productivity is higher when a firm belongs to the high co-innovation group. For example, 
using the 90th percentile definition, firms in low IT co-innovation group on average have 
IT output elasticity of 0.143 (p<0.01), but the output elasticity is as high as 0.257 
(p<0.05) for firms in the high IT co-innovation group. A Chow test confirms that the 





Table 4.5 Split Sample Tests 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10) 
Variables  highInno=0 highInno=1  highInno2=0 highInno2=1  non-
manu 
manu  non-manu manu  non-manu manu 
                
Log(K)  0.560*** 0.776***  0.546*** 0.608***  0.488*** 0.695***  0.472*** 0.695***  0.414*** 0.439*** 
  (0.0283) (0.124)  (0.0321) (0.0586)  (0.0396) (0.0371)  (0.0376) (0.0372)  (0.0273) (0.0335) 
Log(Z)  0.143*** 0.257**  0.156** 0.200***  0.128 0.117**  0.0922 0.117**  0.00893 -0.0240 
  (0.0531) (0.0988)  (0.0604) (0.0662)  (0.0938) (0.0521)  (0.0864) (0.0534)  (0.0429) (0.0310) 
Log(L)  0.250*** 0.0809  0.258*** 0.202***  0.291*** 0.147***  0.301*** 0.146***  0.518*** 0.575*** 
  (0.0425) (0.102)  (0.0490) (0.0634)  (0.0758) (0.0437)  (0.0712) (0.0437)  (0.0349) (0.0366) 
highInno×log(Z)        0.244*** 0.0967**       
        (0.0796) (0.0408)       
Log(C) ×log(Z)           0.0493*** 0.0112*    
           (0.0131) (0.00591)    
C              0.000476*** 0.000109*** 
              (0.000132) (3.82e-05) 
Constant  1.976*** 1.470*  1.987*** 2.020***  2.226*** 1.700***  2.307*** 1.703***  0.654*** 0.0744 
  (0.183) (0.747)  (0.208) (0.331)  (0.403) (0.177)  (0.394) (0.179)  (0.220) (0.133) 
                
Observations  267 28  216 79  82 213  82 213  82 213 
R-squared  0.886 0.871  0.885 0.882  0.840 0.921  0.850 0.921  0.951 0.964 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 




Given that the sample of this study is dominated by firms within the manufacturing 
industry, a particular concern is whether the result of a significant complementarity 
between IT capital and co-innovation holds for industries other than manufacturing. To 
access the validity of my hypothesis across industries, I run a series of split sample tests 
by comparing firms in the manufacturing industry and firms in other industries. The 
results of the split sample tests are reported in column 5-10 of Table 4.5. Among them, 
column 5-6 compares the two groups using a discrete measure of co-innovation, and 
column 7-8 use the continuous measure of co-innovation. Column 9-10 test the 
augmentation models of equation 4. Examining the results I find that the effect of 
complementarity exists not only for manufacturing firms, but also for companies in other 
industries as well. In fact, the estimated effect of complementarity is even higher for non-
manufacturing industries, a finding consistent with Dewan and Ren (2009). 
Although sales are commonly used as a measure of production output in a series of IT 
business value studies (Aral et al. 2009; Brynjolfsson and Hitt 1996), some argue that 
added value as a production output is more comparable across industries (Dewan and 
Min 1997; Dewan et al. 2007). In Table 4.6 I report the results from similar analyses 
using firm annual added value as dependent variable in production functions. Similarly, I 
report results of the baseline, 3-factor production functions, with and without industry 
dummies, in column 1 and 2 respectively. Results from models of equation 3, using both 
discrete measures (90th percentile and 50th percentile) and continuous measures of IT co-
innovation, are reported in column 3-5. Finally, the augmented IT capital model, 
corresponding to equation 4, is tested with the results presented in column 6. 
Interestingly, contrary to Dewan and Min (1997), a significant association between IT 
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capital and firm added value is not detected, probably due to the cross-sectional nature of 
the data used in this study and the different sample period from that of Dewan and Min. 
However, consistent with the findings in the sales models, a significant complementarity 
between IT co-innovation and IT capital is discovered. For example, results from column 
4 suggest that, while IT capital is statistically insignificant as a factor of input for low IT 
co-innovation firms, it has a positive contribution to production output for high IT co-
innovation firms, and its output elasticity is 0.014. In other words, one percent increase in 
IT capital is associated with 0.014 percent increase in annual added value for firms with 
high IT co-innovation, which translates to a marginal product of $7.2, with average added 
value being $5.05 billion and average IT capital being $9.68 million. Or, by the results 
from column 5, while the output elasticity of IT capital is statistically indistinguishable 
from zero for a firm without IT co-innovation, it is increased to 0.010 for a firm with 
average level of IT co-innovation (64.89 reward points). The significant augmentation of 
IT capital by IT co-innovation is also confirmed by column 6 of Table 4.6, consistent 
with the sales model. It is notable that the estimated effect of complementarity is much 




Table 4.6 Added Value as Production Output 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 











       
Log(K) 0.435*** 0.426*** 0.425*** 0.424*** 0.424*** 0.424*** 
 (0.0212) (0.0268) (0.0268) (0.0266) (0.0266) (0.0267) 
Log(Z) -0.000723 -0.00752 -0.0157 -0.0139 -0.0175 -0.0147 
 (0.0252) (0.0250) (0.0259) (0.0260) (0.0265) (0.0262) 
Log(L) 0.558*** 0.578*** 0.574*** 0.575*** 0.575*** 0.578*** 
 (0.0256) (0.0301) (0.0303) (0.0304) (0.0303) (0.0300) 
highInno×log(Z)   0.0532**    
   (0.0263)    
highInno2×log(Z)    0.0277†   
    (0.0189)   
Log(C) ×log(Z)     0.00666*  
     (0.00382)  
C      0.000114*** 
      (3.87e-05) 
Constant 0.205* 0.701*** 0.741*** 0.700*** 0.716*** 0.727*** 
 (0.118) (0.131) (0.131) (0.129) (0.129) (0.130) 
Industry 
Dummies 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 295 295 295 295 295 295 
R-squared 0.960 0.966 0.967 0.966 0.967 0.967 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 




Prior study by Anderson et al. (2003) has demonstrated that production inputs often have 
significant lagged effect, with IT capital spending affects returns several years into the 
future. In addition, Dewan et al. (2007) expressed similar concerns that in production 
function using annual output as dependent, the IT capital stock variable is likely to be 
endogenous because of the lagged effects. Although the IT capital stock used in this 
study already partially captures the lagged effects of IT investment, to allay these 
concerns, I conduct two sets of robustness tests. First, I replace the IT capital stock 
variable in year 2006 with two-year lagged value of IT capital stock, keeping other 
variables unchanged, and rerun the tests. Second, I conduct two-stage-least-square 
regressions in which I instrument the IT capital stock and its interaction with co-
innovation by lagged value of IT capital, the interaction of lagged IT capital and co-
innovation, and the contemporaneous values of all other variables. The results of the 
lagged IT capital variable tests are presented in column 1-4 in Table 4.7, and the results 
of the 2SLS tests are presented in column 5-8 in Table 4.7. In these two sets of tests, I run 
a baseline 3-factor production function model (column 1 and 5), a complementarity test 
of equation 3 with discrete measure of high co-innovation (column 2 and 6), a 
complementarity test of equation 3 with continuous measure of co-innovation (column 3 
and 7), and an augmentation model of equation 4 (column 4 and 8). The estimated results 
are qualitatively similar to those presented in Table 4.4, indicating that all the major 




Table 4.7 Lagged Value of IT-Capital and IV Tests 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Lagged IT-capital  Instrumented IT-capital 












           
Log(K)  0.646*** 0.643*** 0.641*** 0.638***  0.639*** 0.638*** 0.635*** 0.633*** 
  (0.0356) (0.0340) (0.0337) (0.0328)  (0.0353) (0.0335) (0.0334) (0.0326) 
Log(Z)  0.101** 0.0870* 0.0822* 0.0907**  0.118** 0.100* 0.0959* 0.107** 
  (0.0448) (0.0444) (0.0449) (0.0442)  (0.0527) (0.0523) (0.0530) (0.0526) 
Log(L)  0.223*** 0.213*** 0.214*** 0.221***  0.224*** 0.214*** 0.215*** 0.223*** 
  (0.0431) (0.0424) (0.0423) (0.0414)  (0.0432) (0.0423) (0.0422) (0.0415) 
highInno×log(Z)   0.110***     0.120***   
   (0.0364)     (0.0388)   
Log(C) ×log(Z)    0.0157***     0.0163***  
    (0.00558)     (0.00580)  
C     0.000307***     0.000287*** 
     (4.88e-05)     (5.64e-05) 
Constant  1.795*** 1.895*** 1.827*** 1.882***  1.865*** 1.956*** 1.905*** 1.940*** 
  (0.178) (0.175) (0.172) (0.170)  (0.187) (0.184) (0.182) (0.178) 
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
           
Observations  295 295 295 295  295 295 295 295 
R-squared  0.913 0.916 0.916 0.917  0.915 0.918 0.917 0.919 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 




4.6. Concluding Remarks 
Prior research on IT business value has found complementarities between IT investment 
and a variety of organizational assets/practices, such as governance structures, human IT 
resources, business process reengineering, and IT management skills. In this study I 
advance this stream of research to examine the role of co-innovation in enterprise 
information systems on IT productivity. By measuring firms’ participation and co-
innovation activities in enterprise software user community, and incorporating IT co-
innovation into models of production functions, I discover that firms with high levels of 
accumulated co-innovation in their adopted enterprise software have greater IT 
productivity than those with little IT co-innovation. The results hold for both 
manufacturing industry and other industries including mining, utilities and services, and 
are robust to a number of model specifications, different production output measures, and 
lagged effects and endogeneity issues of IT investment. The empirical findings are 
consistent with theoretical predictions that IT co-innovations, such as technical 
inventions and creative ways of conducting business processes, are an important 
component of a firm’s intangible asset that complements IT investments. From a resource 
based view, only resources that are heterogeneously distributed and immobile can create 
sustained competitive advantages (Barney 1991; Barney 1986). For example, Mata et al. 
(1995) examine several potential sources of IT-based competitive advantages, and 
conclude that only managerial IT skills can be a source of sustained competitive 
advantage. Co-innovation is likely to satisfy these two basic assumptions. First, due to 
firms’ different strategic pursuits, deployment of IT resource and co-innovation may 
center on different dimensions of value disciplines such as product leadership, 
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operational excellence, or customer intimacy (Treacy and Wiersema 1993). Second, the 
accumulation of co-innovation is often hard to contract from markets or to be transferred 
across firm boundaries, and firms without these kinds of co-innovation find it costly to 
acquire and develop such intangible assets, due to history, causal ambiguity or social 
complexities (Mata et al. 1995). 
This study has several major implications in the understanding of IT business value, 
platform-based technology, and co-innovation ecosystems. First, the study identifies IT 
co-innovation as a source of firm intangible assets that help to explain the large variations 
in IT productivity among different organizations (Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2000). For firms 
that adopt platform information technologies, it implies that they need to combine IT 
capital investment with creative co-innovations to maximize the return of their 
investment. Second, my results suggest that the strategy of innovation ecosystem by 
technology vendors may work to the benefits of technology adopters as well as 
technology owners. For platform technology owners, fostering a co-innovation ecosystem 
can facilitate knowledge exchange, reduce the cost of co-innovation, and encourage 
innovation activities which will enhance the value of the platform for its users. The 
availability of a large reservoir of co-innovation will further help the diffusion of the 
technology due to indirect network effects, therefore creating a virtuous cycle (Aral et al. 
2006). Combined with prior research (e.g.,Ceccagnoli et al. 2009), this study sheds light 
on the economic value of platform ecosystems. 
This study is not without limitations. First, due to data availability, the empirical 
exercises are conducted based on a cross section of firms in 2006. Although I control for 
industry segments of the sample firms, unobserved heterogeneities among firms may still 
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exist in corporate structures, technical skills in human IT resources, and other intangible 
firm assets, which may lead to alternative explanations of the differences in IT 
productivity. With a longitudinal dataset, fixed effects models can be exploited to 
partially alleviate these issues. Second, while I use hedonic method to impute IT stock by 
implicit prices obtained from historical data (Chwelos et al. forthcoming), the contour of 
hedonic surface may have changed over time due to technology progresses or shift in 
computing paradigms (Triplett 1989). This may lead to biased but conservative estimates 
of the IT stock variable. Further, my measure of co-innovation only captures the part in 
enterprise information systems, therefore is unlikely to be a comprehensive measure that 
covers the whole spectrum of a firm’s IT infrastructure, such as those in personal 
productivity software. However, it should be noted that enterprise software is the 
backbone of a firm’s IT infrastructure, and accounts for a large proportion of IT 
investment of any firm, therefore the co-innovation activities in it would be highly 
correlated with other types of IT co-innovation. 
In terms of future research, the current study can be extended in several ways to explore 
interesting research questions. First, it has been documented that switching costs are 
created when technology users make investments that are specific to a particular IT 
platform (Bakos and Treacy 1986), which suggests that IT users face higher switching 
costs when the stock of IT co-innovation is greater (Mata et al. 1995). Particularly, since 
IT co-innovations are specialized intangible asset that have little value when the 
underlying computing platform is changed, it is interesting to investigate the extent to 
which IT co-innovation creates vendor lock-in issues and prevents switching behaviors. 
Further, Aral and Weill (2007) show that different asset types in IT investments are 
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associated with different firm performance dimensions. In addition, the business value of 
IT and co-innovation may be present at both the firm level and the intermediate process 
level (e.g., cost reduction, inventory turnover; see (Hitt et al. 2002)). While the focus of 
this study is on establishing a link between aggregate measure of co-innovation and 
production output, a closer look at how different types of co-innovation are associated 
with different dimensions of performance improvement may reveal more nuanced 
insights. Finally, to the extent that a firm’s IT co-innovation may encompass both its 
creative adaptation of information technology to its business operations and its IT 
capabilities, and my measure of co-innovation from ecosystem contribution cannot 
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